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ABSTRACT

EXAMINING CALIFORNIA’S ASSEMBLY BILL 1629 AND THE LONG-TERM
CARE REIMBURSEMENT ACT: DID NURSING HOME NURSE STAFFING
CHANGE?

By Matthew S. Krauchunas, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011

Director: Jan P. Clement, Ph.D.,
Professor, Department of Health Administration

California’s elderly population over age 85 is estimated to grow 361% by the year
2050. Many of these elders are frail and highly dependent on caregivers making them
more likely to need nursing home care. A 1998 United States Government
Accountability Office report identified poor quality of care in California nursing homes.
This report spurred multiple Assembly Bills in California designed to increase nursing
home nurse staffing, change the state’s Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology, or both.
The legislation culminated in Assembly Bill (AB) 1629, signed into law in September
2004, which included the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act. This legislation changed

the state’s Medi-Cal reimbursement from a prospective, flat rate to a prospective, costbased methodology and was designed in part to increase nursing home nurse staffing. It
is estimated that this methodology change moved California from the bottom 10% of
Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rates nationwide to the top 25%. This study
analyzed the effect of AB 1629 on a panel of 567 free-standing nursing homes that were
in continuous operation between the years 2002 – 2007. Resource Dependence Theory
was used to construct the conceptual framework. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and first
differencing with instrumental variable estimation procedures were used to test five
hypotheses concerning Medi-Cal resource dependence, bed size, competition (including
assisted living facilities and home health agencies), resource munificence, and slack
resources. Both a 15 and 25 mile fixed radius were used as alternative market definitions
instead of counties. The OLS results supported that case-mix adjusted licensed
vocational nurse (LVN) and total nurse staffing hours per resident day increased overall.
Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased only increased NA
staffing more than nursing homes with the lowest Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629.
The fixed effects with instrumental variable estimation procedure provided marginal
support that nursing homes with more home health agency competition, in a 15 mile
market, had higher LVN staffing. This estimation procedure also supported that nursing
homes with more slack resources (post AB 1629) increased nurse aide and total nurse
staffing while nursing homes located in markets with a greater percentage of residents
over the age of 85 had more nurse aide staffing.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Study Problem
The United States’ population over 65 is expected to grow at a rapid pace over the
next few decades as the Baby Boomer generation ages. This demographic, especially
those over age 85, is more likely to require long-term care in nursing homes. However,
nursing home care is expensive and predominantly publicly paid for through the
Medicaid and Medicare programs. Federal and state legislatures have sought ways to
control these ever increasing Medicaid and Medicare expenditures.
Legislative efforts have included reimbursement method changes such as those
introduced by the 1997 Balance Budget Act (BBA) in which Medicare skilled nursing
care reimbursement moved to a prospective, case-mix method. Additionally, most of the
states have changed their Medicaid reimbursement methods from a retrospective, costbased reimbursement to various prospective reimbursement methods. A number of states
also introduced certificate of need (CON) or bed moratorium policies which sought to
curb supply-induced demand for these services. These efforts at the federal and state
levels are aimed at keeping nursing home payments down, but frequently Medicaid
reimbursement rates are below nursing homes costs incurred in providing care to
Medicaid patients (Castle, 2005). Consequently, nursing home staffing and quality of
care may have decreased.
1
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Studies have found that Medicaid reimbursement rates are an important factor positively
associated with nursing home nurse staffing. Lower rates are generally associated with
either reduced nurse staffing or a reliance on a less skilled nurse staff (Bostick, 2004;
Harrington, Swan, & Carrillo, 2007), which may both impact the quality of care
provided. Lower Medicaid rates have also been associated with lower quality of care
(Amirkhanyan, Hyun, & Lambright, 2008; Grabowski, Angelelli, & Mor, 2004;
Harrington et al., 2008). Additional research shows that prospective payment may not
have lowered expenditures or that reduced expenditures may have resulted due to poorer
quality of care (Chen & Shea, 2002). Thus, a key concern for legislators and
policymakers is trying to obtain the highest level of nurse staffing and quality of care
possible for their program dollars.
In response, California passed Assembly Bill (AB) 1629 in 2004 which contained
the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act. The legislation changed California’s Medi-Cal
(California’s name for Medicaid) nursing home prospective reimbursement methodology
from a flat-rate method based on peer groups, to a facility-specific, cost-based method.
The legislation also increased reimbursement rates and was designed to provide the
means necessary for California nursing homes to increase nurse staffing. Additionally,
the legislation intended to effectively ensure individual access to appropriate long-term
care services, promote quality care, increase wages and benefits for nursing home
workers, support provider compliance with all applicable state and federal requirements,
and encourage administrative efficiency (California Department of Health Care Services,
2004).
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It has been suggested that nursing homes can respond to changes in
reimbursement policies like California’s in several ways. These responses include
becoming more efficient, changing their size, altering their case-mix, changing the level
of quality provided to Medicaid patients, and varying the number of Medicaid patients
admitted (Feldstein, 1993). This study focuses on the question of whether California
nursing homes, particularly those with high Medi-Cal dependence, increased nurse
staffing in response to the new Medi-Cal reimbursement method.
Background
Changing demographics in the United States will impact the demand for nursing
home care and the growing elderly population is the key change. According to U.S.
Census Bureau projections, the United States’ population over the age 84 is expected to
increase from 5.8 million in 2010 to 19 million (231%) by 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau,
2008). Moreover, the Census Bureau predicts the number of elders between the ages of
65 to 84 will increase from 40.2 million in 2010 to 88.6 million (120%) by 2050.
The explosive elderly population growth also holds true in California. California’s
population over age 84 is expected to increase from 628,000 in 2010 to 2.9 million
(361%) by 2050, while the number of elders between ages 65 and 84 is anticipated to
swell from 3.8 million in 2010 to 8.6 million (126%) by 2050 (California Department of
Finance, 2007). The projected growth of the population over age 84, both nationally and
in California, is of concern because members of this population are often frail and highly
dependent on caregivers (Castle & Engberg, 2005) meaning they are the most likely to
require long-term care (Hagen, 2004). Thus, it is readily apparent based on these
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projections that nursing home demand is more than likely to increase across the United
States and in California for the next few decades. This may be troubling to policymakers
and legislatures because it may amplify nursing home nurse staffing and costs concerns.
Appropriate nursing home nurse staffing levels and mix in U.S. nursing homes has been a
major concern because it is the ―structure‖ which enables quality care (Donabedian,
1980). Staffing has indeed been shown to be of pivotal importance in U.S. nursing
homes. For instance, an inadequate level of nursing home nurse staff or the use of a less
skilled nurse staffing mix (e.g., use of licensed vocational nurses [LVNs] instead of
registered nurses [RNs]) has routinely been associated with poorer processes of care
(Castle, Engberg, & Aiju, 2008; Schnelle et al., 2004; Weech-Maldonado, Meret-Hanke,
Neff, & Mor, 2004), worse resident outcomes (Castle, Engberg et al., 2008; WeechMaldonado et al., 2004), and higher numbers of inspection deficiencies (Harrington et al.,
2000; Kim, Harrington, & Greene, 2009).
The high cost of nursing home care, particularly for public payers, has also been a
concern. Nationally in 2005, Medicare and Medicaid combined to pay $72.8 billion
versus the $49.9 billion paid out-of-pocket and by private insurance (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Office of the Actuary, 2009). This difference is
projected to increase, as the Baby Boom generation ages, with the average annual
spending growth by public payers (7.2%) expected to outpace that of private payers
(5.3%) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Office of the Actuary, 2009).
Study Aims and Research Questions
The first aim of this study is to examine the effect of AB 1629 on California
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nursing home nurse staffing. More specifically, the study seeks to determine if RN,
LVN, nurse assistants (NAs), and total nurse staffing hours per resident day (HPRD)
changed in free-standing nursing homes following the passage of the legislation. The
study also investigates whether a nursing home’s dependence on Medi-Cal revenue
influenced nurse staffing changes.
Resource dependence theory (RDT) provides the theoretical framework for this
study. Thus, the second aim is to explore the RDT-based organizational characteristics
and environmental factors associated with nurse staffing increases. Competition for
scarce resources is a key consideration when using RDT, making it important to define
properly a nursing home’s competitors. Researchers conducting nursing home studies
predominantly use the county to define the level of competition. Hence, the third aim of
this study is to use a fixed geographic radius measurement (15 and 25 miles from each
nursing home, respectively) of competition because it may be a more reliable and valid
measure over using counties to determine markets (Grabowski, 2008). The study also
aims to improve upon previous research by including assisted living facilities (ALFs) and
home health agencies (HHAs) as competitors because they vie for some of the same
patients and residents as nursing homes (Davis, Freeman, & Kirby, 1998; Grabowski,
2008; Gruneir, Lapane, Miller, & Mor, 2007; Swan, Kitchener, & Harrington, 2009).
There are four research questions for this study. First, did California nursing
home nurse staffing increase following the passage of AB 1629 as designed? Second, did
nursing homes with the highest levels of Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629 increase
staffing more than those nursing homes with lower dependence? Third, what were the
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RDT-based organizational characteristics and environmental factors associated with
nurse staffing? Fourth, did ALF and HHA competition effect nursing home staffing?
Current Study Significance
Each state has flexibility when deciding on Medicaid reimbursement method and
rate levels. This is why state Medicaid programs have been called 50 individual state
experiments (Little, 1992). This study’s investigation of California’s new reimbursement
method can help determine if the ―experiment‖ was successful at increasing nurse
staffing levels in those nursing homes most affected by AB 1629 (i.e., those most
dependent on Medi-Cal revenue). The analyses will also enable the examination of
organizational characteristics and environmental factors that may influence nurse
staffing. The results can inform other state legislatures and policymakers around the
United States. This would allow California or other states interested in California’s
reimbursement method to tailor their own future Medicaid experiments accordingly.
However, to accomplish this feat a few gaps in the literature need to be filled including
improvements on three previous AB 1629 reports, using a fixed geographic radius to
determine market competition, and including ALFs and HHAs as nursing home
competitors.
The aforementioned three AB 1629 reports used California cost report
information to examine staffing levels following the reimbursement method change, but
they did have some shortcomings. The analysis in this study improves on these previous
reports by using RDT to construct the conceptual model, by employing a fixed-effect
panel data analysis to control for time invariant factors, and by analyzing a longer time
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period including more recent financial data. Moreover, this study relies on audited
financial data.
Another limitation in the literature is how nursing home competitors have been
defined. The county has been the overwhelming choice used to define markets and
identify competitors usually using a Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of market
concentration (Cawley, Grabowski, & Hirth, 2006; Grabowski, 2001a; Grabowski, 2004;
Harrington & Swan, 2003; Intrator et al., 2005; Kash, Castle, & Phillips, 2007; Konetzka,
Norton, Sloane, Kilpatrick, & Stearns, 2006). An alternative method is to determine a
fixed geographic radius around each facility and use that to identify each nursing home’s
market and define the level of competition accordingly (Baker, 2001). This method has
been used in the study of nursing home arena using a 25 km radii (Grabowski &
Stevenson, 2008) and improves on the prevalent method of using counties as markets to
determine competition.
The final gap in the literature entails identifying non-nursing home competitors.
It has been postulated that increased ALF and HHA use has lessened both nursing home
occupancy rates and excess demand in markets because they are substitutable for low
acuity patients (Allen, 2005; Grabowski, Feng, Intrator, & Mor, 2004; Grabowski,
Gruber, & Angelelli, 2008). Thus, excluding these types of facilities may underestimate
the level of competition that nursing homes face.
Theoretical Framework Overview
RDT serves as the theoretical framework for this study and is used to construct
the conceptual model. RDT remains a useful theory 30+ years after being introduced
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because it considers both organizational characteristics and environmental factors in an
organization’s response to resource dependencies, environmental changes and pressures,
and uncertainty. These are all conditions that organizations face to varying degrees.
RDT is particularly applicable to this study because California nursing homes may
respond differently to AB 1629 based on their level of Medi-Cal dependence, other
organizational characteristics, and environmental factors.
There are three RDT-based organizational characteristics of interest for this study.
The first two are nursing home size and slack resources which may affect a nursing
home’s response to external changes or pressures. The third is resource dependence
which is the product of resource importance (internal, organizational characteristic) and
resource concentration (external, environmental factor). Additionally, resource
munificence and competition are important environmental factors as they may also shape
nursing home responses to environmental changes such as structural quality changes
through changes in nurse staffing. Other pertinent control variables are included which
may impact nurse staffing levels according to the empirical literature. These controls
variables are the Medi-Cal reimbursement rate, nurse wage rates, and unemployment
rates. The combination of all of these results is illustrated in the basic conceptual model
shown in Figure 1.
Research Hypotheses
The following are the RDT derived hypotheses tested in this study:
H1: Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased nurse

9

Organizational Characteristics

Control Variables

Environmental Factors

California Nursing Home Nurse
Staffing Changes

Policy Change:
AB 1629 Legislation Passed
in 2004

Figure 1. Basic conceptual model based on resource dependence theory.
staffing relative to nursing homes with lower Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629, other
things constant.
H2: Smaller nursing homes increased nurse staffing relative to large nursing
homes post AB 1629, other things constant.
H3: Nursing homes with more slack resources, (e.g. higher cash flow) increased
nurse staffing post AB 1629, other things constant.
H4: Nursing homes in more competitive markets had higher nurse staffing, other
things constant.
H5: Nursing homes in markets with higher resource munificence (e.g., higher per
capita income and greater percentage of population over 85) were positively associated
with nurse staffing, other things constant.
Data Sources and Analyses
This study uses multiple retrospective data sources with most of it coming from
California state agencies. The California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development (COSHPD) provides most of the study’s information including the data for
all of the staffing dependent variables and all but three of the independent variables.
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Other California data resources include the Department of Finance for county
population over age 85, Department of Social Services for ALF information, Department
of Health Care Services for Medi-Cal reimbursement rates, and the Department of Public
Health for a change in ownership and nursing home closure listing. The University of
Southern California Geographical Information System Lab provided the longitude and
latitude information necessary to construct both the 15 and 25 mile radius from each freestanding nursing home. Additional data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) for median per capita income, the Brown University Long-Term Care Focus
website for case-mix information and the number of beds for hospital-based facilities,
and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for unemployment rates and the consumer
price index (CPI).
California nursing home nurse staffing is the focus of this study. In particular, the
number of RN, LVN, NA, and total nursing staff HPRD are studied pre and post AB
1629 in order to see if staffing increased following the legislation. Three models are run
for each dependent variable. The first model is a simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
interaction model without conditioning on any other variables to get at the root of the
policy effect of AB 1629 on staffing. The second and third models use first differences,
with instrumental variable estimation procedures, and includes all of the independent and
control variables. One model will use a 15 mile radius to define nursing home markets
while the other will use a 25 mile radius.
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Remaining Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 describes nursing home care in California and includes the major
concerns pertaining to nursing home care. The chapter further provides a comprehensive
review of the legislation leading to AB 1629 as well as a detailed description of the new
methodology. An examination of the empirical evidence on the association between
reimbursement methods and rates on nursing home staffing closes the chapter.
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundation for this study. The chapter describes
RDT’s major constructs, presents the study’s conceptual model, and five hypotheses
derived from RDT are presented. These hypotheses are based on a nursing home’s
organizational characteristics (resource dependence, size, and slack resources) and
environmental factors (competition and resource munificence).
Chapter 4 covers this study’s methodology including the study design, sample,
data sources, variables and accompanying measurements, and the analytical techniques
used in the study. Chapter 5 presents the results of the study while chapter six closes
with a discussion of the results, recommendations for future research, and the study’s
limitations.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides a background
on nursing homes in the United States including a description of the various types of care,
the licensed facilities in California that provide care to the elderly population, the major
payers for nursing home care, broad factors driving demand for nursing home care, and
the major concerns over nursing home care paying particular attention to staffing and
quality. The second section introduces the history that led to the focus of this study:
California’s 2004 AB 1629 legislation, which included Article 3.8, The Long-Term Care
Reimbursement Act. Section two also delves into the salient details of AB 1629 and the
Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act including the legislative intent, reimbursement
methodology and structure, as well as the major subsequent events related to the
legislation. The last section reviews the empirical literature on the impact of
reimbursement methods and rates on nursing home staffing while also accounting for
organizational and environmental factors that may impact nurse staffing.
Nursing Home Background Information
Description of Care
Generally, the term ―nursing home‖ is an overarching expression that may
encompass long-term and/or post-acute nursing care. The focus of this research is on
nursing homes that provide long-term care. Long-term care provided in nursing homes
12
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normally consists both of custodial care and some measure of skilled nursing care for
people with chronic conditions and/or functional limitations (Institute of Medicine,
2001). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) defines
custodial care as ―nonskilled, personal care, such as help with activities of daily living
[ADLs] like bathing, dressing, eating, getting in or out of a bed or chair, moving around,
and using the bathroom. It may also include care that most people do themselves, like
using eye drops‖ (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008a). Functional
limitations may either be physical or mental in nature, or both. Examples of physical
limitations comprise difficulties in performing ADLs or instrumental activities of daily
living (IADLs) such as preparing food or housekeeping. Conversely, mental disabilities
may be due to conditions like dementia (Allen, 2005). The long-term care population
served in the typical nursing home is characteristically frail, many are highly dependent
upon caregivers, and this dependence often lasts several years (Castle & Engberg, 2005).
Using California as an example, the typical nursing home patient had six to seven
diagnoses and needed assistance with about three ADLs in 2005 (California Health
Policy and Data Advisory Committee, December 12, 2005).
On the other hand, short-term, post-acute care encompasses skilled nursing care
and/or rehabilitation and therapy. Short-term in this case is usually less than 100 days
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007) and typically follows an acute
patient episode of illness and a recent stay in a hospital (Hagen, 2004). Thus, one
difference between skilled care provided to long-term residents and post-acute patients
involves the duration of care provided. The USDHHS defines skilled nursing facility
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care as ―a level of care that requires the daily involvement of skilled nursing or
rehabilitation staff and that, as a practical matter, can’t be provided on an outpatient
basis‖ (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008b). The skilled nursing portion
involves medical and skilled nursing care, therapy, and social services supervised by a
licensed nurse 24 hours a day, while the physical rehabilitation services are designed to
help patients attain their maximum functional capability (Muramatsu, Lee, & Alexander,
2000). Hence, another difference between long-term residents and post-acute patients
entails the type of care received.
California’s Licensed Facility Types
There are multiple facility types that provide long-term and/or short-term care for
the elderly population in California. These facilities include three different categories
(free-standing, distinct part or hospital-based, and sub-acute) of skilled nursing facilities
(SNFs), nursing facilities (NFs), Congregate Living Health Facility (CLHFs),
intermediate care facilities (ICFs), multi-level retirement communities (MLRCs), and
continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs). All of these facilities will be used to
calculate the nursing home competition variable because they compete with traditional
nursing homes for at least a small segment of the traditional nursing home population.
However, only the free-standing SNFs and NFs will be used in the main analyses. In
addition, there are nonmedical facilities licensed for residential care for the elderly
(RCFE) also known as ALFs. These facilities will be used to construct a separate
competition measure.
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Free-standing SNFs and NFs in California are stand apart health facilities licensed
by the Department of Public Health to provide continuous skilled nursing or supportive
care to patients on an extended basis (California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform,
n.d.). Further, this care is provided 24 hours a day and includes physician, skilled
nursing, dietary, an activity program, and pharmaceutical services. These facilities are
also customarily dually certified as a SNF under the Medicare program and a NF under
the Medicaid program (known as Medi-Cal in California). These are the facilities called
nursing homes for the purpose of this study. However, some facilities may choose not to
be certified by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for one of the
programs, or both (California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, n.d.). For instance,
a NF that strictly cares for private pay patients is not certified by Medicaid.
Distinct-part SNFs or distinct-part NFs in California are those that are a part of an
acute care hospital. These Medicare certified facilities have a unit set aside for skilled
nursing care for higher acuity patients and/or beds set aside for patients requiring post
acute care. They may also be certified for Medi-Cal reimbursement (California
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, n.d.). These facilities are also commonly called
hospital-based facilities and are not considered for the main analyses in this study
because they have a separate reimbursement methodology.
There are also approximately 100 Medi-Cal subacute providers in California that
provide adult or pediatric subacute care (California Advocates for Nursing Home
Reform, n.d.). Subacute care refers to licensed and intensive skilled nursing care
provided to patients who have a fragile medical condition and whose needs exceed those
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that can be provided by a standard skilled nursing facility (Health Care Information
Division, 2008). Most are located in distinct-part facilities although some freestanding
nursing facilities have been also approved to provide this type of care (California
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, n.d.). These facilities are also excluded from the
main analyses as the care they provide is much different than that provided in a typical
nursing home. For instance, California’s subacute residents require breathing assistance
and are on ventilators (Mr. Nixon, personal communications, February 9, 2010).
Congregate Living Health Facility (CLHF) is a residential home generally with a
maximum capacity of 12 beds. These facilities provide inpatient care including: medical
supervision, 24-hour skilled nursing and supportive care, pharmacy, dietary, social,
recreational. Furthermore, at least one type of the following services is provided:
services for persons who are mentally alert, physically disabled persons, who may be
ventilator dependent; services for persons who have a diagnosis of terminal illness, a
diagnosis of a life threatening illness, or both; services for persons who are
catastrophically and severely disabled. This care is generally less intense than that
provided in general acute care hospitals but more intense than that provided in skilled
nursing facilities (California Department of Public Health, 2011).
Intermediate care facilities in California are those that provide inpatient care to
ambulatory or non-ambulatory patients who have a recurring need for skilled nursing
supervision and supportive care, but do not require continuous nursing care (California
Department of Health Services, 2005a). Thus, these facilities provide a lower level of
care than SNFs and are not certified for Medicare reimbursement, although some receive
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Medi-Cal reimbursement at a lower rate than the SNFs (California Advocates for Nursing
Home Reform, n.d.). In the past, SNF and ICF care was usually provided in separate
facilities, but now facilities generally have integrated both types of care thereby allowing
residents to remain in the same facility as their needs change (Inlander, Donio, &
Dodson, 1996). There is also a separate class of ICFs in California which care for
developmentally disabled individuals and they are classified into four types:
developmentally disabled, habilitative, nursing, and continuous nursing (California
Department of Developmental Services, 2008). Facilities that provide care for the
developmentally disabled are also excluded from the main analyses in the study because
the care they require is much different than that provided in a typical nursing home.
MLRCs and CCRCs in California are facilities that provide an array of services.
The continuum of services includes independent living services, assisted living services,
and skilled nursing care all of which are on a single campus. The only difference
between these two types of facilities is that CCRCs have obtained a certificate of
authority to enter into continuing care contracts from the Department of Social Services,
while MLRCs have not (California Department of Health Services, 2005a).
RCFEs are licensed by the California Department of Social Services and provide
care for the elderly, but are not medical facilities unlike the others (California Advocates
for Nursing Home Reform, n.d.). Thus, they are not certified to accept Medi-Cal or
Medicare reimbursement and as such rely on private payers. These facilities are basically
an assisted living arrangement that predominantly cares for residents over age 60 by
providing varying levels of care and supervision (California Advocates for Nursing
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Home Reform, n.d.). However, RCFEs can accept hospice, dementia, and other special
medical conditions by applying for special exemptions and waivers (California
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, 2008).
Major Payers for Nursing Home Care
There are four major payers of nursing home care listed in order in terms of
expenditures: Medicaid, private-pay out-of-pocket, Medicare, and private-pay insurance.
Medicaid pays for long-term care services, which includes custodial care and skilled
nursing for the poor and medically needy, and is the major payer for long-term care
services in the United States. National Medicaid expenditures in 2005 for services
provided in nursing homes, including intermediate care facilities for the developmentally
disabled and CCRCs with on-site nursing facilities, were $53.7 billion, or 44.5% of the
total nursing home expenditures (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Office of
the Actuary, 2009). In a similar vein, California nursing homes, ICFs, and residential
care facilities with on-site nursing combined in 2005 received $3.2 billion or 51.4% of
their net revenue from Medi-Cal (OSHPD, 2009). California nursing homes by
themselves in 2005 received $2.8 billion or 53.8% of their net revenue from Medi-Cal
(OSHPD, 2009).
While it is true that the Medicaid pays for the majority of nursing home care, a
substantial amount of nonpublic program funds were also used. Nationally in 2005,
residents and their families paid $31.5 billion or 26.1% of the expenditures for nursing
home care, including ICFs and CCRCs with on-site nursing, and another $14.4 billion or
7.2% was paid for by private insurance (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’
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Office of the Actuary, 2009). Of that 2005 amount, nursing homes, ICF, and CCRC with
on-site nursing in California received $897.8 million or 14.3% of their net revenues from
out-of-pocket payers and another $447.3 million or 7.5% of their net revenue from
managed care (OSHPD, n.d.). California nursing homes by themselves received $652.3
million or 12.5% of their net revenue from out-of-pocket payers and another $418 million
or 8% from managed care (OSHPD, n.d.).
The Medicare program on the other hand pays principally for post-acute care.
The program provides reimbursement for up to 100 days of skilled nursing care (per
episode) for Medicare-eligible residents (normally those over the age 65) provided that
the care occurred within 30 days of a hospital stay of at least 3 days and was certified as a
medical necessity (Dummit, 2002; Hoffman, Klees, & Curtis, 2008). National Medicare
expenditures in 2005, for services provided in nursing homes, ICFs, and CCRCs with onsite nursing facilities were $19.1 billion or 15.8% of the payments to these types of
facilities (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Office of the Actuary, 2009). Of
that amount, California nursing homes, ICFs, and residential care facilities with on-site
nursing combined received $1.7 billion or 26.7% of their net revenues from the Medicare
program (OSHPD, 2009). California nursing homes received $1.3 billion or 25.8% of
their net revenues from the Medicare program (OSHPD, 2009).
Broad Factors Driving Demand for Nursing Home Care
There are a few changing demographics in the United States that impact the
demand for nursing home care. These demographic changes include an increase in the
elderly population, but also a decrease in the younger population (generally under age 65)
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that often provide ―informal‖ support. Both of these changes are expected to increase the
demand for long-term nursing home care. Conversely, the elderly population has better
functional capabilities than in the past and potential competitors to traditional nursing
home care have emerged. Both of these may have alleviated some of the need for
nursing home care.
It is of no great surprise that the sheer numbers of the population over age 65 are
increasing rapidly and are projected to do so for the next four decades because of the
aging Baby Boomer generation. According to U.S. Census Bureau projections, the
United States’ elderly population over the age 84 is expected to increase from 5.8 million
in 2010 to 19 million (231%) by 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Moreover, the
Census Bureau predicts elders between the ages of 65 to 84 will increase from 40.2
million in 2010 to 88.6 million (120%) by 2050. California has even higher projected
increases for these age groups. California’s elderly population over age 84 is expected to
increase from 628,000 in 2010 to 2.9 million (361%) by 2050, while the elder population
between ages 65 and 84 is anticipated to swell from 3.8 million in 2010 to 8.6 million
(126%) by 2050 (California Department of Finance, 2007).
The projected explosive growth of the population over age 84, both nationally and
in California, is of greater concern because members of this population are often frail and
highly dependent on caregivers (Castle & Engberg, 2005) meaning they are the most
likely to require long-term care (Hagen, 2004). For instance, the 2008 CMS Nursing
Home Data Compendium showed that there were over 37.9 million elders, between the
ages of 65 and 84, in 2007 and 2.8 million (7.4%) of them had a nursing home stay that
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year. Conversely, 21.8% of the 5.5 million elderly over the age of 84 required a nursing
home stay that same year (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008b). Thus, it
is readily apparent that nursing home demand is more than likely to increase both
nationally and in California.
Life expectancy has also continued to rise and is projected to continue for decades
to come. For instance in 2003, the projected life expectancy from birth in the United
States was 77.5 years with differences across genders—males were expected to live 74.8
years and females 80.1 years (Shrestha, 2006). This was projected to increase over time
with life expectancy estimates for 2025 and 2050 extended to 76.5 and 79.5 years for
males and 82.6 and 84.9 years for females, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
These are important projections as they mean a greater risk for aging into frailty
(Spillman & Lubitz, 2002) and that long-term care in nursing homes may be required for
longer periods of time (Hagen, 2004).
A decrease in informal support for the elderly is yet another important factor
anticipated to increase the need for nursing home care, and other forms of long-term care,
because informal providers such as family and friends are the primary providers of longterm care services in the United States (Allen, 2005). A general rule of thumb is that
approximately 66% of the care provided for the elderly is via informal providers (Norton,
2000). However, this informal support network is shrinking and can be traced to more
middle-aged women working, divorce for both elderly persons and their children thereby
weakening family ties, fewer elders living with others, lower fertility rates, and the
geographic dispersion of families (Allen, 2005; Bishop, 1999; Hagen, 2004). For
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example, it is estimated that 1.2 million elderly people will live alone and without living
children or siblings by the year 2020, more than double the number without family
support in 1990 (Allen, 2005). These demographic changes are of vital concern because
informal, unpaid caregivers continue to support care for the elderly living at home
(Bishop, 1999) and expensive institutional care is more likely without it. However, a
couple of factors have emerged that have decreased the need for nursing home care.
Factors that have decreased the need for traditional nursing home care include a
decline in the prevalence of functional disability in the elderly population as well as
nursing home substitutes such as ALFs and HHAs. Bishop (1999) found, upon
examination of the National Long-Term Care Survey (NLTCS) data, that disability had
declined substantially between 1984 and 1994 for both community-resident and
institutionalized elders. More specifically, the proportion of elders with at least one
difficulty in performing an IADL or ADL had fallen to 21.3% by 1994, down from
24.9% just a decade earlier (Bishop, 1999). Others point out that the raw number of
elderly with disabilities remained fairly constant from 1984 to 1999, but the percentage of
those with disabilities fell about 1% to 2% each year over the same time period due to the
growth in this population (Allen, 2005). This means the positive benefit of greater
functional ability in the elderly population will be overcome simply due to the sheer
numbers of aging baby boomers as the total number of disabled elderly is projected to
increase to as high as 12.1 million people by 2040 (Allen, 2005). Thus, increased
functional capability may have decreased nursing home need in the short-run, but the
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previously mentioned population demographics will sweep away this positive
development.
HHAs and ALFs have had perhaps a stronger impact on the decreased demand for
nursing home care due to their substitution effect. Nursing homes have been the
dominant institutional providers of long-term care since the introduction of Medicaid in
1965, but have been challenged by HHAs and ALFs as witnessed by decreased
occupancy rates in nursing homes (Castle, Engberg, Lave, & Fisher, 2009). HHA and
ALF use has grown since the 1990s and this may have occurred in part because the per
capita expenditure for nursing homes greatly exceeds the cost of the care provided in
these alternative settings (Allen, 2005).
Home health care typically follows a hospital stay for an acute medical condition
or a discharge from a different type of medical facility and encompasses medically
oriented services paid, at least in part, by either Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance
(Hagen, 2004). By 1995, more elders were receiving health and personal care than ever
before with 9.6% of all aged Medicare beneficiaries using home health care with
approximately 80 visits per user (Bishop et al., 2008). However, the use of home health
services decreased with the passage of the 1997 Balance Budget Act (BBA) since
Medicare home health care benefits were decreased with this legislation (Spillman &
Lubitz, 2002).
ALFs may attract people who need less assistance than the typical nursing home
resident. These facilities offer a wide range of personal care and health-related services
such as 24-hour emergency monitoring, supervision and dispensing of medication, and
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assistance with one or more ADLs (Hagen, 2004). ALFs may also draw private-payers
away from nursing homes because this type of care is less expensive (Allen, 2005) and in
many cases offer more attractive physical surroundings and amenities (Hagen, 2004). Of
note, Medi-Cal does not pay for assisted living services (California Health Policy and
Data Advisory Committee, December 12, 2005) meaning that residents of these facilities
are private payers either out-of-pocket or via insurance.
This is not to say that HHAs and ALFs are without detractors. Some question
whether or not home health care actually reduces expenditures since some of the services
previously were provided ―free‖ by informal care providers (Allen, 2005). Additionally,
others have questioned the safety of care provided in ALFs believing that regulation for
these facilities is too lax (Kane & Kane, 2001), and that many residents in these types of
facilities should at least be in intermediate care facilities (California Health Policy and
Data Advisory Commission, June 15, 2004). Thus, increased use of HHAs and ALFs
may have decreased the demand for nursing home care thereby making them important
competitors (Bishop, 1999; Hawes, Phillips, Rose, Holan, & Sherman, 2003). However,
their use may not decrease costs overall in the case of HHAs (Allen, 2005; Cohen &
Spector, 1996) and may potentially put residents at risks in the case of ALFs (California
Health Policy and Data Advisory Commission, June 15, 2004; Inlander et al., 1996; Kane
& Kane, 2001).
There are numerous indicators that nursing home demand has declined despite a
growing elderly population. One good indicator is that from 1973 to 1985,
approximately 50 of every 1,000 people over age 65 lived in nursing homes, whereas in
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1997 that number had decreased to about 43 per 1,000 (Hagen, 2004). Yet another good
indicator is the shrinking number of nursing homes themselves. In 2007, there were
16,072 nursing homes that were certified for either the Medicare or Medicaid programs,
or both (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008b). However, this had
steadily dropped from a high of nearly 18,000 facilities in 1997, and the number of
nursing homes decreased by about 4% between 2003 and 2007 (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, 2008b). The number of certified nursing homes beds, per 1,000
people age 65 and older, has also fallen from 50.03 in 1999 to 44.43 in 2007 (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008b). Moreover, occupancy rates have fallen over
time for nursing homes. In aggregate, nursing home occupancy rates fell from 92% in
1985 to 87% in 1995 (Bishop, 1999) and it was 84.3% in 2003, 84.2% in 2004 and 2005,
84.4% in 2006, and 83.8% in 2007 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008b).
In sum, it is readily apparent that demand for nursing home care has decreased,
particularly for elderly people over the age 65. This was illustrated by lower proportions
of older adult and elderly people in nursing homes, a decreased number of nursing homes
and certified beds nationally, and decreased occupancy rates in nursing homes. Some of
these decreases may be due to substitutes such as HHAs and ALFs.
Major Concerns About Nursing Home Care
There are multiple concerns about nursing home care, but perhaps the biggest are
the nurse staffing and the quality of care provided to patients, access to nursing care, and
the high costs for the care provided. Similarly, these may also be thought of in terms of
effectiveness (quality), equity (access), and efficiency (costs) using the Aday model
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(Aday, Begley, Lairson, & Balkrishnan, 2004). Various stakeholders may focus more on
one over the others, but a review of the literature shows each is important in its own right.
Nursing Home Quality Concerns
Apprehension over nursing home quality is not a new phenomenon as the general
public, policy makers, and the nursing home industry itself have been concerned about it
for decades (Arling, Job, & Cooke, 2009). Books such as Mendelson’s, Tender Loving
Greed (1974) and Vladeck’s, Unloving Care: The Nursing Home Tragedy (1980), vividly
portrayed an industry motivated at the time by profit at the expense of quality of care.
Later, reports by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1986 and 2001 also called attention
to the importance of nursing home quality of care thereby leading to important legislation
such as the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA). By and large, concerns over
nursing home quality involve inadequate nurse staffing, poor quality overall, and uneven
quality of care (QOC).
Appropriate nursing home nurse staffing levels and mix in U.S. nursing homes
has been a major concern as it is, in Donabedian’s terminology, the ―structure‖ which
enables quality care (Donabedian, 1980). More specifically, Donabedian considers
staffing an indirect measure of quality of care (QOC), but ―probably the most important
means of protecting and promoting quality of care‖ (1980, p. 82). Staffing has indeed
been shown to be of pivotal importance in U.S. nursing homes. For instance, an
inadequate level of nursing staff or the use of a less skilled nurse staffing mix (e.g., use of
LVNs instead of RNs) has routinely been associated with poorer processes of care
(Castle, Engberg et al., 2008; Schnelle et al., 2004; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004),
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worse resident outcomes (Castle, Engberg et al., 2008; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004),
and higher numbers of inspection deficiencies (Harrington et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2009).
Numerous governmental reports have questioned the overall QOC in nursing homes
(Office of the Inspector General, 2003; Office of the Inspector General, 2008; Office of
the Inspector General, March, 1999; U.S. General Accounting Office, October, 2002).
Nongovernmental reports by entities such as the IOM and consumer advocate groups
have done the same. For instance, the IOM’s 1986 report stated that, despite years of
extensive government regulation, serious problems concerning the QOC and quality of
life (QOL) persisted in nursing homes in every state (Institute of Medicine, 1986). The
report also stated that there was broad consensus that government regulation of nursing
homes at the time was inadequate because it allowed far too many marginal and
substandard nursing homes to continue operations. As a follow-up, the IOM’s 2001
report acknowledged improvement in nursing home QOC and QOL. However, the report
stated that serious QOC problems persisted in some nursing homes and recommended
that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) require a RN’s presence 24 hours
per day in nursing homes and that minimum nurse staffing levels (number and skill mix)
for direct care patient care be developed and based on case-mix (Institute of Medicine,
2001). Furthermore, the California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR)
issued a 2006 report depicting troublesome abuse in a number of California nursing
homes to include physical and sexual assaults as well as mental and verbal cruelty
(CANHR, 2006).
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There have also been concerns over uneven quality of care provided by nursing
homes. These concerns rest on geographical differences or characteristics of patients
who may receive different QOC. Geographical concerns have entailed nursing home
quality of care differences both across states and regions within states. For example,
states vary widely in their deficiency rates and enforcement actions. Furthermore, there
was a variation in the amount and type of deficiencies issued to facilities within each
state due to different inspection teams (Harrington & Carrillo, 1999; Harrington, Mullan,
& Carrillo, 2004). Also, states have the ability to enact more stringent staffing
requirements over federal standards and 40 states had done so by 2006 (Mueller et al.,
2006). Another study of nursing homes, which involved physical restraints, found
significant regional variation in clinical practices that would ostensibly impact the quality
of care provided (Phillips et al., 1996). Thus, there may be quality difference both
between and within states due to different state inspection standards and nurse staffing
standards, variable enforcement actions, deviations in clinical practices, and different
inspection teams.
There have also been concerns that quality of care is uneven based on factors such
as race or socioeconomic status (Konetzka & Werner, 2009; Mor, 2004; Smith, 2008).
Some empirical evidence shows that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than Whites to
rely on Medicaid in nursing homes because of lower incomes and higher chronic illness
rates (Meyer, 2001; Norton, 2000). In turn, they may be provided a lower quality of care
because both lower state Medicaid reimbursement rates (Cohen & Spector, 1996;
Grabowski & Angelelli, 2004; Grabowski, Angelelli et al., 2004) and a higher Medicaid
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census (Castle, 2005; Harrington, Zimmerman, Karon, Robinson, & Beutel, 2000) in
facilities have been associated with a lower quality of care in nursing homes.
There have been numerous actions taken in response to these staffing and QOC
shortcomings. These responses can be broken down into legislative/regulatory actions at
the federal and state level and the encouragement of market mechanisms to spur the
provision of higher quality of care. A prime example of legislative efforts to improve the
quality of care in the nursing home industry was the NHRA of 1987. This Act followed
the 1986 IOM report and required nursing homes to use the Resident Assessment
Instrument (Stewart, Grabowski, & Lakdawalla, 2009), of which the Minimum Data Set
(MDS) is a major part, required that all states establish complaint investigations
(Stevenson, 2005), required all Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes to be
regularly inspected (Werner et al., 2009), and included some minimal staffing standards
(Institute of Medicine, 2001) among other stipulations. States such as California have
also used legislation such as AB 1629 to employ quality assurance fees (QAFs), and
increased Medicaid reimbursement in an effort to increase staffing and thereby improve
quality of care in nursing homes (California Assembly Bill 1629, 2004).
Market mechanisms on the other hand are a relatively new phenomenon when
compared to legislation and regulation and these mechanisms include the publication of
quality information and pay-for-performance. The HCFA began the nursing home
compare (NHC) website in 1998 to provide prospective patients and their families a tool
to examine quality in nursing homes thereby allowing them to ―shop‖ amongst them.
The site contents included quality deficiency citations issued by state inspectors, staffing
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levels, and basic facility characteristics (Fermazin, Canady, Bauer, & Cooper, 2003). In
2002, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (the new name for HCFA as
of June 2001), launched the Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI) which expanded
the NHC website by additionally publishing nationwide quality measures (QMs) meant to
provide an indication of how well individual nursing homes manage various aspects of
resident care (Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, & Mukamel, 2005). States such as California have
also published their own versions of quality information with various levels of
information.
Another market mechanism is pay-for-performance (P4P) programs which have
been used longer in the hospital setting, but are increasingly being used in the nursing
home arena. In essence, nursing homes are rewarded with higher reimbursement for
meeting various QOC goals. For instance, Minnesota is said to have the most extensive
P4P program based on the five QMs of staff retention, staff turnover, use of pool staff,
survey deficiencies, and a MDS summary score based on quality indicators (Miller, Mor,
Grabowski, & Gozalo, 2009).
Nursing Home Access Concerns
Access to nursing home care has caused trepidation in addition to staffing and
QOC concerns. This unease can be broken down into access to nursing home care in
tight markets (Medicaid patients in particular) and access to care for ―heavy‖ needs
patients. The former was more of a concern 15-20 years ago, but still exists today in
nursing home markets with a lower supply of available nursing home beds thereby
creating excess demand conditions and tight markets (Nyman, 1988, 1994). Basically,
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this scenario provided nursing homes the option to choose the types of patients they
wanted to serve. Since private pay patients customarily had a higher reimbursement rate,
they were usually preferred over Medicaid patients resulting in decreased access to care
for the Medicaid population (Bishop, 1988; Ettner, 1993; Grabowski, 2002; Meyer, 2001;
Swan et al., 2009). However, lower overall excess demand in nursing home markets and
falling average occupancy rates make tight markets much less common. Access to heavy
needs patients has also been a concern. This is because there is not an incentive for
nursing homes to treat these patients if the reimbursement method does not account for
case-mix or patient needs. In this case, it is easier and more profitable to treat patients
with lower care needs (Bishop, 1988; Cohen & Dubay, 1990).
There are multiple mechanisms that can be been used in an attempt to increase
access to nursing home care, particularly for Medicaid patients. First, Medicaid
eligibility criteria could be changed to enable more people to qualify for the program
(Meyer, 2001; Swan, Kitchener, & Harrington, 2009). This, of course, would increase
state costs (Norton, 2000) and does not guarantee a nursing home would admit these
patients, particularly in tight markets. Second, CON and bed moratoriums could be
removed or relaxed by states thereby enabling more nursing homes to enter markets
(Nyman, 1994; Starkey, Weech-Maldonado, & Mor, 2005). For example, California
repealed its CON in 1987 (Cauchi et al., 2009). The assumption here is that this action
would decrease excess demand conditions in markets by increasing the supply of beds
and services. Third, Medicaid reimbursement rates or methods could be changed. For
instance, higher Medicaid reimbursement rates have been associated with greater access
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to care (Grabowski & Angelelli, 2004; Meyer, 2001). The type of reimbursement method
has also been shown to make a difference in access. For example, facility-specific
reimbursement methods have been shown to increase access to care over flat-rate
methods (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Moreover, access for patients with heavy care
needs has increased in states that have employed a case-mix reimbursement adjustment
(Feng, Grabowski, Intrator, & Mor, 2006; Grabowski, 2002) although not in every case
(Swan et al., 2009). However, improving access for heavy needs residents may come at
the detriment to those who require lighter care (Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Nursing Home Cost Concerns
The high cost of nursing home care is the final concern discussed here.
Nationally in 2005, Medicare and Medicaid combined to pay $72.8 billion versus the
$49.9 billion paid out-of-pocket and by private insurance (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ Office of the Actuary, 2009). This difference in amount paid by
public funds versus private funds is projected to increase, as the Baby Boom generation
ages, with the average annual spending growth by public payers (7.2%) expected to
outpace that of private payers (5.3%) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’
Office of the Actuary, 2009). This is naturally a concern for federal and state legislatures
and policymakers. However, costs are also a concern for potential residents and their
families because nursing home care is very expensive with a 2009 national average
median annual rate of $74,208 for a private room (Genworth Financial Inc., 2009).
Therefore, it is not uncommon that a person may enter nursing homes initially as a
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private-payer and ―spend down‖ his or her assets until he or she qualifies for Medicaid
coverage (Stewart et al., 2009).
Consumers have used a number of strategies to control costs. These strategies
include a continued reliance on informal providers (Allen, 2005; Grabowski, 2008;
Norton, 2000) and alternatives to nursing homes such as HHAs and ALFs when possible
(Davis et al., 1998; Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski & Angelelli, 2004; Swan et al., 2009).
This is in part due to costs, but also because institutional care in a nursing home is a last
resort for many (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007).
Federal and state governments have also used a variety of tactics to control costs
through legislation designed to either keep costs down or reduce nursing home demand.
The federal government passed the 1997 BBA which established prospective payment for
short-term, post-acute skilled nursing care in an attempt to control skyrocketing Medicare
costs (Kitchener, Bostrom, & Harrington, 2004; Konetzka, Yi, Norton, & Kilpatrick,
2004; Weech-Maldonado, Neff, & Mor, 2003; Zhang, Unruh, & Wan, 2008). States have
also switched from retrospective, cost-based methods to prospective payment
reimbursement methods to control Medicaid costs (Chen & Shea, 2002; Coburn,
Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Institute of Medicine, 2001). Besides creating
a prospective payment system (PPS), the 1997 BBA repealed the Boren Amendment
which stipulated that a state’s Medicaid nursing home payment rates had to be adequate
to cover the costs of care (Grabowski, Angelelli et al., 2004). This provided states an
even greater opportunity to cut Medicaid reimbursement rates for nursing home care
(Grabowski, Angelelli et al., 2004) which was a commonly used tactic to control costs
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(Bishop, 1988; Grabowski & Angelelli, 2004). States have also attempted to reduce
Medicaid demand, and therefore expenditures, through CON laws and construction
moratoria (Banaszak-Holl, Berta, Bowman, Baum, & Mitchell, 2002; Grabowski &
Angelelli, 2004; Grabowski, 2004). Preadmission screening of both Medicaid and
potential spend-down patients has been used as well (Bishop, 1988; Meyer, 2001;
Reschovsky, 1998).
In summary, there are numerous nursing home care concerns including high cost
of care, access to care for Medicaid patients and those with heavy care needs, and the
QOC provided including adequate nurse staffing levels. There have been numerous
responses to all three of these concerns including legislation and regulation, the use of
alternative facilities such as HHAs and ALFs, the encouragement of market mechanisms,
and a change in Medicaid reimbursement rates and methods. As shown in the next
section, California passed AB 1629 in response to some of these concerns, but the focus
of this study is how AB 1629 impacted nurse staffing.
California’s AB 1629 and the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act
History
There were five major events that occurred within 6 years of AB 1629 and all
were instrumental directly or indirectly in the passage of the legislation. These events
either called attention to inadequate quality of resident care in California nursing homes,
attempted to improve staffing and quality of care, and/or established the foundation for
AB 1629 itself. The five events, listed chronologically, were a 1998 United States
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and the passage of four California
Assembly Bills: AB 1107, AB 1731, AB 1075, and AB 1762.
The first major event was a 1998 U.S. GAO report that specifically targeted the
quality of resident care in California nursing homes. The report examined allegations of
death due to poor quality of care via a records review, evaluated the adequacy of federal
and state efforts in monitoring nursing home care, and assessed the degree to which
federal and state efforts enforced compliance with requirements (Avruch et al., 1998).
The report found poor quality of care overall and inadequate federal and state efforts in
monitoring and enforcing compliance with nursing home regulations. For instance, the
report found that residents had received unacceptable care in 34 of the 62 cases of
resident deaths sampled. Although the authors were unable to examine causation because
autopsies were not performed, the findings were grim nonetheless. Furthermore, certain
nursing homes in the state had not been sufficiently monitored to guarantee the safety and
welfare of their residents. Even more troubling was the finding that when discrepancies
were discovered by surveyors, enforcement actions were inadequate to correct the
problems and ensure they did not reoccur. This was especially disturbing because the
GAO’s analysis of federal survey and state complaint investigations discovered that
approximately 1 in 3, or 407, of the 1,370 California nursing homes at the time were cited
by state surveyors for having serious or potentially life-threatening care problems. The
results of this audit painted an overall poor quality picture of California nursing home
care and no doubt was a precursor to future legislation aimed at improving the QOC.
AB 1107, signed in to law on July 22, 1999, was the first relatively recent legislation
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which impacted AB 1629. It was directed at improving wages for direct-care nursing
home staff as well as improving the QOC in California nursing homes through minimum
staffing ratios (A.B. 1107, 1999). Direct-care staff salaries, wages, and benefits were
increased through a 5% wage pass-through provision effective August 1, 1999 (A.B.
1107, 1999). The legislative intent for this provision was not included in the bill, but was
probably perceived as necessary due to difficulties in attracting and retaining direct-care
nurse staffing. The revision of the minimum nurse staffing to patient ratio was the other
important provision of the bill. It increased the minimum number of nursing (RNs,
LVNs, nurse aides and nursing assistants) HPRD in skilled nursing facilities from 3.0
hours to 3.2 hours effective January 1, 2000. Higher direct-care staffing equating to
higher quality of care was the likely logic behind these requirements. Thirty-six million
dollars was appropriated from California’s General Fund to support both provisions (A.B.
1107, 1999). Although its impact on AB 1629 may not have been direct, AB 1107 did
recognize the importance of staffing and quality of care both of which were directly
addressed by AB 1629.
AB 1731 was the next important piece of California legislation. It was signed on
September 14, 2000 and tackled staffing issues and QOC in nursing facilities thereby
creating a solid foundation for AB 1629. In fact, the legislative intent of AB 1731 was to
―ensure that nursing home facilities in California provide safe and secure environments
for residents and their families and that they have the highest quality of care possible‖
(2000, p. 9). It attempted to accomplish this via reformed nursing home standards,
stronger enforcement of those standards, and the promotion of resident and family rights.
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The bill also included a requirement for a staffing study to be accomplished by May 1,
2001. Additionally, the legislature intended to increase nurse HPRD to 3.5 or another
level deemed appropriate by the aforementioned staffing study in order to provide
California nursing home residents with a safe environment and quality skilled nursing
care (A.B. 1731, 2000). However, the biggest impact may have been the appropriation of
$500,000 to conduct a study examining alternatives to the Medi-Cal flat rate
methodology employed at the time. Several alternatives were to be examined which
included a case-mix type reimbursement, direct care labor-based factors, and
geographical or regional differences in the cost of operating facilities and providing
resident care. The results were to be reported in a formal report to the legislature and
included both the statutory changes necessary to implement the recommendations as well
as the projected costs associated with the changes. Thus, this bill was the impetus behind
and foundation of what would become AB 1629 in a few years.
AB 1075, signed on October 10, 2001, was the third bill in the legislative chain
leading to AB 1629. It entailed more specifics on staffing ratios and a requirement to
have a new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology in place by August 1, 2004 (A.B.
1075, 2001). The bill required the California State Department of Health Services (DHS)
to create regulations effective August 1, 2003 that established direct caregiver staff-topatient ratios in skilled nursing facilities. Direct caregivers were defined as RNs, LVNs,
certified nurse assistants (CNAs), and psychiatric technicians. Noteworthy, DHS split
into the Department of Public Health (DPH) and the Department of Health Care Services
(DHCS) on July 1, 2007 with the latter retaining responsibility for calculating Medi-Cal
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long-term care reimbursement rates (Harrington, et al., 2008). It also required DHS to
consult with consumers, advocates, providers, and collective bargaining agents to
determine the sufficiency of the staffing by January 1, 2006 and every 5 years thereafter.
However, the requirement to have a Medi-Cal facility-specific rate-setting methodology
in place by August 1, 2004 was the much more pivotal provision of this bill. This was
especially true since AB 1075 directed the examination of facility-specific cost-based rate
models used in other states whereas AB 1731 did not. DHS was also required to submit
annual status reports to the legislature by April 1 in the years 2002-2004.
AB 1762 was the last piece of significant legislation passed before AB 1629 and it
was signed on August 9, 2003. The three key provisions of this bill were the extension of
the required date to have the new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology in place, MediCal reimbursement rates were frozen for free-standing nursing and intermediate care
facilities, and QAFs were introduced for ICFs serving the developmentally disabled (A.B.
1762, 2003). This bill extended the requirement to have the new Medi-Cal
reimbursement methodology in place thereby making it effective August 1, 2005. During
this time period, AB 1762 states that California ―faces a fiscal crisis that requires that
unprecedented measures be taken to reduce General Fund expenditures‖ (2003, p. 41).
As such, the second key provision was that it froze nursing facility rates for 2003/04 and
2004/05 at the August 1, 2003 level. This was important because AB 1629 would later
repeal this rate freeze and add a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). The bill’s final key
provision was the introduction of a QAF for ICFs designed to support quality
improvement efforts. This was a critical provision because it appears that this was the
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state’s first foray into QAFs (at least for the long term care provider community). This
experience would prove to be crucial because AB 1629 relied heavily of QAFs.
The five important events discussed here were paramount to the passage of AB
1629 in one respect or another. The GAO report drew critical attention to the plight of
nursing home residents in California and the need for government intervention. Three of
the pieces of subsequent California legislation sought to improve this quality of care by
addressing nursing facility staffing (AB 1107, AB 1731, and AB 1075).
Correspondingly, three of them recognized that the Medi-Cal reimbursement
methodology for long-term care was inadequate to provide the quality of care desired for
the state’s elderly population and passed legislation to improve this methodology (AB
1731, AB 1075, and AB 1762). This is not to say other vital federal or state events did
not occur. However, the ones presented here were the most recent and most applicable to
AB 1629 which included an Act seeking to improve the nurse staffing through a new
reimbursement methodology.
Legislative Intent of AB 1629
In September 2004, the California Governor signed AB 1629 (of which Article
3.8, the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act, was an important part) into law. This
ushered in the beginning of a new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology for long-term
nursing home care that was prospective, facility-specific, and cost-based. The previous
methodology was prospective, peer-grouped (median facility determined the rate for that
group), and employed flat-rates. These peer-groups were based on two bed size
categories, 59 beds or fewer and greater than 60 beds (California Health Data and Public
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Information Committee, January 12, 2006), as well as the three geographic regions of Los
Angeles County, the Bay Area, and all others (California Health Policy and Data
Advisory Commission, 2004). All nursing homes in Los Angeles county were assigned
the Los Angles rate while the Bay Area consisted of the Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,
San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties until the 2002/2003 rate year. The
Napa and Sonoma counties were moved from the ―All Others‖ category and added to the
Bay Area starting with the 2002/2003 rate year according to Sandra Kristensen of the
California Association of Health Facilities (personal communications, June 21, 2010).
This flat-rate methodology effectively controlled Medi-Cal costs, but its primary
criticism was that it did not provide nursing homes the resources necessary to improve
the quality of care (California Health Policy and Data Advisory Commission, 2004).
However, the new legislation, built on the aforementioned events, reflected California’s
continued efforts to address staffing and the quality of care among other aims. California
was in the bottom 10% of Medicaid (Medi-Cal) nursing home reimbursement rates prior
to the implementation of the AB 1629, but the new legislation was expected to bring the
state near the top 25% in national rankings (California Health Policy and Data Advisory
Committee, 2005).
The purpose of the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act was to implement a
facility-specific rate setting system that ―reflects the costs and staffing levels associated
with quality of care for residents in nursing facilities‖ (California Department of Health
Care Services, 2004). More specifically, the legislative intent was meant to effectively
ensure individual access to appropriate long-term care services, promote quality care,

41
advance wages and benefits for nursing home workers, support provider compliance with
all applicable state and federal requirements, and encourage administrative efficiency
(A.B. 1629, 2004). In addition, the legislation lifted a 2-year rate freeze and provided a
COLA (5.68% average) retroactive to August 1, 2004 (California Department of Health
Services, 2004; California Health Policy and Data Advisory Committee, 2005). In sum,
the new legislation replaced a reimbursement methodology aimed solely at controlling
costs with one intended to improve staffing and the quality of care among other aims.
The Act was primarily directed toward those facilities providing skilled nursing
care in the traditional setting (i.e., nursing homes), but it also affected many other types
of facilities. AB 1629’s primary target was free-standing skilled nursing facilities
although freestanding skilled adult subacute nursing facilities were also required to pay
the quality assurance fees (QAF). Free-standing nursing facilities (the facilities of
interest for this study) are licensed and certified skilled nursing facilities, not part of an
acute care hospital, that meet the standards of participation in Medi-Cal (California
Department of Health Services, 2005a). Interestingly, some of facilities may meet the
Medi-Cal participation standards, but not provide care to Medi-Cal eligibles because they
serve private-pay patients.
There were also facility types that were exempt from paying the QAF, but
benefited from a subsequent higher reimbursement rate due to the new reimbursement
methodology. These included CCRCs, MLRCs, and publicly owned and operated
nursing facilities (California Department of Health Services, 2005a). Distinct-part
nursing facilities (hospital-based) were also excluded from paying the QAF, but did not
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benefit from a higher reimbursement rate because they had a separate reimbursement
methodology. Hence, the primary targets were the free-standing skilled nursing facilities
that provide traditional nursing home services, but subacute facilities and those which are
part of an MLRC or CCRC benefited as well through higher reimbursement.
Legislators set two important conditions to be met before the Long-Term Care
Reimbursement Act could be implemented and they also established an initial sunset date
for the Act as July 31, 2008 (A.B. 1629, 2004). The first condition was that CMS had to
approve both the QAF and the State Plan Amendment (SPA) for the new reimbursement
methodology. CMS approval was necessary as it increased the federal participation
percentage paying for California’s Medi-Cal long-term care via the QAF. CMS approved
the QAF in June 2005 and the SPA in September 2005. The QAF fees and new rate
methodology were retroactively implemented to August 1, 2005 (California Department
of Health Care Services, 2008a). Interestingly, the Medi-Cal share percentages were
50% California and 50% federal before the legislation, but Nancy Reagan of the
California Association of Health Facilities (personal communication, September 25,
2009) estimated that the QAF has decreased California’s share to 42% and increased
federal financial participation to 58% of total costs for skilled nursing facility services.
The second condition was that California needed to make appropriations from both the
General Fund and the Federal Trust Fund. These two appropriations were necessary to
fund the reimbursement rate increases for SNFs as well as the actual implementation of
the bill. Both appropriations were included as part of AB 1629 when the Act was passed
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(A.B. 1629, 2004). Therefore, the two important requirements were met making
implementation of the Act possible.
The QAF, also known as provider tax, was the linchpin of the new reimbursement
methodology, but it was not unique to California. Grabowski, Feng et al. (2008) outlined
the relatively short history of provider taxes and found that 31 states had implemented
them by 2004. They further stated that the original mechanism enabling the QAF was a
1991 legislative change that amended the federal Medicaid statute and permitted states to
levy taxes on the gross patient revenues of health care providers as long as certain rules
were followed. Federal funds were then matched with these provider taxes thereby
providing the ability to increase Medicaid reimbursement rates (Grabowski, Feng et al.,
2008). Thus, California’s introduction of the QAF followed a long line of states which
had already done so in an attempt to increase the federal participation rate. This
ultimately enabled higher Medicaid reimbursement rates for long-term nursing home
care.
The QAF became a condition of licensure meaning that all licensed facilities in
California, except the before mentioned exempt facilities, had to pay the fee regardless of
whether or not they treated Medicaid patients (California Health Policy and Data
Advisory Committee, 2005). The QAF was expected to generate $120 million 2004/05
and about $760 million between 2005/06 through 2007/08 (California Department of
Health Services, 2005a). It was hoped that this additional amount would provide the
needed funding to help increase Medi-Cal reimbursement rates enough to support
increased staffing and other quality improvement efforts in California’s nursing homes.
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California’s DHS calculated the QAF using aggregated net revenue and projected patient
days from all of the applicable facilities (California Department of Health Services,
2005a). Net revenue was defined as the total gross resident revenue for routine and
ancillary services provided to all skilled nursing facility residents minus Medicare
revenue and payer discounts and applicable contractual allowances (A.B. 1629, 2004).
Once eligible revenue was determined, the aggregate projected net revenue for all
facilities was multiplied by the appropriate percentage, 3% percent for 2004/05 and 6%
thereafter, then divided by the projected total resident days of all providers subject to the
fee (A.B. 203, 2007). As a hypothetical example, the QAF would have initially been $3
per resident day if the projected net revenue for all applicable facilities as $1 billion
dollars multiplied by 3% and then divided by projected total resident days of 10 million
(1,000,000,000 * .03 / 10,000,000 = $3 per resident day). Two different QAF rates were
also established for facilities with fewer than 100,000 resident days and those with
greater than 100,000 resident days. Of note, the QAF is a per-resident day fee and they
are listed by each rate year in Table 1.
The QAF has been called a provider tax by some (Grabowski, Feng et al., 2008)
and California’s QAF may also appropriately be termed a provider tax. This is because
the Medicare revenue is excluded from the QAF calculation and the QAF is returned to
facilities for all Medi-Cal resident days via a pass-through discussed next in the section.
Thus, it is essentially a tax on private-pay patients.
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Table 1
Quality Assurance Fee (QAF) Per Resident Day (PRD)

Rate Year

QAF ≤ 100,000 Days

QAF > 100,000 Days

2004-2005

3% of net revenue, $3.66 PRD

3% of net revenue, $3.17 PRD

2005-2006

6% of net revenue, $7.31 PRD

6% of net revenue, $6.33 PRD

2006-2007

6% of net revenue, $7.79 PRD

6% of net revenue, $6.81 PRD

2007-2008

6% of net revenue, $8.27 PRD

6% of net revenue, $7.55 PRD

2008-2009

6% of net revenue, $9.05 PRD

6% of net revenue, $8.05 PRD

Source: California Department of Health Care Services (2007); California Department of Health
Care Services (2008b); California Department of Health Services (2005a); California Department of
Health Services (2006b).

Reimbursement Methodology
California’s new reimbursement methodology is a unique prospective, facilityspecific, and cost-based approach to Medi-Cal reimbursement for nursing homes.
However, it is not case-mix adjusted meaning that patient acuity is not taken into account
(California Health Policy and Data Advisory Committee, 2005). This makes this
reimbursement method different from the majority of states because 35 states had
employed some version of a case-mix reimbursement methodology by 2004 (Feng,
Grabowski, Intrator, Zinn, & Mor, 2008). Further, only two other states employed a costbased reimbursement system (Harrington, et al., 2008). Three key aspects of the new
methodology were the structure of the reimbursement rate across the five cost categories,
reimbursement caps based on both peer groups and maximum annual weighted averages,
and the time lag of the cost reports used to calculate the reimbursement rates. A more
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detailed description of the cost categories, and Table 2 which summarizes the cost
categories, concludes this section.
Reimbursement Description
California’s new Medi-Cal reimbursement method was a prospective, facilityspecific, and cost-based approach. It was a prospective approach because facility rates
were determined for each year; therefore, each facility generally knew beforehand the
Medi-Cal reimbursement rate. It was facility-specific because each facility potentially
had a different reimbursement rate whereas the previous methodology was a simple flat
rate methodology based on one of three geographical areas and two bed size categories.
The exception was the time between the new rate year (August 1) and the publication of
the new rates which always occurred after this date. It was cost-based because it was
based on past facility costs with added inflation adjustments. This Medicaid type of
reimbursement method is relatively rare because, after the passage of AB 1629,
California was only one of three states that used it.
The reimbursement rate itself was based upon five cost categories. The five cost
categories were: (a) labor costs; (b) indirect care, nonlabor costs; (c) administrative costs;
(d) capital costs; and (e) direct pass-through costs. A facility’s applicable costs for each
of the first three categories were divided by the total number of skilled nursing days to
create that portion of the per diem (Department of Health Care Services, 2009). The
capital costs and direct pass-through components were more complex and are not covered
here. The Medi-Cal facility-specific, cost-based per diem reimbursement rate equaled the
sum of these five categories. There were also two important considerations when
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Table 2
Facility-Specific Reimbursement Methodology Cost Category Summary

Cost Categories of
Reimbursement Rates

Percentile Ceiling
Based on Peer-Group

Category Caps

Category Components

Inflation Adjustment

Labor costs

90%

Labor-driven operating
allocation (LDOA)
could not exceed 5% of
reimbursement rate.

Entailed facility employed full-time and
part-time direct care staff, contracted
and temporary direct care staff, indirect
care staff employed and contracted
including housekeeping and plant
operations and maintenance, and the
labor-driven operating allocation.

Adjusted using labor
inflation index.

Indirect-care,
nonlabor costs

75%

N/A

In essence the supplies needed for
direct care, and indirect care services
such as housekeeping, laundry and linen,
and plant and operations.

Adjusted using
California consumer
price index for
all-urban consumers.

Administrative

50%

N/A

Administrative and general expenses
needed to operate facility, allowable
home office costs, and property
insurance.

Adjusted using
California consumer
price index for
all-urban consumers.

Capital

N/A

2005/2006 could not
exceed Dept. Health
Services' 2004/2005
estimate and subsequent

Accounted for capital-related assets
such as mortgage principal and interest,
leases, leasehold improvements,
depreciation of real property, equipment,

N/A
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Table 2 - continued

Cost Categories of
Reimbursement Rate

Percentile Ceiling
Based on Peer-Group

Category Caps
years could not exceed
8% of the previous
year's Fair Rental
Value System (FRVS).

Direct pass-through

N/A

N/A

Category Components

Inflation Adjustment

and other capital-related expenses,
but uses a FRVS methodology.

Encompassed property taxes, facility
license fees, caregiver training costs,
liability insurance costs, the Medi-Cal
portion of QAF, and any new state and
federal mandates for the applicable
rate year.

Adjusted using the
California Consumer
Price Index for
All-Urban Consumers
for caregiver training
costs and liability
insurance. The
property tax
pass-through was
updated 2% annually.

Note. The sum of these five categories made up the facility-specific Medi-Cal reimbursement rate. There was also a maximum weighted average increase per year
in the aggregate which was 8% for 2005/2006, 5% for 2006/2007, 5.5% for both 2007/2008 and 2008/2009.
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calculating the rates. First, the methodology did not allow costs within a specific
category to be shifted to another (California Department of Health Services, 2005b).
Second, costs associated with residential care in CCRCs and MLRCs were excluded from
the rate calculations (Department of Health Care Services, 2009). Table 2 derived from
the October 2005 California Medi-Cal Provider Bulletin, summarizes the facility-specific
reimbursement methodology’s cost categories.
Reimbursement Cost Control
Two cost control restrictions were put into place to protect California from
inflationary trends and unbridled cost increases due to the new reimbursement
methodology (California Health Policy and Data Advisory Committee, 2005). The first
important restriction on cost growth was a ceiling on three of the five cost-based
categories based on a facility’s membership in one of seven peer-groups. These peer
groups were created via a cluster analysis using 2003 COSHPD cost data and were based
on direct care cost per diem cost per county and whether or not the county in which the
facility was located was rural or urban. It was determined that four rural peer groups and
three urban peer groups were necessary based on size and distinctly different median
direct care costs between clusters (Navigant Consulting, 2005). Of note, a facility’s peer
group is the same for each of the five cost categories. A facility’s maximum
reimbursement rate was based on its peer group membership and the percentile limits for
the applicable cost categories in that peer group. As an example, Crestwood Geriatric
Treatment Center (Fremont) is in peer-group seven. In rate year 2008-2009, the facility
had a direct care labor cost calculated at $133.77 (California Department of Health Care
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Services, 2009b). However, the 90th percentile for direct labor cost in peer group seven
was a mere $122.98 (California Department of Health Care Services, 2009a). Therefore,
this facility received the lower rate of $122.98 for direct-care labor because its costs
exceeded the 90th percentile in its peer group (California Department of Health Services,
2005b).
The second cost control restriction was achieved through a couple of category
caps (Table 2, column 3) and an overall reimbursement cap (Table 2, last line). The labor
driven operating allocation (LDOA) was capped at a 5% maximum of the facility
reimbursement rate, while the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS) was capped at a
maximum of 8% over the previous year’s amount for each facility. There was also an
overall reimbursement cap that pertained to all facilities and limited the maximum annual
weighted average Medi-Cal reimbursement rate increase. This cap was based on the
weighted average of the reimbursement rate from the previous year, after adjusting for
the change in costs due to the QAF and the total projected costs of complying with new
state and federal mandates (California Department of Health Services, 2005b). The
maximum weighted average increase for the study period was 8% for 2005/06, 5% for
2006/07, and 5.5% for both 2007/08 and 2008/09 (A.B. 203, 2007; California
Department of Health Services, 2005b). For example, the projected weighted average
rate across all nursing homes for the 2008-2009 rate year was $163.46, which exceeded
the 2007/08 weighted average rate after considering mandate adjustments and
multiplying by 5.5% ($153.37 * 1.055 = $161.81). Hence, each facility’s AB1629 rate
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was capped at 98.9903% ($161.81 / $163.46) for the 2008-2009 rate year (Department of
Health Care Services, 2009).
Time Lag Used to Calculate Medi-Cal Rates
The time lag of the cost reports used to create each year’s current reimbursement
rate was an important aspect of the new methodology. In general, there was about an
18-24 month time lag between the cost report and the beginning of the new rate year that
occurred on August 1st of each year (California Department of Health Services, 2005a).
For instance, the retrospective rates established for 2005/06 were based on California
Office of State-Wide Health Planning and Development (COSHPD) disclosure reports
that had facility fiscal period end dates in 2003 while the 2006/07 rates were based on
COSHPD disclosure reports ending in 2004, etc. (California Department of Health
Services, 2006a). Inflation adjustments were used to compensate for this lag in cost
report data (California Department of Health Services, 2005b).
Detailed Cost Category Descriptions
Each of the five cost categories varied in their calculations. Percentile ceilings
based on peer group membership and different inflation adjustments may have been
included depending on the cost category. Moreover, the calculations based on each
category were based on the applicable facility cost for the category divided by the
number of SNF days except for the capital cost category and the direct pass-throughs
such as the LDOA and QAF. Unless indicated otherwise, the following detailed
information for each cost category came from the October, 2005 Medi-Cal Provider
Bulletin (California Department of Health Services, 2005b).
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The labor cost category consisted of both direct and indirect labor resident care
costs as well as the LDOA component. The direct resident care labor costs pertained to
facility employed full-time and part-time employees and included their salaries, wages,
and benefits. Furthermore, expenditures for contract, registry or temporary agency
staffing for individuals provided direct resident care were also included in this category.
The indirect care labor costs included services related to the delivery of care, but without
direct resident contact. This category included labor for services such as dietary,
housekeeping, laundry and linen, in-service education for staff, and plant operations and
maintenance costs. A facility’s direct and indirect care labor costs were also updated
from the midpoint of each individual facility’s cost reporting period to the midpoint of
each rate year based on a labor inflation index which used the most recent industryspecific historical wage data. Further, this category employed a 90th percentile ceiling in
each of the seven peer groups.
The LDOA is an intriguing part of the labor cost category and it was a mechanism
to reward nursing homes for directly employing staff. The LDOA included an amount
equal to 8% of direct and indirect resident care labor costs after subtracting expenditures
for agency staffing such as contract staffing and temporary agency costs. However, the
total LDOA was capped at 5% of the facility’s total Medi-Cal reimbursement rate as
previously described. The LDOA in essence led to a higher reimbursement rate, which
was an indirect method to increase the quality of care through additional staffing. The
LDOA has been called a profit component by some (Harrington, et al., 2008), although
this terminology was not used in the legislation or subsequent revisions (J. McCraw,
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personal communications, September 25, 2009). However, a key point to remember is
that the cost data was lagged 18-24 months meaning that it would take awhile for
facilities to realize higher Medi-Cal reimbursement rates by hiring additional staff.
The indirect care, nonlabor cost category was the second component of the
reimbursement rate. This category was designed to capture the nonlabor costs associated
with such things as nursing, housekeeping, laundry and linen, in-service education for
staff, plant operations, and maintenance costs. This category was updated at the midpoint
of the rate year using the California Consumer Price Index for All-Urban Consumers
created by the State Department of Finance (California Department of Health Services,
2005b). The ceiling for this category was at the 75th percentile for each facility’s peergroup. This percentile threshold was set less than labor, but higher than the
administrative costs, to allow them to spend what was necessary on these types of costs
without exceeding reasonable parameters (Mr. Nixon, personal communications,
February 9, 2010).
The administrative costs category was the third element of the reimbursement
rate. This category consisted of administrative and general expenses associated with
operating the facility including expenditures related to allowable home office costs and
property insurance costs. This category was limited to a 50th percentile ceiling in the
facility’s peer-group and it was adjusted for inflation in the same manner as the indirect
care, non-labor cost category.
The capital costs category was the next piece of the reimbursement rate. This
category accounted for the value of the capital related assets needed to care for Medi-Cal
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residents including mortgage principal and interest, leases, leasehold improvements,
depreciation of real property, equipment, and other capital related expenses. However, a
FRVS methodology was used to account for these costs instead of reimbursing the costs
of these assets directly. The FRVS was based on a complex formula to assess the facility
value based on age, condition, and a market interest factor (California Department of
Health Services, 2005b). There were also limits on this category as the 2005-2006 rate
year could not exceed DHS’ estimated value for this category for the 2004-2005 rate year
because it had to be budget neutral at inception (Mr. Nixon, personal communication,
February 9, 2010). For 2006-2007 and subsequent rate years, the maximum annual
increase for the capital cost category, for all facilities in the aggregate, could not exceed
8% of the prior rate year’s FRVS cost component.
Direct pass-through costs were the fifth and final category for the new
reimbursement rate. This cost category consisted of property taxes, facility license fees,
caregiver training costs, and liability insurance costs. The Medi-Cal portion of QAF and
any new state and federal mandates for the applicable rate year were included as well.
This category also had a couple of inflation adjustments. First, the California Consumer
Price Index for All-Urban Consumers was applied to update caregiver training costs and
liability insurance. Second, the property tax pass-through was increased 2% annually.
Both were updated from the mid-point of the cost report period to the mid-point of the
rate year. Conversely, facility license fees and the Medi-Cal portion of the QAF were
applied on a prospective basis for each rate year meaning that they did need an inflation
adjustment.
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In summary, there were numerous parts to the new reimbursement methodology.
Some were subject to ceilings and caps while others were adjusted for inflation. This was
indeed a much more complicated reimbursement methodology than the prior flat-rate
methodology. However, the new methodology was also designed in such a way that a
facility could potentially be reimbursed for the full costs for their Medi-Cal patients as
long the cost stayed below the particular percentile ceilings for each cost category
established for its peer-group. Additionally, the LDOA provided incentive to hire
additional permanent staff because a facility could be reimbursed eight percent over their
labor costs up to a cap of 5% of the total Medi-Cal reimbursement rate. Another key
point was that the QAF was returned to each facility for each Medi-Cal patient through
the direct pass-through category. This meant that a facility with a higher Medi-Cal
census would have a lower QAF burden. Another way to think about it is that CMS
patients were excluded from the QAF since Medicare patient revenue was excluded from
its calculation and the QAF was returned to the facility for Medi-Cal patients. This in
essence made the QAF a tax on non-CMS patients.
Subsequent Events
There were many important events that occurred after the passage of AB 1629
that are related to this research. These events presented chronologically include: (a)
CMS’ approval of the new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology, (b) retroactive
payments for cost-of-living adjustments as well as retroactive QAFs, (c) the
establishment of the new facility-specific rates with the accompanying retroactive
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payment, and (d) two extensions to the sunset date of the Act. These are all summarized
in Figure 2, along with the aforementioned legislation leading up to AB 1629.
The first two events occurred when CMS approved California’s QAF in June
2005 and the California SPA for the new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology, on
September 9th, 2005 (California Department of Health Care Services, 2008a). These
were key steps, as previously mentioned, because the new methodology could not be
implemented without them. Additionally, the legislation stated that the new methodology
became effective on August 1, 2005 even though the CMS approval date occurred
afterwards. The Act was to be implemented the first day of the month following CMS
approval; thus, it was implemented October 1, 2005 (A.B. 1629, 2004).
Once CMS approval was granted and AB 1629 implemented, the retroactive
payments for COLA ensued as well as the retroactive collection of the QAF. The
retroactive COLA payments were meant to overcome the 2-year rate freeze effective
August 1, 2003 (A.B. 1629, 2004). This payment process began in October 2005, was
completed for the most part by December 2005, and paid the facilities on average a
5.68% COLA retroactive to August 1, 2004 (California Health Policy and Data Advisory
Committee, December 12, 2005). Facilities were also awaiting DHS payment for
2004/05 Medi-Cal QAFs around the same time frame. Facilities were then charged their
non-Medi-Cal QAFs for 2004/05 after receipt of this payment (California Health Policy
and Data Advisory Committee, December 12, 2005). Facilities were paid the QAF
pass-through first and then charged their appropriate QAFs because CMS would not
allow an offset (D. Nixon, personal communication, November 17, 2009). Mr. Nixon
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Figure 2. AB 1629 timeline of events.

57
also indicated that the timeframe for QAF reimbursement and payment was between
November 2005 to February 2006.
The creation of the new facility specific rates and the retrospective payment back
to August 1, 2005 were the next significant events. The new rates for 2005-2006 were
finalized March 7, 2006 (J. McCraw, personal communication, September 25, 2009) and
retrospective payment began shortly thereafter. Also, these payments should have been
recorded in each facility’s current fiscal period, rather than restating prior periods,
according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for changes in estimates handled
retrospectively (T. Christensen, personal communication, October 14, 2009). This is
important because the true effect of AB 1629 should be reflected in 2006 and later cost
reports. The 2006-2007 rates were released in November 2006 (California Department of
Health Services, 2006c), 2007-2008 rates in November 2007 (California Department of
Health Services, 2006d), and 2008-2009 rates in January 2009 (California Department of
Health Care Services, 2009c).
AB 1629’s original sunset date was July 31st, 2008, but it was subsequently
extended twice through legislation. First, the governor approved AB 203 on August 27,
2007 which extended the methodology until July 31, 2009 (A.B. 203, 2007). Afterwards,
the governor approved AB 1183 on September 30th, 2008 which prolonged the
methodology until July 31, 2011 (A.B. 1183, 2007).
Empirical Evidence Concerning Reimbursement and Staffing
Researchers have investigated the relationship of both the reimbursement method
and rate when examining nurse staffing in nursing homes. A literature review on both
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reimbursement method and rate is appropriate because AB 1629 changed the Medi-Cal
reimbursement method and increased the rates. These studies have entailed examination
of Medicare and/or Medicaid methods and/or reimbursement levels using national
(Bourbonniere et al., 2006; Cawley et al., 2006; Cohen & Spector, 1996; Dummit, 2002;
Feng et al., 2008; Grabowski, 2001a; Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski, 2002; Grabowski,
2004; Harrington et al., 2007; Intrator et al., 2005; Konetzka et al., 2004; Mueller et al.,
2006; White, 2005; Zinn, Feng, Mor, Intrator, & Grabowski, 2008); multi-state (Swan &
Pickard, 2003); and single-state data (Harrington, et al., 2008; Harrington & Swan, 2003;
Kash, Castle, Naufal, & Hawes, 2006; Kash, Castle, & Phillips, 2007; Schnelle,
Mukamel, Sato, & Chang, 2007; Zinn, 1993). Organizational and market/environmental
factors have also been included as either independent or control variables depending on
the theoretical or conceptual framework used for that particular study. This study seeks
to examine if the change in California’s Medi-Cal reimbursement method, along with its
more generous reimbursement rate, is positively associated with changes in nursing home
nurse staffing, particularly for nursing homes highly dependent on Medi-Cal revenue.
Thus, both streams of literature are reviewed and summarized.
Reimbursement Methods and Staffing
Reimbursement method has been linked with nurse staffing in nursing homes.
There are basically three different types of reimbursement methodologies: (a)
prospective; (b) retrospective; and (c) a combination system (Grabowski, Feng et al.,
2004). Grabowski and colleagues (2004) defined prospective methods as those that set
rates in advance regardless of actual facility costs during the rate year. These rates were
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generally based on previous year’s facility and/or resident-level information. They
further stated that there were four prospective method subclasses: (a) facility-specific
based on historical costs and other factors; (b) class method also known as flat-rate; (c)
resident-specific based on resident characteristics also known as case-mix
reimbursement; and (d) both facility and resident specific. Retrospective reimbursement
methods pay nursing homes a facility-specific interim rate based on a base year’s cost
along with an inflation adjustment. If the actual costs (usually up to a ceiling) were
different from the interim rate, the state either paid the facility or the facility paid the
state the difference (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Medicare retrospective payment was
pre-1997 BBA and the employment of this type of methodology for Medicaid
reimbursement is uncommon.
Combination methods are a hybrid of both prospective and retrospective
reimbursement methods. This methodology sets the rate in advance for some cost
components and afterward for others based on actual costs (Grabowski, Feng et al.,
2004). Thus, combination systems allow some portion of the rate to reflect actual facility
costs (Swan et al., 2000).
Most researchers examining nursing home reimbursement methodologies have
studied prospective payment over the past decade. These studies have examined either a
change in reimbursement methodology explicitly (Grabowski, 2002; Harrington, et al.,
2008; Schnelle et al., 2007; Swan & Pickard, 2003; White, 2005; Zinn et al., 2008) or
compared different reimbursement methodologies across states (Feng et al., 2008;
Grabowski, 2001a; Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski, 2004; Harrington & Swan, 2003).
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Medicare has used PPS to reimburse nursing home post-acute care since 1997. The
payment bundles nursing, therapy, and capital payments into a single per diem amount
(Institute of Medicine, 2001). Furthermore, the per diem payment is based on a
combination of national and facility-specific payment amounts with a case-mix
adjustment based on resource utilization groups (RUGs).
Most studies have found support that prospective payment was related to nursing
home staffing. Many of these studies have examined the relationship between Medicare
adoption of PPS and staffing. White (2005), in a national study using 1997 and 2000
data, found a large decline in RN, licensed practical nurse (LPN), CNA, and total nurse
time per resident day in nursing homes following Medicare PPS, particularly among
those with for-profit ownership. Likewise, Konetzka et al. (2004) found that RN and
professional nurse staff (RNs + LPNs) HPRD in nursing homes decreased following PPS
using national 1996-2000 data. Zinn et al. (2008) studied nursing home administrative
nurse staffing using a 1997 - 2004 national panel study of nursing homes. They found
higher administrative nurse staffing after the introduction of Medicare PPS.
The strength of these studies is that they were able to show that facilities may
have adapted their nursing staffing structure in response to a reimbursement change.
Further, the studies used national, longitudinal data. However, the weakness in national
nursing home staffing studies is that they depend on CMS’ Online Survey Certification
and Reporting (OSCAR) data. The reliability and validity of OSCAR staffing data has
been questioned since each facility is required to report the number of staffing hours, by
category, worked in the 14 days before their periodic survey (Feng, Katz, Intrator,
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Karuza, & Mor, 2005). These periodic inspections are relatively predictable and facilities
may increase staffing just before them to make staffing numbers appear more favorable
(Kash, Hawes, & Phillips, 2007).
The majority of states also use Medicaid prospective payment to pay for Medicaid
residents’ nursing home care (Institute of Medicine, 2001). A purely prospective
payment methodology is expected to be associated with lower staffing in nursing homes
because there is an incentive to minimize costs (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Konetzka et
al., 2004). Adding a case-mix adjustment to a prospective methodology may increase
total nurse staffing because higher rates are tied to or adjusted for residents that require
more complex care and therefore more staffing (Harrington et al., 2007). However,
others argue that case-mix reimbursement should not change staffing since it is ―budget
neutral‖ in that it is not specifically designed to increase or decrease staffing. Rather, it is
designed to reimburse facilities for higher patient complexity and the accompanying
higher costs of care (Feng et al., 2008).
Empirical studies of Medicaid prospective payment based on facility-specific
costs and its relationship with nursing home staffing are rare. This is in large part
because only two other states had employed a Medicaid prospective payment method
based on facility-specific costs before California passed AB 1629 in 2004 (Harrington et
al., 2008). However, three nonpeer reviewed reports have been published pertaining to
AB 1629 and its relationship with nursing home staffing.
Harrington et al. (2008) examined the impact of AB 1629 on nursing facilities,
subacute facilities, and multi-level retirement communities (MLRCs). The researchers
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specifically examined the effect of the legislation on revenues, access to care, quality
(complaints, inspection deficiencies, staffing levels, and turnover rates), and facility
wages and benefits. The study found that total direct care nurse staffing HPRD increased
by 3% and RN HPRD increased by 1.5% between 2004 and 2006. However, the study
was limited in that it only had 2001-2006 data, it used a series of paired t-tests to test
mean differences between 2001 and 2006 and 2004 and 2006, and it employed a repeated
measures analysis to test differences across five groups (ownership type, chain
membership, facility size, percent Medi-Cal revenues, and geographical areas) and 12
variables using 2004 and 2006 data. Three of the 12 variables were the number of RN
HPRD, the total nurse HPRD, and the nursing assistant HPRD (Harrington et al., 2008).
Schnelle et al. (2007) also evaluated AB 1629 and sought to determine if revenues and
expenditures increased; if there were quality improvements in terms of inspection
deficiencies, CMS NHC measures (high and low risk pressure ulcers, physical restraints,
and decline in functional status), and staffing levels; and if wages increased for nursing
staff. They found that revenues and expenditures had indeed increased, inspection
deficiencies had increased, there were inconsistent QM findings, licensed nurse staffing
increased, CNA staffing decreased, turnover increased, and there was not a correlation
between expenditures and QOC. However, this study also only had data 2001-2006 and
it did not specifically account for organizational and market variables in the regression
analysis.
A progress report required on AB 1629, as part of the legislation itself, was also
presented to the California legislature in January 2009 (California Department of Public
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Health, 2009). The report found gradual increases of the number of SNFs meeting the
state’s minimum staffing standard and increased staffing retention rates for RNs, LVNs,
and CNAs. The number of severe deficiencies increased in calendar years (CYs)
2004-2006 and dropped in CY 2007 while the number of state citations dropped in 2004
and 2005 only to rise in 2006 and 2007. The shortcoming of this report is that it relied on
simple descriptive statistics for the comparisons (California Department of Public Health,
2009).
The strengths of these three reports were that they explicitly investigated
California nursing home staffing both before and after AB 1629. This permitted an
examination of nurse staffing anchored on the reimbursement method change. The
studies also used state Medi-Cal cost report data for their staffing measures instead of the
less reliable OSCAR data. However, the first two studies only had data through 2006
which may not have been enough time to see staffing changes. Moreover, the statistical
analyses did not use a multivariable statistical approach that accounted for organizational
characteristics and environmental factors that may have affected nurse staffing changes.
Medicaid prospective payment with a case-mix adjustment has also been
commonly examined. Feng et al. (2008) used national panel data to explicitly examine
the adoption of a Medicaid prospective payment methodology with a case-mix
adjustment. They found that nursing homes in states that adopted a Medicaid prospective
payment method with a case-mix adjustment had less RN and LPN HPRD when
compared to states that had Medicaid prospective payment without a case-mix
adjustment. Grabowski (2004), also used national panel data to compare reimbursement
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methods and found that nursing homes in states with a Medicaid prospective payment
case-mix adjustment had a lower LPN HPRD, but higher CNA HPRD than those in states
that employed Medicaid prospective payment without a case mix adjustment. Swan and
Pickard (2003) explicitly studied Medicaid prospective payment adoption with a casemix adjustment in three states. They found the average number of nursing HPRD
increased in Minnesota nursing homes following the adoption of a case-mix methodology
after a move from a facility-specific prospective payment system without a case-mix
adjustment. Unfortunately, this study was not able to examine staffing changes in the
other two states of Texas and South Carolina due to data limitations. A case-mix
adjustment was considered for California’s new Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology,
but it was not ultimately chosen (California Assembly Bill 1731, 2000).
The strength of the first two studies lies in a national examination of the
relationship between Medicaid reimbursement methods and nurse staffing. However, the
reliance on national OSCAR staffing data remains a weakness. A strength of the Swan
and Pickard (2003) study was that it used state cost reports which were more reliable than
the OSCAR data (Feng et al., 2005). However, this study was descriptive in nature, it
examined different time periods for each state, and the same data elements were not
available in each state.
The use of flat rates is another variant of Medicaid prospective payment and it has
been examined in a few studies. Cohen and Spector (1996) found in a national, crosssectional study of nursing homes that a flat-rate reimbursement methodology was
associated with lower RNs and LPNs per 100 residents when compared to a cost-based
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(retrospective) methodology. Another national nursing home study using cross-sectional
data found a flat-rate methodology was associated with about two fewer RNs per nursing
home when compared to prospective facility-specific methodology (Grabowski, 2001b).
Before AB 1629, California was only one of three states that employed a flat-rate
reimbursement method for Medi-Cal (Kitchener et al., 2004) and it was blamed for
inadequate staffing and QOC problems in the state’s nursing homes (California Health
Policy and Data Advisory Commission, 2004; Harrington, et al., 2008). Recent nursing
home studies of Medicaid prospective payment using flat rates are rare.
The second type of reimbursement methodology is a retrospective approach.
Contemporary studies of this Medicaid reimbursement method are uncommon because by
1996 only Nebraska employed a purely retrospective-based methodology (Grabowski,
2001a). However, a cross-sectional examination of U.S. nursing homes found that states
with a Medicaid retrospective reimbursement methodology had a higher number of RNs
when compared to states with a prospective methodology (Grabowski, 2001a).
The final type of reimbursement methodology is a combination of the prospective and
retrospective methods. A national, cross-sectional study investigated the relationship
between nurse staffing and different Medicaid reimbursement methods including a
combination reimbursement methodology (Grabowski, 2001b). The study found that
nursing homes in states with a Medicaid combination reimbursement method had less
RNs when compared to nursing homes in states that used a prospective reimbursement
method.
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In summary, these reimbursement studies have shown a relationship between
reimbursement method and nursing home staffing. National studies have either explicitly
examined a reimbursement method change, the BBA in particular, or compared
reimbursement methods across states. However, these studies suffer from a dependence
on OSCAR data that is thought to be less reliable than state cost reports. There have been
reimbursement method studies using state cost reports, but these have simply been
descriptive in nature or have not accounted for organizational characteristics and
environmental factors in a multivariable analysis.
Reimbursement Rates and Staffing
Most studies of the relationship between reimbursement rates and nursing home
nurse staffing have entailed Medicaid rate levels (Cohen & Spector, 1996; Feng et al.,
2008; Grabowski, 2001a; Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski, 2004; Harrington et al., 2007).
However, others have also investigated the relationship between nurse staffing and
Medicare rates (Dummit, 2002; Harrington et al., 2007) as well as private-pay rates
(Grabowski, 2004). The national studies did not explicitly investigate rate changes, but
rather compared rates across states. Conversely, the single-state studies compared rates
across facilities within each state.
National studies of reimbursement rates have used average state reimbursement
rates collected as part of a number of published state data books (Harrington, Swan,
Wellin, Clemena, & Carrillo, 1999) or through primary research (Grabowski, Feng et al.,
2004). These sources were used for national studies because state cost reports vary in the
type of data available (Swan & Pickard, 2003) and their definitions of data elements
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(Feng et al., 2005). There were also endogeneity concerns between rates and nursing
home staffing (Cohen & Spector, 1996; Grabowski, 2004; Grabowski, 2004; Harrington
et al., 2007). National studies of reimbursement rates have also customarily controlled
for reimbursement methodology through the use of dummy variables.
National panel data studies generally show a positive relationship between
Medicaid reimbursement rates and nursing home nurse staffing. One such study of
nursing homes found that states with higher Medicaid rates were positively associated
with LPN HPRD, but negatively associated with CNA HPRD (Grabowski, 2004).
Similarly, Feng et al. (2008) in a panel study of nursing homes discovered found that
higher state Medicaid rates were positively associated with LPN, CNA, and total nurse
HPRD, but negatively associated with RN HPRD.
National, cross-sectional studies of nursing homes have also by and large shown a
positive relationship between Medicaid reimbursement and staffing. For example, a
positive relationship was found between RNs per resident and Medicaid reimbursement
rates (Grabowski, 2001a) as well as RN HPRD and total nurse HPRD (Harrington et al.,
2004). Additionally, Cohen and Spector (1996) found that a higher Medicaid rate was
positively associated with a higher number of LPNs per 100 residents (Cohen & Spector,
1996). Moreover, Mueller et al. (2006) discovered a positive association between
Medicaid rate and total nurse staff, licensed nurse staff, and CNA HPRD (Mueller et al.,
2006). Also of interest, a pooled independent cross-sectional study by Intrator et al.
(2005) found that higher state Medicaid rates were associated with a greater likelihood
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that a nursing home would hire a physician assistant or nurse practitioner (Intrator et al.,
2005).
The relationship between Medicare rates on nursing home nurse staffing has also
been examined. Harrington et al. (2007) in a national, cross-sectional study found a
positive relationship between average state Medicare SNF reimbursement rates and RN
HPRD, but a negative relationship with total nurse HPRD (Harrington et al., 2007).
Additionally, a 2002 GAO report found that the passage of the Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 did not improve SNF nurse staffing despite an increase in the
nursing component of Medicare’s PPS payment (Dummit, 2002).
Overall, the national panel and cross-sectional studies show a positive relationship
between average state Medicare rates and nursing home nurse staffing. However, these
studies did not explicitly examine Medicaid rate changes as a result of a policy change.
Rather, they compared state Medicaid rates, over time for panel studies and at a single
point in time for cross-sectional studies, to ascertain their relationship with nurse staffing.
There have also been a few cross-sectional, single-state studies that have
examined the relationship between Medicaid reimbursement rates and nursing home
staffing. These studies have the advantage of examining facility specific rates because
they use state cost reports whereas the national studies do not. Kash, Castle et al. (2007),
in a Texas nursing home cross-sectional study found that higher Medicaid reimbursement
rates were positively associated with RN, LPN, and CNA HPRD (Kash, Castle et al.,
2007). Similarly, Kash et al. (2006) in another Texas nursing home cross-sectional study
found that higher Medicaid reimbursement rates were again positively associated with
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RN, LPN, and CNA HPRD. A cross-sectional investigation of nursing homes in New
York found that higher facility-specific Medicaid rates were associated with a higher
number of RNs (Grabowski, 2001b).
The cross-sectional, state studies also generally showed that higher Medicaid rates
were positively related to higher nursing home nurse staffing. The strength of these
studies is that they used state cost reports and were able to examine facility-specific
reimbursement rates. The weakness of these studies is that they were cross-sectional and
therefore unable to investigate whether rate changes over time were associated with
higher nurse staffing.
Summary of Empirical Literature
The empirical literature reviewed examined the relationship between nursing
home nurse staff and Medicare and/or Medicaid reimbursement methods and rates using
national, multi-state, and single-state data. These studies have also used panel, pooled
independent cross-sections, and cross-sectional data. Opportunities lie in examination of
flat-rate and cost-based reimbursement methodologies as they have rarely been studied.
Also, the national studies suffer from using OSCAR data for staffing measures, while all
of these studies share weaknesses in how nursing home markets are defined and
competitors identified.
Flat-rate and cost-based reimbursement methodologies for nursing homes have
rarely been examined, in part, because they are rare. After the passage of AB 1629,
California was only one of three states that used a cost-based strategy for Medicaid
reimbursement (Harrington et al., 2008). Thus, California presents a unique opportunity
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to examine nursing home staffing levels following a significant Medi-Cal reimbursement
method change that was also designed to provide higher reimbursement levels and
improve staffing levels.
All of the national nursing home studies reviewed used OSCAR data to
operationalize the staffing measures. However, the reliability and validity of OSCAR
staffing data has been a concern since each facility is required to report the number of
staffing hours, by category, worked in the 14 days before their periodic survey (Feng et
al., 2005). These periodic inspections are relatively predictable and facilities may
increase staffing just before them to make staffing numbers appear more favorable (Kash,
Hawes et al., 2007). Feng et al. (2005) further maintain that state Medicaid cost reports
hold greater reliability and consistency than the OSCAR data because of this concern.
There is some support for this as Kash, Hawes et al. (2007) found that average staffing
levels were higher in OSCAR than the Texas Medicaid cost report. The present study
uses desk-audited California annual financial data which may more accurately indicate
relationships between reimbursement method and nursing home staffing.
The three previously mentioned AB 1629 reports used California cost report
information for staffing and also examined staffing levels following the reimbursement
method change. However, these studies only had data available up through 2006, lacked
a lucid theoretical framework/conceptual model, and the analyses could be improved by
using a more comprehensive multivariable analysis accounting for organizational
characteristics and environmental factors that may be related to nursing home nurse
staffing.
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Another limitation in the literature is how nursing home competitors have been
defined. The county has been the overwhelming choice used to define markets and
identify competitors usually using a Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of market
concentration (Cawley et al., 2006; Grabowski, 2001b; Grabowski, 2004; Harrington &
Swan, 2003; Intrator et al., 2005; Kash, Castle et al., 2007; Konetzka et al., 2006). Using
this method, Los Angeles County, which is over 4,000 square miles (Wikipedia, 2010),
would overestimate the level of competition because each nursing home would be viewed
as a competitor despite potentially being over a hundred miles apart. Conversely, the
amount of competition facing a nursing home is underestimated when a nursing home in
one county competes with a nursing home located just outside its county boundary
(Grabowski, 2008). An alternative method is to determine a fixed geographic radius
around each facility and use that to identify each nursing home’s market and define the
level of competition accordingly (Baker, 2001). This method has been used in the study
of nursing home arena using a 25 km radius (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008) and
improves on the prevalent method of using counties as markets to determine competition.
However, this method will not account for nursing homes that are across state lines and
within 15 or 25 miles of a California nursing home, but neither would the standard county
calculation. This study will use both a 15 mile and 25 mile radius to determine a nursing
home’s competition with other nursing homes, distinct-part facilities, ICFs, subacute
nursing facilities, MLRCs, and CCRCs.
The final gap in the literature entails identifying competitors. It has been
postulated that increased ALF and HHA use has lessened both nursing home occupancy

72
rates and excess demand in markets because they are substitutable for low acuity patients
(Allen, 2005; Grabowski, Feng et al., 2004; Grabowski, Gruber et al., 2008). However,
these are rarely included in analyses as nursing home competitors, with a few exceptions
(Amirkhanyan, 2007). Excluding these types of facilities may underestimate the level of
competition that nursing homes face.
This study will improve upon previous research in three ways. First, California’s
desk-audited cost reports are used to construct the dependent staffing variables. Second,
this study will take advantage of a unique opportunity to examine the change to a
relatively rare reimbursement methodology. Preliminary studies have also taken
advantage of this reimbursement change. However, this study will contribute to the
literature by improving on their efforts by using a more comprehensive statistical analysis
and creating a robust theoretical framework. Third, this study will define competition
more appropriately by using a fixed radius measure of nursing home market competition,
and including HHA and ALF facilities as competitors in the analysis.
Chapter Summary
The elderly population is projected to grow rapidly in the United States over the
next 40 years. This population growth, when combined with less informal support for
them, will more than likely increase the need for nursing home care. This is despite a
healthier elderly population in terms of ADLs and alternatives such as home health care
and ALFs which may alleviate some of the demand. This is troubling for many
legislatures, policymakers, and other stakeholders since nursing home care is expensive
and predominantly paid for by the federal and state governments. Also worrisome is
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potentially limited access for Medicaid patients and inadequate nurse staffing levels
needed to provide the quality of care in many nursing homes. Federal and government
intervention has sought to address these various concerns through policies such as CON
and bed moratoria, case-mix reimbursement, enactment of different reimbursement
methods, and higher Medicaid rates. Market mechanisms such as publication of quality
information and use of pay-for-performance have also begun.
Reports of poor nursing home care in California in concert with four legislative
bills designed to increase nurse staffing, change Medi-Cal reimbursement method, and
increase Medi-Cal rates culminated in the passage of AB 1629 in 2004. In intent, AB
1629 was California’s attempt to improve Medi-Cal nurse staffing in order to provide the
quality of care California nursing home residents deserve. The Act contained therein also
sought to increase access to appropriate long-term care services, improve wages and
benefits for nursing home workers, support compliance with state and federal
requirements, and encourage administrative efficiency. The focus of this study is on
whether AB 1629 achieved staffing increases, particularly for those nursing homes highly
dependent on Medi-Cal, because the empirical literature shows that both reimbursement
method and rate are related to nurse staffing.

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual model using resource
dependence theory (RDT) and it is organized into four main sections. The first section
defines quality for the purpose of this study and briefly introduces some of the ways
quality has been examined in nursing homes. The second section describes Donabedian’s
(1980) quality framework while focusing on the importance of the structure element. The
third section provides an overview of RDT and its most important constructs. The final
section introduces this study’s conceptual model, formulates hypotheses, and briefly
discusses other factors that need to be accounted for when examining nurse staffing. The
chapter culminates with a brief summary.
Quality Defined
Defining nursing home quality of care is an important first step before introducing
the theoretical framework and conceptual model. Quality essentially encompasses two
components: quality of care (QOC) and quality of life (QOL). The IOM defines the
QOC component as ―the degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current
professional knowledge‖ (IOM, 2001, p. 30). On the other hand, the IOM defines QOL
as ―subjective or objective judgment concerning all aspects of an individual’s existence
including health, economic, political, cultural, environmental, aesthetic, and spiritual
75
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aspects‖ (2001, p. 29). The QOC construct has dominated empirical studies over the
QOL construct in large part because the former has more measures available. This is
especially true when considering the large, administrative databases such as CMS’
OSCAR database and state cost reports that researchers frequently use.
Nursing home QOC has been described as a ―multidimensional‖ construct (Davis, 1991).
As such, nurse staffing (Castle & Engberg, 2005, 2007, 2008; Castle, Engberg et al.,
2008; Kim, Harrington et al., 2009; Kim, Kovner, Harrington, Greene, & Mezey, 2009;
Schnelle et al., 2004); QMs (Castle, Engberg, & Liu, 2007; Werner et al., 2009; Zinn et
al., 2005); and inspection deficiencies (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008; Castle, 2002; Castle &
Longest, 2006; Konetzka et al., 2004) have all been examined. These examinations
commonly use Donabedian’s Structure, Process, and Outcome (SPO) quality framework
alone (Castle & Longest, 2006; Chen & Shea, 2002; Grabowski, 2001a; Hillmer,
Wodchis, Gill, Anderson, & Rochon, 2005; Munroe, 1990; Zinn, 1994) and/or in concert
with an organizational or economic theory (Aaronson, Zinn, & Rosko, 1994; Decker,
2008; Harrington et al., 2007; Kim, Kovner et al., 2009; Starkey et al., 2005; WeechMaldonado et al., 2003; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004).
Donabedian’s Quality Framework
Donabedian (1980) introduced SPO as the three important elements of QOC.
Structure is a blunt measure of QOC and it encompasses the human, physical, and
financial resources needed to produce care (Donabedian, 1980). It also includes the
number, distribution, and qualifications of professional personnel. Many studies have
used this framework to examine nursing home staffing (Aaronson et al., 1994; Decker,
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2008; Grabowski, 2001a; Zinn, 1994). Donabedian further stated that structure was
relevant to quality because it increased or decreased the probability of good performance
and ―is probably the most important means of protecting and promoting the quality of
care‖ (1980, p. 82). Facility specific nursing home staffing was made available on CMS’
NHC website in 1999 and California nursing home staffing information has been
available on California’s Nursing Home Search website since October 2002 (Harrington,
O’Meara, Collier, & Schnelle, 2003).
Processes of care are sets of activities that occur within and between staff and
patients according to Donabedian (1980). He further stated that these processes of care
were normative behaviors derived from either the science of medicine or society’s ethics
and values. CMS began publishing 10 QMs, a combination of process and outcome
measures, nationally on its NHC website beginning in November 2002 as part of its
NHQI (Fermazin et al., 2003; Mukamel, Weimer, Spector, Ladd, & Zinn, 2008). These
measures were based on resident-level data obtained from the MDS and they have
subsequently been studied by researchers. For instance, process QMs such as restraint
use (Castle & Engberg, 2005; Grabowski, Angelelli et al., 2004; Grabowski, Gruber et
al., 2008; Mukamel et al., 2008) and catheter use (Castle & Engberg, 2005; Grabowski,
Angelelli et al., 2004; Grabowski, Gruber et al., 2008) have commonly been examined.
Patient outcomes were the last element in Donabedian’s QOC framework.
Outcomes were described as ―a change in a patient’s current and future health status that
can be attributed to antecedent health care‖ (1980, p. 82). CMS NHC outcome measures
such as residents with moderate to severe pain (Castle & Engberg, 2008; Castle, Engberg,
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et al., 2008; Grabowski, Angelelli et al., 2004) or residents whose ability to move
about in and around their room got worse (Castle & Longest, 2006; Castle, Engberg et
al., 2008; Castle, Liu, & Engberg, 2008) have been studied.
Examination of structures, processes, and outcomes are the three major
approaches to quality assessment and there is functional relationship between these three
elements (Donabedian, 1980). For instance, structural characteristics influence processes
of care thereby enhancing or diminishing QOC. Moreover, process of care changes
influence the effect of care on health status (i.e., outcomes). Donabedian offers a simple
schematic shown in Figure 3. Thus, single elements of this framework can be studied
alone or the relationships between them studied.

Figure 3. Donabedian’s relationship between quality elements.

The focus of this study is on the structure element of Donabedian’s framework.
More specifically nurse staffing as the dependent variable, because AB 1629 set out to
specifically improve nursing home staffing and because staffing is critical to the
protection and promotion of QOC as described by Donabedian. Moreover, staffing is
considered a structural element of quality in of itself. RDT will be used to construct
hypotheses based on organizational characteristics and environmental factors that may be
related to nurse staffing in California nursing homes.
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Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory has commonly been used in health care research
including studies of nursing homes (Banaszak-Holl, Zinn, & Mor, 1996; Davis, Brannon,
& Whitman, 2009; Decker, 2008; Harrington et al., 2007; Intrator et al., 2005; Starkey et
al., 2005; Zinn, Proenca, & Rosko, 1997; Zinn, Weech, & Brannon, 1998; Zinn, Mor,
Castle, Intrator, & Brannon, 1999); hospitals (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989; Hsieh,
Clement, & Bazzoli, 2010; Kazley & Ozcan, 2007; Nayar, 2008; Proenca, Rosko, &
Zinn, 2000; Proenca, Rosko, & Zinn, 2003; Zinn et al., 1997); and outpatient facilities
(Alexander & Wells, 2008; Campbell & Alexander, 2005). It remains a useful
organizational theory over three decades after being introduced. This is mainly because it
considers both organizational characteristics and environmental factors in an
organization’s response to resource dependencies, environmental changes and pressures,
and uncertainty--conditions all organizations face to varying degrees. The passage of AB
1629 is a prime example of an environmental change. Thus, RDT is particularly
applicable to this study because California nursing homes may respond differently to AB
1629 based on their level of Medi-Cal dependence, other organizational characteristics,
and environmental factors.
Overview
Resource dependence theory operates in the open system, natural model realm.
The open system portion acknowledges the vital importance of the environment, while
the natural perspective stresses that organizations are social groups attempting to adapt to
their particular circumstances and environment in order to survive (Scott & Davis, 2007).
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The passage of AB 1629 in this case is an environmental change that may require
adaptation depending on an organization’s characteristics and environment. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) outlined RDT in their seminal work, The External Control of
Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (later republished in 2003 with a
new introduction). The central theme of this work is that organizational activities and
outcomes are determined by the environment or social context. Organizations do not
control all the resources they need to operate, and as a consequence must exchange
resources with others in order to survive. This drives organizational decisions.
In response, organizations use various means available to them to try to avoid or manage
dependence in an attempt to maintain as much autonomy as possible (Aldrich, 1979;
Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). However, organizational actions
are never completely successful and new patterns of dependence and interdependence
emerge (Pfeffer, 1997). Therefore, it is important that managers not only manage their
structures, but also their environments to reduce or manage dependencies (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003; Scott, 2004). Figure 4 illustrates the important RDT constructs of
interdependence, uncertainty, dependence, competition, and munificence as well as a few
organizational response options when resource dependence and uncertainty are both high.
Interdependence
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) state that organizational exchanges and transactions
may entail monetary or physical resources, information, or social legitimacy with other
groups and organizations and these exchanges and transactions create interdependencies.
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Organizational Environment
Focal Organization
Environmental Structure

Concentration of
Resource Control

Resource Importance

• Competition
Resource Dependence

Resource
Exchanges

Uncertainty

• Interconnectedness

Interdependence

Exchange
Organization
Resource Discretion

Low Dependence,
High Uncertainty
Not Problematic for
Focal Organization

High Dependence,
High Uncertainty
• Compliance
• Change Strategies

• Avoidance

Focal Organization’s Response Options

Figure 4. Resource dependence theory model.

• Resource Munificence
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These interdependencies exist between organizations whenever one organization does not
entirely control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for
obtaining the desired outcome from that action. They also maintain that when these
exchanges are asymmetrical, some power accrues to the less dependent organization
which may be used to influence or compel the weaker one. Thus, organizational behavior
is constrained and shaped by the demands and pressures of organizations in its
environment—a consequence of the open-systems nature of organizations. Moreover,
these interdependencies can create problems of uncertainty. The resulting
interdependence, when coupled with the ambiguity of the exchange organization’s
actions, leads to a situation in which survival and continued success are uncertain (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978).
Uncertainty
Pffefer and Salancik (2003) describe uncertainty as the degree that future
conditions cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted. Furthermore, it is the
predicated on the structural characteristics of the environment in which an organization
resides. As such, it may be partially looked upon as an outcome of an environment’s
structural elements. Additionally, competition plays an important role in environmental
uncertainty especially when resources are scarce. In response to environmental
uncertainty, organizations may comply with environmental demands, use organizational
change strategies, or attempt to avoid resource dependence and control.
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Dependence
According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1987) uncertainty is only problematic when it
involves critical elements on which an organization depends. They further state that this
dependence is based on three factors. The first factor is internal and it is resource
importance or how much the focal organization requires it for continued operation and
survival. The second factor is external to the focal organization and it is the extent to
which the exchange organization has discretion of the resource’s allocation and its use.
The final factor is also external and it is the concentration of resource control.
Resource importance is essentially the extent to which the focal organization has come to
depend on certain types of exchanges for resources in order to operate and survive. There
are two factors that determine resource importance: magnitude of the exchange and how
critical the resource is to focal organization. The magnitude of an exchange can be
thought of as the proportion of total inputs or outputs accounted for by the exchange
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Conversely, the criticality of the resource is the ability of the
focal organization to operate in the absence of a given resource and this factor is more
difficult to determine than magnitude of the exchange.
The exchange group’s discretion over resource allocation and use is the second
factor determining resource dependence. The discretion over resources provides the
exchange group power especially when the resource is scarce. Resource control can be
based on: (a) possession of resource; (b) access to resource; and (c) the ability to make
rules, regulate the possession, allocation, and use of resources and have the ability to
enforce these regulations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Concentration of resource control
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is the final factor determining the focal organization’s dependence on a resource. This
concentration of resource control is the extent to which input or output exchanges are
made by a relatively few, or only one for that matter, significant organizations. Pfeffer
and Salancik (2003) point out that the number of suppliers or purchasers is not as critical
as whether or not the focal organization has access to resources from additional sources.
Thus, the essence of concentration of resource control is the ability of the focal
organization to substitute sources for the same resource. These three factors combined
determine an organization’s dependence on another. More specifically, Pfeffer and
Salancik state that ―dependence can then be defined as the product of the importance of a
given input or output to the organization and the extent to which it is controlled by a
relatively few organizations‖ (2003, p. 51). Dependence then ultimately boils down to
the importance of the external organizations in the focal organization’s environment and
how much they must be accounted for and considered in decision-making (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003).
Structural Characteristics of the Environment
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) discussed three main structural characteristics of an
organization’s environment: (a) concentration; (b) munificence, and (c)
interconnectedness. Environmental concentration was described as the degree in which
power and authority in the environment was distributed (i.e., competition), while
munificence was the availability of critical resources in the environment.
Interconnectedness was expressed as the number and patterns of linkages between
organizations within an environment (i.e., network of relationships). Concentration and
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munificence alter the intensity of conflict between organizations. In essence, there is less
organizational conflict when there is a higher concentration of organizations (i.e., less
competition) and more resource munificence in the environment. On the other hand,
munificence and interconnectedness cause varying levels of interdependence. Higher
levels of munificence result in less interdependence, but higher degrees of
interconnectedness produce more interdependence. Higher levels of conflict and
interdependence consequently result in a higher amount of uncertainty that an
organization faces in its environment. In response, organizations seek to avoid or
manage dependence by adapting to the environment or altering the environment so it fits
the organization’s capabilities.
Managing Environmental Demands
Organizations have many options available to them when trying to manage
environmental demands. These responses include compliance, avoiding influence,
managing the conditions of social control, and managing and avoiding dependence
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Compliance with external demands is avoided when possible
because it results in lost autonomy; however, it is not always possible to avoid
compliance especially when dealing with powerful organizations in one’s environment.
Avoiding influence and managing the conditions of social control are more successful
when dealing with less powerful groups in the environment, but are not effective when
dealing with powerful organizations that control critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003). In these circumstances, organizations seek to manage and avoid dependence.
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Organizational change strategies and resource dependence avoidance are a couple
of ways that organizations can manage and avoid dependence when dealing with
powerful organizations. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) list many change strategies that
organizations may employ in attempts to fit its environment. These strategies include
adapting its (a) structure; (b) information system; (c) patterns of management and human
relations; (d) technology; (e) product; or (f) definition of the environment. Conversely,
the organization may attempt to use strategies to affect the environment. These include
diversification, mergers, cooptation, and government lobby.
Organizations may also choose to try to avoid resource dependence through
buffering, controlling rules of trade, pursuit of substitutable exchanges, and
diversification (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Buffering is building up an inventory of
resources large enough to continue operations even when resources are scare. Moreover,
the development of substitutable exchanges is an attempt to lessen the importance of an
exchange. Diversification is movement into different business lines.
Aldrich (1979) agreed with Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) that maintaining as much
autonomy as possible and avoiding unnecessary dependence on others was of the utmost
importance. He outlined a hierarchy of preferred organization relation strategies going
for most preferred to least preferred: (a) proprietary strategies, such as product
differentiation, in which an organization maintains possession and control over resources
and protects organizational boundaries; (b) strategies which require cooperation or
negotiation with other organizations on a dyadic basis (e.g., cooptation, joint ventures,
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and mergers); and (3) the development of action sets (e.g., joint lobbying group) as the
least preferred strategies (Aldrich, 1979).
Although popular, RDT does have some detractors. Some critics of RDT point to
its lack of attention to the spatial character of social action and structure, that it ignores
social class when considering ties, and that the ability of managers to manage
environmental dependencies is more limited because of a shift to investor capitalism
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Additionally, others point out four sources of ambiguity in
RDT: (a) constraint absorption does not discriminate between power imbalance and
mutual dependence, (b) RDT is both a normative and positive theory leading to
prescriptions that are often confounded with predictions, (c) the scope conditions of the
RDT model are ambiguous, and (d) although RDT is based on dyadic relationships,
empirical tests tend to focus on only one organization without considering the other’s
reciprocal dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Despite these critiques RDT
remains a powerful theory. This may in part lie in part by it offering a unifying theory of
power (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). However, perhaps its greatest strength is giving
credence to organizational adaptability versus a natural selection approach like
population ecology.
Conceptual Model
The use of RDT to hypothesize nurse staffing in nursing homes is suitable for this
study’s research questions for a few reasons. First, a nursing home’s response to AB
1629 surely varied based on the environmental factors that it faced. RDT is therefore an
appropriate theory because it outlines potential responses to exogenous changes in the
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environment including organizational change strategies, resource dependence avoidance,
resource control avoidance, or even no change when organizations are not dependent on a
particular resource for survival.
Nursing homes also have unique organizational characteristics that may have
affected how it reacted to the legislation. For instance, it is quite possible the amount of
dependence on Medi-Cal revenues may be the best predictor of how these nursing homes
reacted in terms of nurse staffing changes. Thus, RDT remains the proper theory since it
effectively frames important organizational characteristics such as resource dependence,
size, and slack resources and accounts for environmental factors like competition,
resource control concentration, and resource munificence which may impact
organizational responses.
Nursing homes may have also had different reasons for increasing nurse staffing
following AB 1629. For instance, there was pressure to increase nurse staffing in nursing
homes as witnessed by the legislation leading up to AB 1629, but the problem may have
been inadequate Medi-Cal reimbursement rates that were not high enough to permit
additional nurse staffing investments. Thus, higher Medi-Cal reimbursement rates post
AB 1629 may have allowed nursing homes to meet nurse staffing level pressures.
Nursing homes may have also increased nurse staffing in an attempt to differentiate their
products and services, particularly in competitive markets.
Nursing homes can differentiate their products in many ways, but one way is
through quality improvements. Thus, higher staffing levels are a structural measure of
quality and are readily available on NHC. RDT again appropriately accounts for these
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different circumstances. Figure 5 is the RDT-based conceptual model with the control
variables thought to influence staffing.
Research Hypotheses
There are three RDT-based organizational characteristics of interest for this study.
The first two are nursing home size and slack resources which may affect a nursing
home’s response to external pressures. The third one is resource dependence which is the
product of resource importance (organizational characteristic) and resource concentration
(environmental factor). These two constructs were shown externally in Figure 5 for the
sake of clarity. Additionally, resource munificence and competition are important
environmental factors as they may also shape nursing home responses such as structural
quality changes through changes in nurse staffing. Other pertinent control variables are
included which may impact nurse staffing levels according to the empirical literature.
Organizational Characteristics
Compliance with external demands is more likely in organizations that depend on
external organizations for scarce resources or for resources needed for survival (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). Although these demands vary based on the actors involved and their
sometimes competing interests, a few examples of external demands include minimum
nurse staffing standards, profit maximization, and providing high quality care. For
instance, a study of community orientation found that hospitals with a higher dependence
on managed care had a positive relationship with community orientation thereby
illustrating compliance with external demands (Proenca et al., 2000). A nursing home’s
dependence on Medi-Cal revenue is determined by the magnitude of the exchange
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Resource Dependence Theory Constructs
Related to Organizational Adaptation in
Response to Environmental Changes
Organizational Characteristics:

Control Variables:
• Medi-Cal Reimbursement Rate
• Market Nurse Pay Rates
• Unemployment Rate

• Size
• Slack Resources

Environmental Factors:
Environmental Change:

• Resource Munificence

• Passage of AB 1629

• Competition

Resource Concentration

Resource Dependence

Resource Importance

Figure 5. Conceptual model derived from resource dependence theory.

Structural Quality Changes
• Change in Nurse Staffing
o Registered Nurse
o Licensed Vocational Nurse
o Nurse Aides & Orderlies
o Total Nurse Staffing
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(resource importance) multiplied by how concentrated the control of the resource in the
nursing home’s environment (resource concentration). Hence, nursing homes are more
dependent on Medi-Cal, the higher the product value of the interaction term (resource
importance × resource concentration). Higher resource dependence increases pressure on
the nursing homes to meet external demands such as providing higher nurse staffing.
However, California was in the bottom 10% of Medicaid (Medi-Cal) nursing home
reimbursement rates prior to the implementation of the AB 1629 (California Health
Policy and Data Advisory Committee, 2005). This meant that nursing homes highly
dependent on Medi-Cal may not have had the financial resources means necessary to hire
additional nurse staff. For instance, Harrington et al. (2007) found that a higher
dependence on Medicaid patients resulted in lower RN and total nurse staffing.
Nursing homes with high Medi-Cal dependence benefitted the most from AB
1629. These facilities saw their Medi-Cal revenues increase via higher Medi-Cal
reimbursement rates. They also had a lower quality assurance fee (QAF) burden since
the QAF (essentially a provider tax on the number of resident days) was returned to them
through a pass-through for each Medi-Cal patient. This may have provided them the
ability to meet the external demands of increasing their nurse staffing. Changing their
nurse staffing may have also been a strategic response. This is because additional
staffing would later lead to higher reimbursement rates due to higher staff costs and the
labor driven operating allocation (LDOA) which was a bonus reimbursement percentage
above and beyond the cost of nurse staffing. Conversely, facilities with low Medi-Cal
dependence did not see their Medi-Cal revenue increase much and they also had a higher
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QAF burden. Low Medi-Cal resource dependence for these nursing homes meant they
were less likely to react to these changes by altering their staffing structure.
Therefore:
H1: Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased
nurse staffing relative to nursing homes with lower Medi-Cal dependence
post AB 1629, other things constant.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) state that larger organizations have more control over
critical activities which reduces problematic dependence, provides stability, and reduces
uncertainty. They also maintain that larger organizations are better equipped to resist
immediate pressures for change (e.g., increase nurse staffing, improve quality of care, or
expand access to care) from policymakers, stakeholders, and legislators. Therefore,
larger organizations have more time to recognize threats in the environment and adapt to
them accordingly. Hence, larger facilities may not have felt enough pressure to increase
nurse staffing after the passage of AB 1629. This is supported by Harrington et al. (2007)
who found that larger facilities had fewer RN HPRD and total nurse HPRD in a national
study of nursing home staffing and Medicaid reimbursement rates (Harrington et al.,
2007). Conversely, smaller facilities may have felt much greater pressure to adapt their
nurse staffing in response to environmental demands associated with AB 1629.
Therefore:
H2: Smaller nursing homes increased nurse staffing relative to large
nursing homes post AB 1629, other things constant.
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) stated that organizational slack, extra profits or other
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resources, enable organizations to manage competing environmental demands. Many
demands can at least be partially satisfied when slack resources are available. This means
that California nursing homes may have been able to meet pressures to increase nurse
staffing when slack resources were available. Slack resources were also probably needed
because hiring new or replacing lost staff is an expensive process. For example, a
conservative rule-of-thumb for employee turnover is that the cost of hiring a new
employee is 25% of his or her annual compensation amount (Seavey, 2004). Thus, a RN
with an annual compensation of $50,000 would cost about $12,500 to replace.
Hence:
H3: Nursing homes with more slack resources, (e.g., higher cash flow)
increased nurse staffing post AB 1629, other things constant.
Environmental Factors
California nursing homes in competitive markets compete for scarce resources
(i.e., potential residents). One way to attract residents is through product differentiation
(Aldrich, 1979). Nurse staffing level information had been available to potential
California residents and their families on CMS’ NHC website since 1999 and California’s
Nursing Home Search since October 2002 (Harrington et al., 2003). This permitted
potential residents and/or their families the ability to distinguish between nursing homes
based on the structure element of quality. In addition, staffing is perhaps an easier
quality measure to understand because generally more staffing indicates a higher quality
of care. Empirical nursing home studies by and large support this positive association
between higher competition and nurse staffing (Feng et al., 2008; Grabowski, 2001a,
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2002, 2004). This may have meant that California nursing homes, in competitive markets
before AB 1629, sought to distinguish themselves from others with better nurse staffing.
Additionally, AB 1629 gave each nursing home even greater incentive to compete for
Medi-Cal residents due to the higher reimbursement rates based in large part on staffing
costs. This may have provided these facilities the resources necessary to increase staffing
particularly since the increased staffing costs would be a part of future reimbursement
rates. Thus:
H4: Nursing homes in more competitive markets had higher nurse
staffing, other things constant.
Higher munificence or availability of resources is associated with lower
environmental conflict and interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Scott & Davis,
2007). As such there is less uncertainty and greater access to resources. Nursing homes
must take into account the resources available from the environment, such as per capita
income or percentage of the population age 85 and older, when making hiring and
staffing decisions. A higher per capita income and a greater percentage of the population
over age 85 both indicate more favorable environments for nursing homes. A higher per
capita income is an indicator of a more affluent environment that could more readily
afford higher private-pay nursing home charges. This would result in higher patient
revenue thereby providing a means to increase nurse staffing. Similarly, a higher
percentage of the population over age 85 indicates a higher demand for nursing home
services which may translate into less competition and also higher charges. This may
again provide the means necessary for nursing homes to hire additional nurse staffing.
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Conversely, nursing homes may employ cost-cutting strategies such as lowering nurse
staff or using contract nurse staff to meet minimum staffing standards (Bourbonniere et
al., 2006) in less munificent markets. This is supported by empirical research that
confirms a positive link between higher resource munificence and nursing home nurse
staffing (Cohen & Spector, 1996; Grabowski, 2001a, 2002, 2004; Harrington et al., 2007;
Kash et al., 2006). Hence:
H5: Nursing homes in markets with higher resource munificence (e.g.,
higher per capita income and greater % of population over 85) were
positively associated with nurse staffing, other things constant.
Other Factors Related to Nurse Staffing
There are other organizational characteristics and environmental factors which lie
outside the RDT theoretical framework that may also impact California nursing homes’
nurse staffing decisions. Organizational characteristics include Medi-Cal reimbursement
rate, resident case-mix, ownership type, and chain membership. Similarly, environmental
factors such as market nurse staff pay rates and the unemployment rate have shown an
association with nurse staffing.
Cross-sectional, single-state studies have shown a relationship between Medicaid
reimbursement rates and nursing home staffing. These studies have the advantage of
examining facility specific rates because they use state cost reports whereas the national
studies use average rate for each state. A Texas nursing home cross-sectional study
found that higher Medicaid reimbursement rates were positively associated with RN,
LPN, and CNA HPRD (Kash, Castle et al., 2007). Similarly, a cross-sectional
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investigation of nursing homes in New York State found that higher facility-specific
Medicaid rates were associated with a higher number of RNs (Grabowski, 2001b). A
cross-sectional study of California nursing homes also revealed that Medi-Cal
reimbursement rates were positively associated with RN staffing hours (Harrington &
Swan, 2003).
Resident case-mix has been shown to be related to nurse staffing in that increased
patient acuity customarily requires additional nurse staffing. Nursing homes studies by
Grabowski (2001, 2002, 2004) and Swan and Harrington (2003), all show a positive
relationship between higher ADL requirements and nurse staffing. Further, other casemix measures such as the acuity index (Feng et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2006),
intravenous therapy availability (Bourbonniere et al., 2006), tracheotomy care availability
(Bourbonniere et al., 2006), and high rehabilitation intensity (Bourbonniere et al., 2006)
have all also been positively associated with nurse staffing in nursing homes.
Ownership type may have also affected staffing levels in California nursing
homes. In essence, for-profit (FP) owned nursing homes are thought to maximize profits
by setting output, quality, and patient mix at levels necessary to achieve this objective for
shareholders (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). Thus, they may reduce nurse staffing in
the pursuit of profits. Not-for-profit (NFP) and government owned nursing homes on the
other hand have a ―non-distribution constraint‖ which prohibits them from distributing
residual earnings to individuals who exercise control over the nursing home, such as
officers, directors, or members (Hansmann, 1987). Thus, given that government and
NFP owned nursing homes do not have defined shareholders, there is less incentive for
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them to maximize profit and even greater incentive to maximize other objectives such as
increasing quality or access (Grabowski & Stevenson, 2008). Empirical research
supports that NFP ownership indeed has higher staffing levels when compared to FP
ownership (Harrington & Swan, 2003; Harrington et al., 2007; Kash et al., 2006; Kash,
Castle et al., 2007; Mueller et al., 2006).
Chain membership may reduce the cost of capital, facilitate the transfer of
knowledge between facilities, and allow for greater economies of scale (Davis et al.,
2009). It may also provide additional access to capital and administrative expertise
(Shah, Fennell, & Mor, 2001). As such, members of chains may benefit from shared
experience and hiring practices (Intrator et al., 2005) that would ease the hiring of nurse
staff. Empirical evidence in general shows a positive relationship between chain
membership and higher RN and LPN staffing (Grabowski, 2001b). Of note, ownership
type and chain membership are not included in the first difference, fixed effects
estimation analyses because these constant variables would be ―washed away.‖
Nurse wages may also impact the amount of nursing home nurse staffing. In
essence, the higher the market wages the lower the ability of nursing home’s to hire
additional nurse staff (Harrington et al., 2007; Zinn, 1993). On the other hand, higher
nurse staff wages may increase their supply in the market perhaps enhancing the ability
of nursing homes to hire them. This effect may be tempered somewhat because nursing
homes have historically been viewed as the least desirable employers in terms of working
conditions (Bourbonniere et al., 2006). Research has shown a negative relationship
between wages and nursing home nurse staffing (Harrington et al., 2007; Zinn, 1993).

98
The unemployment rate is expected to be related to nurse staffing particularly for RNs.
High unemployment rates may mean that spouses of married RNs lost jobs or worried
they may lose them shortly. This actual or potential loss of household income may
compel RNs to make up for the lost income by increasing their nursing activities or reentering the nurse workforce (Buerhaus, Auerbach, & Staiger, 2007). This would
increase their supply in the market. A cross-sectional study of California nursing homes
indeed found higher RN HPRD in markets with higher unemployment rates (Harrington
& Swan, 2003).
Chapter Summary
Nursing homes do not control all of the resources necessary to survive and
continue operations. Hence, they depend on a combination of public, private, and
insurance payers to pay for supplies and services rendered for their patients and residents.
The Medicaid and Medicare programs, respectively, make the bulk of the payments to
these facilities making them a force to be reckoned with for most nursing homes. The
more dependent nursing homes are on this revenue, the more likely they are to succumb
to the various pressures put on them by these programs. The desire for increased nurse
staffing in California nursing homes was one such pressure, but prior to AB 1629 the
Medi-Cal reimbursement level was low which made it difficult for some nursing homes
to hire additional staff. AB 1629 was passed in part to provide the means necessary for
California nursing homes to increase staffing. This provided California nursing homes an
opportunity to adapt their nurse staffing structures to match the changed external
environment.
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Nursing home reaction to AB 1629 undoubtedly varied based on unique
organizational characteristics and the environment in which the nursing home operated.
This makes RDT an appropriate theoretical framework as it takes into account various
organizational characteristics such as resource dependence, size, and slack that may be
related to nurse staffing changes after the passage of AB 1629. The theory also outlines
various tactics in response to exogenous changes in the environment as well as
environmental factors like competition and munificence that may affect a nursing homes
response. Table 3 summarizes this study’s hypotheses derived from RDT.
Table 3
Summary of Hypotheses With Expected Sign
Hypothesis

Expected Sign

H1: Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased
nurse staffing relative to nursing homes with lower Medi-Cal
dependence post AB 1629, other things constant.

+

H2: Smaller nursing homes increased nurse staffing relative to large
nursing homes post AB 1629, other things constant.

+

H3: Nursing homes with more slack resources (e.g., higher cash flow)
increased nurse staffing post AB 1629, other things constant.

+

H4: Nursing homes in more competitive markets had higher nurse
staffing, other things constant.

+

H5: Nursing homes in markets with higher resource munificence
(e.g., higher per capita income and greater percentage of population
over 85) were positively associated with nurse staffing, other things
constant.

+

CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the study’s methodologies used to ascertain whether
California nursing home nurse staffing increased following implementation of AB 1629.
The research design is introduced first along with a short discussion on threats to design
validity. This is followed by a description of the data sources, study sample, and the
variables with their accompanying measures. The analytical procedures are then detailed
and the chapter closes with a brief summary.
Research Design
The research design for this study is based on the natural experiment concept
(similar to a quasi-experimental design) found in the economics literature. A natural
experiment occurs when an exogenous event, such as a change in government policy,
alters the environment in which firms operate (Wooldridge, 2006). A natural experiment
has a control group, which is not typically affected by the policy change, but there is a
treatment group which is expected to be affected by the change (Polit & Beck, 2004).
Wooldridge (2006) asserts that the difference between a true experiment and a natural
experiment lies in the fact that true experiments have treatment and control groups that
are randomly chosen. Conversely, the treatment and control groups in a natural
experiment are the result of a policy change.
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California’s AB 1629 may be viewed as a natural experiment, although most
California nursing homes were affected by AB 1629 because only a very small
percentage of the nursing homes do not have Medi-Cal residents. However, there are
varying levels of Medi-Cal dependence meaning that there would be a stronger AB 1629
impact for some nursing homes. This is straightforward as nursing homes with high
Medi-Cal dependence gained the most from AB 1629, while those with low Medi-Cal
dependence gained the least. The treatment group of most interest is nursing homes with
high Medi-Cal dependence, while the control group is nursing homes with low Medi-Cal
dependence. A control group with zero exposure to AB 1629 was not available because
only about 5%-7% of California’s nursing home population do not treat Medi-Cal
residents and the non-CMS certified nursing homes do not have case-mix information.
Quartiles are used in this study to create four groups based on a nursing home’s
baseline measure of Medi-Cal dependence in 2002. The top quartile had the highest
degree of Medi-Cal dependence and the lowest quartile had the least. The second and
third quartiles are also appealing because there may have been a dose effect (Konetzka et
al., 2004). This dose effect occurs when larger effects are observed as each subsequent
quartile is compared to the control group. Meyer (1995) also stated that multiple groups
have an advantage in that it may allow further checks of hypotheses and the elimination
of alternative explanations. It is noteworthy that the low Medi-Cal dependence control
group in this study was exposed to AB 1629 because the nursing homes in the group
received Medi-Cal payments, albeit a much smaller amount when compared to the high
Medi-Cal dependence quartile.
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Specifically, this is a difference-in-difference panel data study design that can
separate the AB 1629 effects from macro-effects that may cause changes in the
dependent variable over the study period (Konetzka et al., 2004). The unit of analysis is
free-standing California nursing homes and the pre-AB 1629 period is 2002-2004 and the
post-AB 1629 period is 2006-2007. Two periods (pre-AB 1629 and post-AB 1629) with
multiple years in each period are used because it permits the examination of various
validity threats and allows researchers to examine if the treatment and control groups
moved in parallel (Meyer, 1995). The 2005 data are excluded from the main analyses
because this is a transitional phase between the time when the legislation was passed and
the initial effects of AB 1629 were felt. The research design is graphically depicted in
Figure 6 below where ―O‖ represents a yearly observation for each nursing home and
―X‖ represents the introduction of AB 1629 for the two main study groups of interest
(i.e., high and low Medi-Cal dependence).

O2002
O2002

O2003
O2003

O2004 X
O2004

O2006
O2006

O2007
O2007

High Medi-Cal Dependence
Low Medi-Cal Dependence

Figure 6. Research design

This design is similar to a quasi-experimental, time series nonequivalent control
group design. However, the groups were not randomly assigned in this study. The
groups were created based on their level of Medi-Cal dependence in 2002 to determine
the effect of the exogenous AB 1629 legislation on nursing home staffing changes. This
means that the groups may not have been initially equivalent. Therefore, statistical
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procedures are required to control for the differences in organizational characteristics
and environmental factors. Also, the study uses panel data instead of time series. Panel
data allows for the control of time-invariant fixed effects that may have been omitted
variables and confounded the results.
Design Validity
The overarching consideration when choosing a study design is whether or not the
design provides trustworthy answers to the research questions by addressing threats to
design validity (Polit & Beck, 2004). The types of design validity include internal,
external, statistical conclusion, and construct. All four types are important, but internal
and external validity are of greater concern.
Internal Validity
Internal design validity is the ability to make inferences that the independent
variables are truly causing or are associated with the dependent variable after controlling
for confounding or extraneous factors (Polit & Beck, 2004). Thus, the key question is
whether observed changes in nurse staffing can be attributed to AB 1629 and not to other
causes. A good research design addresses the major threats to internal validity. Table 4
summarizes how this study’s design tackles the various threats to internal validity.
External Validity
External validity seeks to ensure the study is generalizable to other settings and
samples (Polit & Beck, 2004). In other words, it is the degree to which the conclusions
found in this study would hold for other nursing homes in other states and at other times
(Trochim, 2006). This is a single state study that may limit generalizability to other
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Table 4
Threats to Internal Design Validity

Threat

Source

Solution

History

California nursing homes may have been exposed to
extraneous events that influenced nurse staffing, but
that were not related to AB 1629.

A control group is included which would have also
been exposed to these potential events.

Maturation

Nursing home staffing changed during study period.

A control group is included and there are also a series
of pre and post measures.

Selection bias

Nursing homes with varying levels of Medi-Cal
dependence may have been fundamentally
different.

Measures Medi-Cal dependence before implementation
of AB 1629 and other differences are controlled for via
independent and control variables in the estimation
procedures.

Mortality

Some nursing homes changed ownership or
closed during study period.

Nursing homes that changed ownership or closed during
the study period are removed from analyses.

Statistical
regression

Nursing homes' Medi-Cal dependence grouped
on extreme scores.

Nursing homes were grouped based at a point in time
before AB 1629 and level of Medi-Cal dependence
should have been stable prior to AB 1629. Thus, this

Interaction of
selection and
maturation

Nursing home nurse staffing changes over time and
due to pre-existing differences.

The series of pre and post measures can identify
interaction effects.
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Table 4 - continued

Threat

Source

Solution

Testing

Pretest sensitivity to performance on posttest
measures.

Study uses secondary data and a baseline measure of
Medi-Cal dependence. Thus, it does not apply.

Instrumentation

Changes in the instrument used to collect the data.
For instance, changing the wording on
California's nursing home financial disclosure
forms.

A control group is used that is exposed to the same
instrument.
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states. However, California is thought to be the largest and most diverse state in the
continental United States (Phibbs & Robinson, 1993). California also has the largest
number of nursing home beds of any state and its nursing homes are similar to national
averages in terms of total average staffing levels, nurse turnover rates, resident
characteristics, resident payer sources, and occupancy rates (Harrington & Swan, 2003).
Hence, positive results that show a relationship between the new reimbursement method
and increased nurse staffing in California may be generalizable to other states.
Statistical Conclusion Validity
Polit and Beck (2004) note that the first criterion for establishing causality is
demonstrating that there is an empirical relationship between the independent and
dependent variable. As such, appropriate statistical methods are needed to ensure
statistical conclusion validity. A couple of threats to statistical construct validity are low
statistical power and inadequate precision. Basically, small sample sizes limit statistical
power and the resulting analyses may fail to show a relationship between the independent
and dependent variables (Polit & Beck, 2004). Low statistical power is not an issue in
this study because the population of free-standing nursing homes in California is used
(with some exclusions) instead of random sampling.
Inadequate precision can result when inaccurate measurement tools are used,
there is poor control over extraneous variables, and inappropriate or weak statistical
methods are utilized (Polit & Beck, 2004). This study uses audited financial data and
other widely accepted and used data for measures. Additionally, the study controls for
extraneous variables that may affect the dependent variables and strong statistical
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procedures, based on panel data, are used to control for fixed-effects that may be
omitted variables. Thus, inadequate precision should not be present in this study
especially when considering that the measures used in this study are commonly found in
the empirical literature.
Construct Validity
Construct validity is essentially the degree to which a given instrument properly
measures the construct being investigated (Polit & Beck, 2004). There are multiple
threats to construct validity including demand traits, expectancy effects, compensatory
rivalry effects, compensatory equalization effects, and novelty effects. However, these
threats are based on the reaction of people or organizations to an experiment and/or
instrument used to collect data for the experiment. However, these should not be a factor
because this study is based on a natural experiment without the use of a researchercontrived intervention or instrument.
Data Sources
California state agencies provide the bulk of the data for this study. These state
agencies include the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(COSHPD), California Department of Finance, California Department of Social Services,
California Department of Health Care Services, and the California Department of Public
Health. Other data sources include the University of Southern California, Brown
University, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
All nursing homes are required to submit an Integrated Disclosure and Medi-Cal Cost
Report within 4 months of the nursing home’s fiscal year end (Office of Statewide Health
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Planning and Development - Healthcare Information Division, 2008). The report
contains detailed financial and utilization information about each nursing home to include
nurse staffing information. The COSHPD offers this data as ―submitted‖ by each facility
or upon completion of their desk-audit. The desk-audit encompasses a COSHPD
algorithm that is run on the facility submitted disclosure reports (Mr. Ty Christensen,
personal communications, March 5, 2010). The process flags values that are outside of a
predetermined threshold and COSHPD sends questions to the facility in a back-and-forth
process until the issue is resolved. Approximately 98% of the facilities receive questions
on their submitted reports and COSHPD spends an average of 4 hours on each long-term
care submitted report according to Mr. Christensen. This gives COSHPD an advantage
over other data sources including CMS OSCAR data. OSCAR data have been deemed
less reliable, particularly for staffing variables, because there are concerns that nursing
homes may ―staff up‖ before state inspections (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Kash, Hawes
et al., 2007). COSHPD staffing measures do not suffer from this problem because they
are based on a facility’s entire fiscal year. The COSHPD also provides the nurse wage
and HHA data needed to calculate the HHA competition measure.
Nursing homes in California choose their own fiscal year and report the data for
this period to COSHPD accordingly. However, Mr. Ty Christensen stated that
approximately 80% of them have a fiscal year end date of December 31 (personal
communications, April 30, 2010) which is easy to assign to study years because the
calendar year matches the fiscal year. On the other hand, a data rule is necessary for the
remaining 20% of nursing homes whose fiscal year straddles 2 calendar years. A nursing
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home’s COSHPD data will be assigned to the appropriate study year based on which
calendar year exceeded 182 days in the fiscal year reporting period. For instance, a
nursing home with a fiscal year begin date of July 1, 2007 had 184 calendar days in 2007
and 182 calendar days in 2008 (2008 was a leap year resulting in an extra day). Thus,
this nursing home’s reporting period data would be assigned to the 2007 study year.
The California Department of Finance provides the data for the percentage of the
population over age 85 in each county. The benchmark population for the projections is
based on the 2000 U.S. Census counts and modified using fertility, mortality and
migration assumptions (State of California, Department of Finance, July, 2007). The
department then uses a baseline cohort-component method to project the population by
age, gender and race/ethnicity for each year. Cohorts change as specified in the mortality
and migration assumptions as each year passes and new cohorts are formed by applying
the fertility assumptions (State of California, Department of Finance, July, 2007).
The California Department of Social Services is the source for the ALF (i.e.,
residential care for the elderly) data for all licensed facilities. The department is charged
with inspections and licensing of all RCFEs and as such maintains a listing of all licensed
facilities. Only licensed RCFEs that were in continuous operation for the entire calendar
year will be considered for that particular study year and included as competitors.
The California Department of Health Care Services (formerly the California
Department of Health Services until 2007) provides the Medi-Cal daily per diem
reimbursement rates. The Med-Cal reimbursement rates were based on two bed
categories and three geographic regions before AB 1629. Post AB 1629 these
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reimbursement rates became facility-specific based on costs. These rates were
released after August 1st of each year with a different release date depending on the year.
However, the rates were retroactive to August 1st each year regardless of when they were
released. These rates could be considered a pseudo-FY Medi-Cal reimbursement rate
even though it does not match California’s state fiscal year of July 1 - June 30. Thus,
Medi-Cal reimbursement rates straddle two calendar years (e.g., 2006-2007). In this
study, the Medi-Cal rates will be applied to the later study year since the rates apply to
the majority of the days in the later calendar year. For instance, the 2006-2007 Medi-Cal
rates will be applied to the 2007 study year because the rates applied to more days in
calendar year 2007 (January 1 - July 31) than calendar year 2006 (August 1 - December
31). This data rule also aligns for the most part with the majority of California nursing
homes which use a January 1, 20XX - December 31, 20XX fiscal year.
The California Department of Public Health is the supplier for the nursing home
change in ownership (CHOW) and closure listing. These listings are important because
nursing homes that have changed ownership or closed will be removed from the final
sample of nursing homes, although they will still be used in the competition and nurse
wage rate measures. The COSHPD financial data also has a variable that indicates
whether or not the report is generated as a result of a CHOW. However, this information
is not reliable according to Mr. Ty Christensen because some nursing homes fail to
annotate that a disclosure report is the result of a change in ownership (personal
communication, April 30, 2010). Alternatively, Mr. Christensen suggests looking for
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reports that are less than 365 days and/or with an unusual fiscal year end date (e.g.,
May 23, 2007) if COSHPD data is used to determine CHOWs.
The University of Southern California Geographical Information System (GIS)
Lab (also known as WebGIS) provides the majority of the geocoding for the study.
Geocoding is the name of the process for converting nonspatial location data into a
corresponding spatial representation, usually converting postal addresses into latitude and
longitude geographic coordinates (University of Southern California, College of Letters,
Arts, and Sciences, 2010). The WebGIS platform performed well in a recent comparison
to seven other commercial geocoders by tying with three of them for the best in terms of
address matches (Swift, Goldberg, & Wilson, 2008). The longitude and latitude
information is necessary to create the 15 mile and 25 mile radii market measures from
each nursing home.
The Brown University Long-Term Care Focus website provides the case-mix data
used to adjust the hours per resident day dependent variables. The website is an
important nursing home data source and includes elements from the Minimum Data Set
(MDS), OSCAR, Area Resource File, Residential History File, and Brown University
collected Medicaid state policy data (Brown University, Alpert Medical School, 2010).
The acuity index (ACUINDEX) is used as the case-mix adjustment for this study and is
generated from OSCAR information obtained during the periodic (i.e., every 9-15
months) nursing home inspections. Noncertified CMS nursing homes are excluded from
this study because the ACUINDEX variable is not available. The Brown University
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website also provides the total number of beds for each hospital-based facility. This
information is necessary in order to compute the nursing home HHI.
The median per capita personal income is provided by the U.S. BEA. The median
per capita personal income is based upon estimates of the personal income of residents
divided by the Census Bureau’s annual midyear population estimates (U.S. Department
of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010b). The BEA released new median per
capita estimates for 2008 and revisions for 1969-2007 on April 22, 2010 (U.S.
Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010a).
The U.S. BLS is the last data source for this study and furnishes the
unemployment information for each county in California. The individual states collect
monthly data and create estimates for local area and state level unemployment data using
BLS developed concepts, definitions, and technical procedures (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2010). The BLS Handbook of Methods further explains that monthly data is
based on a time series approach to sample survey data with the intent to reduce high
variability in monthly Current Population Survey estimates for geographic areas with
small sample sizes. The BLS also is this study’s source for the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) All Urban Consumers (Current Series) used to convert the wage, income, and
Medi-Cal rate variables into December 2007 real dollars.
Sample
The study sample consists of approximately 1,000 CMS certified, free-standing
California nursing homes in continuous operation from 2002 to 2007. Approximately 25
nursing homes were not certified by Medicare or Medi-Cal and they are excluded from
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this study because they do not have available case-mix data. Facilities which have
changed ownership or closed during the study period are only included in the competition
and nurse wage rate measures. This is because they were competitors for a given study
year, but either information is not available for the entire study period (closures) or they
are expected to operate differently after changes in ownership. Hospital-based facilities
are only included in the nursing home competition measure because they compete for
some of the same patients as nursing homes. However, AB 1629 did not affect them due
to the fact they fall under a different reimbursement methodology. Subacute care
facilities were subject to the QAF and a new reimbursement methodology because of AB
1629. However, these facilities care for some residents that have much more intensive
needs than residents in a typical nursing home. For instance, California’s subacute
residents require breathing assistance and are on ventilators (Mr. Nixon, personal
communications, February 9, 2010). Hence, subacute care facilities will only be included
in the construction of the HHI competition and nurse wage rate measures. Similarly,
ICFs, CCRCs, and MLRCs are included in the construction of the HHI competition
measure because they compete for a segment of the residents who may receive care in a
nursing home, but they offer a range of services much different from the typical nursing
home. These facilities are also used to determine market nurse wages.
Variables and Measures
This study’s conceptual model, constructs and an empirical literature review
provide the basis for the dependent, independent, and control variables. These constructs
were outlined in Figure 5 and include competition, resource munificence, resource
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concentration, size, slack resources, resource importance, and resource dependence.
Table 5 summarizes the variable names, operational measures, and data sources.
Additionally, the variable operationalizations in this study are commonly used and found
in the nursing home or hospital empirical literature.
Dependent Variables
Nurse staffing standards or recommended nursing home nurse staffing are usually
expressed as HPRD. For example, CMS’ minimum recommended total nursing home
nurse staffing HPRD is 2.75 (Harrington, 2002). Likewise, California’s current
minimum total nursing home nurse staffing is 3.2 HPRD as established by AB 1107 in
1999 (A.B. 1107, 1999). A panel of experts convened at the John A. Hartford Institute
for Geriatric Nursing in 1998 recommended a 4.4 HPRD standard for total nursing home
nurse staff (Harrington, 2002). This recommendation consisted of 1.04 RN HPRD,
.7 LVN HPRD, and 2.7 nurse assistant HPRD. Empirical nursing home studies also
commonly use nurse staffing HPRD as the dependent variable (Bostick, Rantz, Flesner,
& Riggs, 2006; Feng et al., 2008; Kash, Hawes et al., 2007; Mueller et al., 2006).
The typical HRPD calculation is based upon the number of total productive nurse hours
for each dependent variable (i.e., RN, LVN, NA, and total HPRD) divided by the number
of resident days. COSHPD productive hours include regular time, overtime and inservice and out-service education hours, but do not include vacation, sick, on-call,
holiday or any other paid time off (California Healthcare Information Division, 1998).
The COSHPD productive hours also do not differentiate between skilled and intermediate
nursing care.
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Table 5
Variable Type, Name, Measure, and Data Source

Type of
Variable/Construct

Variable Name

Variable Measure

Data Source

Registered Nurse (RN)
hours per Resident
Day (HRPD)
RN_HPRD

Total RN productive hours for nursing services
during the period (including temporary
staffing) divided by (number of resident days
[DAYS] multiplied by the acuity index
(ACUINDEX).

California (CA) Office of
Statewide Health Planning and
Development (COSHPD) and
Brown University.

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) HPRD
LVN_HPRD

Total LVN productive hours for nursing
services during the period (including temporary
staffing) divided by (number of resident days
[DAYS] multiplied by ACUINDEX).

COSHPD and Brown
University.

Nurse Assistant (NA)
HRPD
NA_HPRD

Total NA productive hours for nursing
services during the period (including temporary
staffing) divided by (number of resident days
[DAYS] multiplied by ACUINDEX).

COSHPD and Brown
University.

Total Nursing HPRD
TOTAL_HPRD

Total RN, LVN, and CNA productive hours
for nursing services during the period
(including temporary staffing) divided by
(number of resident days [DAYS] multiplied
by ACUINDEX).

COSHPD and Brown
University.

Dependent Variables
Structural quality
changes
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Table 5 - continued

Type of
Variable/Construct
Independent Variables
Environmental
Change:
Passage of AB 1629

Variable Name

Variable Measure

Data Source

POST

Indicator variable for pre and post periods with
the pre period as the reference category

N/A

BEDS

Average number of licensed beds for the year
broken into quartiles and assigned indicator
variables. Highest bed quartile is base group.

COSHPD

Interaction term of POST indicator variable
multiplied by BEDS quartiles.

COSHPD

Ratio of cash flow (net income plus
depreciation) to total assets.

COSHPD

Interaction term of POST indicator variable
multiplied by SLACK variable.

COSHPD

Organizational
Characteristics:
Size

POST_BEDS

Slack Resources

SLACK

POST_SLACK

Resource
Importance

MCAL_REVENUE Gross Medi-Cal facility revenue for skilled
nursing care/gross revenue for routine and
ancillary services for inpatient and outpatient
care.

COSHPD
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Table 5 - continued

Type of
Variable/Construct
Variable Name
Independent Variables-continued
Resource
Dependence

DEPENDENCE

Variable Measure

Interaction term of MCAL REVENUE and
MCAL_CONCENTRATION. Broken into
quartiles with low dependence as bottom
quartile while high dependence is top quartile.
Indicator variables created with fourth
quartile as base group.

POST_DEPENDENCE Interaction term of POST indicator variable
multiplied by Medi-Cal DEPENDENCE
quartiles.

Data Source

COSHPD

COSHPD

Environmental
Factors:
Competition

NH_HHI

ALF_BEDS

Sum of the squares of the market shares in
terms of licensed beds with 15 and 25 miles of
each free-standing nursing home. Includes
distinct-part, subacute facilities, ICFs, MLRCs,
and CCRCs as they provide some skilled
nursing care.
The number of assisted living beds within 15
and 25 miles of each free-standing nursing
home scaled by 10,000.

COSHPD

CA Department of Social
Services and COSHPD
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Table 5 - continued

Type of
Variable/Construct

Variable Name

Variable Measure

Data Source

Independent Variables-continued
HHA_VISITS

The number of home health agency unique
patient visits within 15 and 25 miles of each
free-standing nursing home scaled by 10,000.

COSHPD

Resource
Concentration

MCAL_
CONCENTRATION

Total number of skilled nursing Medi-Cal
days in each market/total number of skilled
nursing days in the market. Uses a 15 and 25
mile radius from each free-standing nursing
home to determine total days in the
environment.

COSHPD

Resource
Munificence

INCOME

POPULATION

Median per capital income in the county
converted to December 2007 real dollars
using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All-Urban
Consumers (Current Series).
Percentage of the county population over
age 85.

U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis and
BLS

CA Department
of Finance
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Table 5 - continued

Type of
Variable/Construct

Variable Name

Variable Measure

Data Source

Control Variables
MCAL_RATE

Annual Medi-Cal reimbursement rate for each
nursing home converted to December 2007
real dollars using BLS CPI for All-Urban
Consumers (Current Series).

California Department
of Health Care Services
and BLS

WAGES

Weighted average of RN, LPN, and NA
market wage rates using 15 and 25 mile radii
from each free-standing nursing home, ICF,
CCRC, MLRC, and subacute care facility
converted to December 2007 real dollars
using BLS CPI for All-Urban Consumers
(Current Series).

COSHPD and BLS

UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment rate for the civilian labor
force in each county.

BLS
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This study uses a modified version of the typical HPRD by incorporating a casemix adjustment. Case-mix should be considered when examining nurse staffing levels
because higher staffing levels are generally needed for residents with higher nursing care
needs (Harrington, 2002). Using a case-mix adjusted HPRD has the added benefit of not
having to control for case-mix in the estimation procedures which may cause simultaneity
with the nurse staffing dependent variables. Case-mix and nurse staffing may suffer from
simultaneity in that a higher case-mix may require higher nurse staffing levels, but higher
nurse staffing levels may also permit a higher case-mix. Seblega et al. (2010) used a
similar approach in their nursing home nurse staffing study. Specifically, they divided
nurse staffing HPRD by an acuity index (ACUINDEX) to arrive at a case-mix adjusted
HPRD (Seblega et al., 2010). The ACUINDEX has also been frequently used in other
nursing home studies to account for case-mix (Feng et al., 2006; Mueller et al., 2006;
Seblega et al., 2010; Stevenson, 2006).
The average acuity index is used as the case-mix adjustment for this study. It is a
measure of care needed by each nursing home’s residents and calculated based on the
number of residents needing various levels of ADL assistance, the number of residents
receiving special treatments (i.e., respiratory therapy or intravenous treatments), and the
number of residents with certain diagnoses such as dementia
(http://ltcfocus.org/Downloads.aspx, row 164, column 3). More specifically, The Brown
University Center for Gerontology & Healthcare Research’s LTCFocUS.org Data
Dictionary describes its calculation in detail:
Average Acuity Index = Adlindex + Stindex + Addindex
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(i) Adlindex = (number of eating-dependent residents × 3) + (number of
eating-assisted residents × 2) + (number of eating-independent residents) +
(number of toileting-dependent residents × 5) + (# toileting-assisted
residents × 3) + (number of toileting-independent residents) + (number of
transfer-dependent residents × 5) + (number of transfer-assisted residents ×
3) + (number of transfer-independent residents) + (number of bedfast
residents ×5) + (number of chairbound residents × 3) + (number of
ambulatory residents) divided by (total number of residents).
(ii) Stindex = (number of residents receiving respiratory care) + (number of
residents receiving suctioning) + (number of residents receiving IV therapy)
+ (number of residents receiving tracheostomy care) divided by (total
number of residents).
(iii) Addindex = (number of residents with dementia) + (number of
residents with psychiatric diagnosis) + (number of residents with
retardation) + (number of residents receiving PT, OT or speech therapy) +
(number of residents receiving tube feedings) divided by (total number of
residents) (http://ltcfocus.org/Downloads.aspx, row 164, column 4).
This study will use 2002 as the base year to create an index of the acuity index
measure. The mean of the average acuity index, for each nursing home in 2002, is first
calculated. Next, the average acuity index for each facility, and for each study year, is
divided by the 2002 overall mean of the average acuity index. The value of the new
index would be one if the average acuity index equaled the 2002 overall mean of the
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average acuity index. A value greater than one would indicate that a nursing home had a
higher case-mix than the average nursing home in 2002 (i.e., residents with higher patient
acuity). Similar procedures have been in the empirical literature. For example, one study
created an index using the procedures outlined above. They then divided the number of
hours of nursing care per inpatient-day by the case-mix index to calculate the adjusted
number of hours of nursing care per day (Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, &
Zelevinsky, 2002).
Independent Variables
The independent variables consist of an environmental change variable (passage
of AB 1629 [POST]) as well as three environmental factors: competition (NH_HHI,
ALF_BEDS and HHA_VISITS), resource munificence (INCOME and POPULATION)
and resource concentration (MCAL_CONCENTRATION). There are also three
organizational characteristics: size (BEDS), slack resources (SLACK), and resource
importance (MCAL_REVENUE). The Medi-Cal dependence variable (DEPENDENCE)
is the product of the resource concentration environmental factor (MCAL_
CONCENTRATION) and the resource importance organizational characteristic
(MCAL_REVENUE). This interaction term was expressed outside of the environmental
factors and organizational characteristics boxes in Figure 5 for the sake of clarity.
Environmental Change
The POST indicator variable delineates the environmental change caused by the
passage of AB 1629 and divides the pre-AB 1629 and post-AB 1629 study periods. The
AB 1629 indicator variable is assigned a zero for the study years 2002-2004 and a one for
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the years 2006-2007. It is further used with the BEDS, SLACK, and DEPENDENCE
variables to create interaction terms. These interaction terms are in effect the policy
effect variables. Similarly, one may view them as the difference-in-difference estimators.
For instance, the POST_DEPENDENCE_Q1 parameter is the post period multiplied by
the lowest Medi-Cal DEPENDENCE quartile. This parameter represents the difference
between pre and post period as well the difference between the highest Medi-Cal
dependence group and the lowest. Hence, the term difference-in-difference.
Environmental Factors
Competition is a key consideration especially when using a RDT-based
framework because it is the competition for scarce resources that drives many
organizational actions. Nursing homes may engage in price competition or product
differentiation to gain a competitive advantage over others with the need for these actions
based on the level of market concentration (Starkey et al., 2005). The HHI is the
prevalent measure of market concentration in nursing homes studies. The index ranges
from zero to one and is constructed by summing the squared market shares, typically
beds (Bourbonniere et al., 2006; Castle & Engberg, 2008; Harrington et al., 2007;
Mukamel & Spector, 2002; Zinn et al., 1999) or patient days (Mukamel & Spector, 2002;
O’Neill, Harrington, Kitchener, & Saliba, 2003), in the defined market area. Higher
values indicate more concentration and therefore less market competition. The market
area is usually defined geopolitically through the use of counties, but this study instead
uses both a 15 mile and 25 mile radii from each nursing home.
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The nursing home HHI includes all free-standing nursing homes, distinct-part
facilities (hospital-based), MLRCs, CCRCs, ICFs, CLHFs, and subacute facilities that
were in operation for each individual study year. Each of these facilities is included in
the competition measure because they provide some measure of skilled nursing care
thereby making them competitors. The NH_HHI is based on the number of beds for all
of these facilities within a 15 and 25 mile radii of each free-standing nursing home.
Grabowski & Stevenson (2008) used a 25 km radius around each nursing home in their
national study of nursing home ownership conversions. Similarly, Phibbs and Robinson
(1993) used multiple measures including a 15 mile radius to determine hospital market
structure.
The ALF competition measure includes all licensed California RCFE facilities
that were in operation for each individual study year. The ALF_BEDS variable is based
on the total number of licensed ALF beds within both a 15 and 25 radius from each
free-standing nursing home. ALFs have rarely been included as competitors in empirical
studies despite general acknowledgement that they compete with nursing homes for
residents with lower acuity (Castle et al., 2009; Gruneir et al., 2007). This may be due to
a lack of national data or limited availability in some state nursing home studies. A
cross-sectional, Texas study of nursing home dementia special care units included ALFs
as competitors (Gruneir et al., 2007). This study incorporated both the number of ALFs
in each county and the number of ALF beds per 1,000 people age 65 and over as nursing
home competitors.
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The HHA competition measure includes all licensed HHAs that were in operation
in each individual study year. The HHA_VISITS variable is based on the number of
unique HHA patient visits and within both a 15 and 25 mile radius from each
free-standing nursing home. Unique patient visits were chosen instead of total visits
because an individual patient can have multiple visits per year. For instance, it was
estimated that the number of HHA visits per user was 80 in 1995 (Bishop, 1999). The
number of HHAs per county (Amirkhanyan, 2007), the number of HHAs per 1,000
people age 65 and over (Gruneir et al., 2007; Starkey et al., 2005), and the number of
HHAs per 10,000 people age 65 and over in each county (Gulley & Santerre, 2007) have
been used as HHA measures of nursing home competition.
Resource munificence is represented by the two variables of median per capita
income and proportion of the population age 85 and older. The median per capita income
is calculated as the median value of the personal income of residents in each county
divided by the resident population in each county (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2010). The BEA calculates personal income as the sum of net earnings by place of
residence, rental income of persons, personal dividend income, personal interest income,
and personal current transfer receipts. Additionally, the BEA uses the Census Bureau’s
annual midyear population estimates to compute the resident population in each county.
The median per capita income has been commonly used in nursing home studies to
represent resource munificence or more favorable markets (Grabowski, 2001a, 2001b,
2004; Swan et al., 2009). The median per capita income is converted to December 2007
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real dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All
Urban Consumers (Current Series).
The proportion of the population age 85 and older in each county is calculated
using the California Department of Finance’s population projections for each study year.
This data source has projections for each age group (0 to 100) broken down by gender
and county. The male and female age groups are combined and then totaled to obtain
each county’s estimated population. The age groups 85 and older are then totaled for
each county and divided by the total estimated county population. Health care studies
have used the proportion of the population age 65 and older (Decker, 2008; Harrington et
al., 2007; McCue, Mark, & Harless, 2003; Swan et al., 2009), 75 and older (Intrator et al.,
2005; Zinn et al., 2003), and 85 and older (Kim, Harrington et al., 2009; Kim, Kovner et
al., 2009; Swan et al., 2009) in each market. This study uses the proportion of the
population 85 and older because this group is more likely to require long-term care
(Hagen, 2004).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) describe resource concentration as the extent to which
inputs or outputs are made by relatively few significant resources. Therefore, this is an
environmental factor, but it is shown separately in Figure 5 for the sake of clarity. Thus,
a measure is needed that reflects the resource concentration (i.e., purchasing power) in
each market. Starkey et al. (2005), in a study of nursing home market competition,
created such a measure by dividing the total number of Medicaid nursing home residents
in the county by the total number of nursing home residents in the county. This study
takes a similar tack, but uses the number of Medicaid skilled nursing days divided by the
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total number of days. Days were chosen instead of residents because private-pay patients
commonly ―spend down‖ until they become Medicaid eligible meaning they may have
been both private-pay and Medicaid eligible in a given study year. Thus, using days may
be a more accurate measure. Both a 15 and 25 mile radius from each free-standing
nursing home is again used to represent nursing home markets.
Organizational Characteristics
The number of licensed beds is commonly used in the empirical literature to
represent a nursing home’s size (Cohen & Spector, 1996; Harrington & Swan, 2003;
Intrator et al., 2005; Konetzka et al., 2004). The number of licensed beds in this study
will be broken into quartiles with an indicator variable assigned to each group. The
highest quartile (i.e., nursing homes with the most beds) will act as the base group in the
analysis. The use of categorical variables helps to ease interpretation, reduce noise
(Intrator et al., 2005), and capture the possible curvilinear effect of facility size on nurse
staffing (Zinn, Mor, Feng, & Intrator, 2007).
Slack resources are those that an organization has in excess of the minimum
necessary to produce a given level of organizational output (Zinn et al., 2007). Slack
resources are sometimes represented by chain membership (Castle & Fogel, 1998; Zinn,
Feng, Mor, Intrator, & Grabowski, 2008; Zinn, Mor, Feng, & Intrator, 2007) and/or size
(Zinn et al., 2008; Zinn et al., 1998; Zinn et al., 2007) in part because financial data may
not be available. This is would be the case for national nursing home studies. However,
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note that slack is frequently apparent in the form of extra
profits or resources. Thus, chain membership and/or size may instead be proxy variables
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for slack resources. COSHPD collected financial data are available for this study and the
ratio of cash flow (net income plus depreciation) to total assets is used to represent slack
resources. This measure was used to represent slack resources in a study of hospitals
offering long-term care (Muramatsu et al., 2000) reasoning that cash flow per asset
represents more financial resources to invest in skilled nursing and long-term care.
Resource importance is the extent to which a nursing home has come to depend
on certain types of exchanges for resources in order to operate and survive. Hence, it is
an organizational characteristic, but is shown separately in Figure 5 for the sake of
clarity. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) assert that resource importance can be measured by
assessing the proportion of total inputs accounted for by the exchange. In support of this
measure, Harrington et al. (2007), in a national study of nursing homes, state that nursing
facilities depend on revenues from Medicaid and Medicare, which in turn may impact
nurse staffing levels. As such, the proportion of total gross Medi-Cal nursing home
revenue for skilled and intermediate nursing care is divided by total gross revenue for
routine and ancillary services for inpatient and outpatient care is used to operationalize
resource importance. Skilled nursing care net revenue figures by payer (i.e., Medi-Cal)
would be preferred, but they are not broken down by payer on the COSHPD financial
disclosure forms.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stated that resource dependence is an interaction of
resource concentration (environmental factor) and resource importance (organizational
characteristic). However, health care studies generally either use resource concentration
(Banaszak-Holl et al., 1996; Intrator et al., 2005; Starkey et al., 2005) or resource
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importance (Decker, 2008; Harrington et al., 2007; Thompson & McCue, 2004) alone to
represent the resource dependence construct. This study follows Pfeffer and Salancik’s
(1978) guidance by operationalizing resource dependence by multiplying resource
concentration and resource importance to create the interaction term. The resulting
measure is then broken into quartiles with an indicator variable created for each quartile.
The highest quartile (i.e., high Medi-Cal dependence) serves as the base category.
Furthermore, this study uses a 2002 baseline measure of resource dependence for each
free-standing nursing home.
Control Variables
There are three control variables for this study: each nursing home’s Medi-Cal
reimbursement rate (MCAL_RATE), the nurse wage rates using both a 15 and 25 mile
radius (WAGES), and the unemployment rate in each county (UNEMPLOYMENT).
The Medi-Cal reimbursement rate is the daily per diem rate, in each study year, paid to
each nursing home for providing skilled nursing care to Medi-Cal residents. This was a
flat rate prior to AB 1629 based on two bed categories and three geographic regions. The
rate became facility specific post-AB 1629 based on the aforementioned reimbursement
cost categories (i.e., labor, indirect care and nonlabor, administrative, capital, and direct
pass-through). State level nursing home studies have the ability to use facility specific
Medicaid reimbursement rates (Kash et al., 2006; Kash, Castle et al., 2007; Mukamel &
Spector, 2002) while national studies use the average state Medicaid rates (Castle, 2005;
Castle et al., 2009; Grabowski & Castle, 2004). The Medi-Cal rate is converted to

130
December 2007 real dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers (Current Series).
The nurse wage rates are included in the analysis because Harrington et al. (2007)
note that nursing homes are expected to hire fewer RNs (and with fewer hours) when RN
wage rates are high. The same may be said for other nurse staffing categories. The nurse
wage rates for each staffing category (i.e., RN, LVN, and NA) are created using weighted
averages. This is calculated by first totaling the productive hours (skilled nursing and
intermediate care) of all free-standing nursing homes, ICFs, CCRCs, MLRCs, and
subacute facilities within both a 15 and 25 mile radius of each free-standing nursing
home. This number is then divided by the total salary and wages (skilled nursing and
intermediate care) of all free-standing nursing homes, ICFs, CCRCs, MLRCs, and
subacute facilities within both a 15 and 25 mile radius of each individual freestanding
nursing home. The resulting measure is the weighted average wage for each nurse
category. The wage rates are also converted to December 2007 real dollars using Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers (Current
Series).
The regression analyses for the total HPRD will include the pay rates for RNs,
LVNs, and NAs. The regression analyses for the RN, LVN, and NA will only include the
wage rate which matches the dependent variable (e.g., the RN HPRD will have RN
wages included in the regression analysis). Other nursing homes studies have followed
this convention by only including the wage rate for the dependent staffing variable being
examined (Harrington & Swan, 2003; Kash et al., 2006; Kash, Castle et al., 2007).
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The final control variable is the unemployment rate in each county. According to
the BLS a person must be without work, be available for work, and have actively
searched for work to be classified as unemployed (Cohany, 2008). The BLS calculates
the official unemployment rate as the total number of unemployed persons divided by the
civilian labor force and multiplied by 100. Nursing home research has used county
unemployment rates because high unemployment means fewer vacant positions and less
likelihood of voluntary turnover (Castle & Engberg, 2005; Castle & Engberg, 2008).
Analytical Approach
Descriptive Statistics
The first step of the analytical approach is to examine the univariate descriptive
statistics. The minimum values, maximum values, mean, and standard deviation are all
examined and presented, as well as a correlation matrix. The frequency for all nominal
variables will be presented as well. The descriptive statistics are used to ascertain if there
are problems of multicollinearity, outliers, and missing data. Not many outliers and/or
missing data are expected since the majority of this study’s data comes from audited
COSHPD financial data.
Model Specifications
The second step is to specify the models. There are two different model
specifications for this study. The first model is a simple interaction model using ordinary
least squares (OLS), without conditioning on any other variables, to get at the root of the
policy effect of AB 1629 on staffing. This model is meant to provide a simple, yet
revealing indication if nursing homes with high Medi-Cal dependence did indeed
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increase nurse staffing post-AB 1629. The first model for each dependent variable is:
Staffingit = β0 + β1POST + β2DEPENDENCE_Q1 + β3DEPENDENCE_Q2 +
β4DEPENDENCE_Q3 + β5POST_DEPENDENCE_Q1 + β6POST_
DEPENDENCE_Q2 + β7POST_DEPENDENCE_Q3 + uit
where β0 is the average staffing for nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence
before AB 1629, POST represents the study years 2006-2007 following passage of AB
1629; DEPENDENCE denotes the indicator variables for each quartile of Medi-Cal
dependence in 2002; POST_DEPENDENCE is an interaction term of the post AB 1629
period multiplied by Medi-Cal dependence quartiles; uit signifies the error term; i indexes
nursing homes and t indexes time. The parameter of primary concern is β1 since it is the
estimator of pre and post periods of nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal
dependence. These regressions will also be run using the first, second, and third MediCal dependence quartile as the base to ascertain if nurse staffing increased (indicated by
the POST variable in each regression) after AB 1629. The coefficients and standard error
are not reported, but the results will be discussed.
The second model includes all of the organizational characteristics, environmental
factors, and control variables. The model is the same for all of the dependent variable
regressions except for the nurse pay rate as previously outlined. The total nurse staff
HPRD will include all three nurse pay rates while the other three dependent variables
(i.e., RN, LVN, and NA) will only include the corresponding nurse pay rate. For
example, the RN dependent variable regression will only include the RN pay rate in the
estimation procedure. Of note, these regressions will be run twice, once with a 15-mile
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market radius and the other with a 25-mile market radius around each nursing home. The
second model for each dependent variables is:
Staffingit = αi + β1POST + β2POST_ DEPENDENCE_Q1it + β3POST_
DEPENDENCE_Q2it + β4POST_DEPENDENCE_Q3it + β5BEDS_Q1it +
β6BEDS_Q2it + β7BEDS_Q3it + β8POST_BEDS_Q1it + β9POST_BEDS_Q2it +
β10POST_BEDS_Q3it + β11SLACKit + β12POST_SLACKit + β13NH_HHIit +
β14ALF_BEDSit + β15HHA_VISITSit + β16INCOMEit + β17POPULATIONit +
β18MCAL_RATESit + β19WAGESit + β20UNEMPLOYMENTit + uit
where POST represents the study years 2006-2007 following passage of AB 1629;
DEPENDENCE denotes the indicator variables for each quartile of Medi-Cal dependence
in 2002; POST_DEPENDENCE parameters are interaction terms of the post AB 1629
period multiplied by Medi-Cal dependence quartiles; BEDS represents the indicator
variables for each of the nursing home bed size quartiles; POST_BEDS parameters are
interaction terms of the post AB 1629 period multiplied by the bed size quartiles; SLACK
represents the amount of slack resources available to each nursing home; the
POST_SLACK parameter is an interaction term of the post AB 1629 period multiplied by
slack resources available to each nursing home; NH_HHI, ALF_BEDS, and
HHA_VISITS are the competition measures from each free-standing nursing home
during the entire study period each using a 15 and 25 mile radius; INCOME and
POPULATION represent per capita media income and proportion of the population age
85 and older in each county, both signifying resource munificence; MCAL_RATE
denotes each nursing homes Medi-Cal rate; WAGES are the weighted average of nurse
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wages using both a 15 mile and a 25 mile radius around each nursing home;
UNEMPLOYMENT reflects the unemployment rate in each county; αi is the fixed-effect;
uit signifies the error term; i indexes nursing homes and t indexes time. Table 6 provides
a breakdown of this study’s hypotheses, matching parameters, and expected sign of the
results.
Table 6
Study Hypotheses, Associated Parameter, and Expected Sign

Parameter

Expected
Sign

ß1

+

to large nursing homes post AB 1629, other things constant.

ß8
ß9
ß10

+
+
+

H3: Nursing homes with more slack resources (e.g., higher

ß12

+

higher nurse staffing, other things constant.

ß13
ß14
ß15

+
+
+

H5: Nursing homes in markets with higher resource

ß16

+
+

H1: Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence
increased nurse staffing relative to nursing homes with lower
Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629, other things constant.
H2: Smaller nursing homes increased nurse staffing relative

cash flow) increased nurse staffing post AB 1629, other
things constant.
H4: Nursing homes in more competitive markets had

ß17
munificence (e.g., higher per capita income and greater
percentage of population over 85) were positively
associated with nurse staffing, other things constant.
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Econometric Approach
Wooldridge (2006) states ―panel data sets are very useful for policy analysis‖ (p.
467). He further explains that panel data consists of unobserved factors that are both
constant and vary over time. The intercept αi in the aforementioned model specification
represent all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect the dependent variables.
Conversely, the uit is the time-varying error that characterizes the unobserved factors that
change over time and impact the dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2006). The αi may be
considered an omitted variable and could bias results if not accounted for properly. This
study uses panel data to account and control for the unobserved fixed-effects that may
impact the dependent variables of interest. More specifically, first-differencing (FD)
estimation procedures are used to eliminate the unobserved, fixed-effects.
The FD estimator will produce an unbiased, or consistent estimator, if several
assumptions hold true as outlined by Wooldridge (2006). First, strict exogeneity must be
satisfied where the change in uit is uncorrelated with the changes in the independent
variables. This should be true for all of the independent variables except for the MediCal reimbursement rate which will require an instrumental variable (IV) and IV
estimation procedures as described below. Second, there must be some variation for each
independent variable across the nursing homes. This is the reason why chain
membership and ownership type could not be included as independent variables as they
are both static for the most part and would be ―washed away‖ under the first-differencing
procedure.

136
Homoskedasticity (i.e., constant error variance) is also required for all of the
observations in order to ensure that the standard errors and test statistics are valid
(Wooldridge, 2006). Thus, the standards errors must be corrected if heteroskedasticity is
present. This study will cluster by nursing homes in the estimation procedures to account
for heteroskedasticity and the possibility of correlated errors within each individual
nursing home.
First differencing procedures require strict exogeneity where the error term is not
correlated with any of the independent variables and in any period. However, this is not
the case for Medi-Cal rates at the end of the study period (i.e., 2007). The nursing homes
were unable to affect their Medi-Cal rates in the years prior to AB 1629 because it was a
flat rate based on two bed categories and three geographic regions. Thus, strict
exogeneity holds in this time period. Strict exogeneity also held true the first couple of
years after AB 1629 because the rates were based on past financial data (18 to 24 month
lag). This means that the Medi-Cal rates for 2005 and 2006 were based on fiscal years
that ended in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Again the nursing homes did not have the
ability to impact their future Medi-Cal rates. However, a feedback effect is present in the
2007 year. This is because nursing homes had the ability to increase their future MediCal rates by increasing nurse staffing in the years 2005 and beyond. Nursing homes that
increased their nurse staffing in 2005, in response to AB 1629, would see higher MediCal rates in 2007 due to the 18-24 month lag; however, this ability may have been
tempered somewhat because of cost category percentile limits as well as the overall
aggregate Medi-Cal rate cap. Regardless, a feedback effect is obvious and must be
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accounted for using the concept of sequential exogeneity and IV estimation procedures.
Wooldridge (2006) notes that in the presence of endogeneity all estimators will be biased
and inconsistent when using ordinary least squares (OLS). He further states that IV
estimation can be combined with panel data methods such as FD. This permits consistent
parameter estimates in the presence of unobserved effects and endogeneity in one or
more time-varying independent variables. Importantly, Wooldridge (2002) relaxed the
strict exogeneity assumption and discussed the sequential exogeneity concept where the
error term uit is allowed to be correlated with future values of the explanatory variables.
This is particularly applicable to this study, and Medi-Cal rates because a large uit may
feed into future Medi-Cal rates for the 2007 study year. A lagged value of the
endogenous independent variable can be used as an IV in these circumstances since it is
uncorrelated with the change in the error term uit (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, this study
will use IV estimation procedures with the lagged values of Medi-Cal rates acting as IVs.
The FDs for the study variables need to be calculated and then IV estimation
performed on the calculated differences. This procedure is necessary since excluding the
2005 year data leaves a gap in the panel study. All FDs for year 2006 are then
necessarily missing if 2005 data is excluded entirely. Further, in this circumstance the
FD of a variable such as POST would be missing in 2006 and zero in all other years.
Hence, 2005 data is used for constructing first differences for 2006, but excluded
otherwise (i.e., first differences between 2005 and 2004 are excluded).
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Ethical Issues
All of the datasets for this study are publicly available. They also do not contain
any patient-level data, nor does the study involve any human subjects. Hence, this study
is exempt from the Virginia Commonwealth University Internal Review Board process
outlined in Title 45, Part 46, of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46).
Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the research design along with the threats to design
validity. The data sources were explained in detail and the sample population was
described as well. The dependent, independent, and control variables and their
operationalizations were outlined as was the analytical approach that included a depiction
of the study’s hypotheses, corresponding parameters in the model specifications, and the
expected signs of the parameters. A short explanation of ethical issues closed the
chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

This chapter presents the study’s empirical analyses results. The first section
describes how the study’s sample of free-standing nursing homes was derived. In the
second section, the dependent, independent, and control variables of free-standing
California nursing homes in the study sample are compared to the excluded free-standing
nursing homes. The third section briefly presents the other facility types used to compute
the nursing home competition measures (e.g., HHI in terms of beds, HHA unique patient
visits, and ALF beds). Next, descriptive statistics for the study variables are presented.
The final section presents the results from the regression analyses as well as a sensitivity
analyses. The chapter closes with a summary.
Study Sample Derivation of Free-Standing Skilled Nursing Facilities
The purpose of this study was to determine the policy effect of AB 1629 on
California nursing home staffing (i.e., RN, LVN, NA, and total nurse staffing). The study
also looked to ascertain the impact of Medi-Cal dependence on nurse staffing as well as
organizational characteristics and environmental factors that may have affected nurse
staffing during the study period. The unit of analysis is free-standing California nursing
homes that may or may not have been members of a chain. Other facilities such as
hospital-based facilities, CLHFs, ICFs, MLRCs, CCRCs, ALFs, and HHAs are used in
the competition measures.
139
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The population of all free-standing nursing homes in California was: 1,026 in
2002, 1,020 in 2003, 1,016 in 2004, 1,010 in 2005, 1,002 in 2006, and 995 in 2007 for a
total of 6,069 free-standing SNF observations during the study period. The number of
SNFs in 2005 is in the sample derivation description because a CHOW or closure in 2005
removes the nursing home from the sample. The 2005 data is also used to compute firstdifferences (i.e., 2006-2005). The entire panel for a free-standing SNF is excluded if it
provided sub-acute care or care for the mentally or developmentally disabled, had a study
year that did not have COSHPD data, changed license type from/to a skilled nursing
license, did not have case-mix information for any given year, did not provide skilled
nursing care to Medicare and Medi-Cal patients, or was missing Medi-Cal revenue or
Medi-Cal rates for any given study year. Additionally, the entire panel for a
free-standing SNF was removed if it changed ownership or closed from 2002-2007.
Table 7 illustrates the number of nursing home exclusions by reason. A couple of trends
can also be identified from Table 7. First, the number of free-standing nursing homes
providing sub-acute care increased from 32 in 2002 to 56 in 2007. This is not too
surprising since AB 1629 also created a new, more generous reimbursement methodology
for sub-acute care. Second, there were a large number of CHOWs during the study
period. In fact, 313 CHOWs occurred between 2002-2007, and of those, 21 facilities
changed ownership twice during this period.
The exclusion criteria resulted in a balanced panel of 567 SNFs and 2,835
observations for the years 2002-2004 and 2006-2007 as shown Table 8.
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Table 7
Free-Standing Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Exclusions by Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

Adult subacute facilities

32

35

43

-

52

56

218

Pediatric subacute facilities

3

3

5

-

5

5

21

Developmental disabled
facilities

2

1

1

-

2

2

8

Mentally disabled facilities

32

31

31

-

29

29

152

Missing year of data
(incomplete panel)

0

2

2

-

23

26

53

No Medicare and Medicaid
skilled nursing facility
(SNF) days

53

58

56

-

47

45

259

Changed license type
to/from skilled nursing
license

18

13

15

-

19

19

84

Missing Medi-Cal rates

-

-

-

-

21

18

39

Change of ownership

37

104

22

33

32

85

313

Closure

0

8

8

2

9

3

30

185

268

194

35

248

296

1,226

Total Exclusions

Of note, the excluded facility totals in Table 8 for each year do not match the
excluded criterion totals shown in Table 7. There are a couple of reasons for this
imbalance. First, a free-standing SNF panel is removed if it meets one of the exclusion
criteria in any study year. This also holds true for CHOWs and closures except that the
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Table 8
Free-Standing Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Final Sample and Population

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

SNFs - final sample

567

567

567

0

567

567

2,835

Excluded SNFs

459

453

449

1,010

435

428

3,234

SNF population

1,026

1,020

1,016

1,010

1,002

995

6,069

panel is also excluded if a CHOW or closure occurred in 2005 as well as the study period.
Second, individual facilities may meet more than one exclusion criterion for a given year.
For example, three nursing homes in 2003 had a CHOW and did not provide skilled
nursing care to Medi-Cal nor Medicare patients. Therefore, although there were 185
exclusions in 2002, 459 facilities were actually excluded because of meeting one or more
criteria in the same or another year.
Comparison of Sample and Excluded Free-Standing Skilled Nursing Facilities
The sample and excluded facility means are compared to assess differences
between the two groups. More specifically, the final sample is compared to the excluded
free-standing nursing homes to discover if there are differences across the dependent,
independent, and control variables. This is first accomplished by examining only the
year 2002 using two-group mean-comparison tests (i.e., t-tests). Table 9 provides the
2002 study year comparisons between the final sample and excluded observations, across
the dependent variables. In a supplementary analysis, the final sample across all years is
compared to the excluded free-standing nursing homes. The standard errors (and hence
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Table 9
Dependent Variable Comparison of Final Sample and Excluded Facilities, Study Year 2002

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Registered Nurse hours per
Resident Day HPRD,
case-mix adjusted.

567

0.27

0.16

400

0.34

0.35

-4.17

0.00003

Licensed Vocational Nurse
HRPD, case-mix adjusted.

567

0.62

0.22

400

0.68

0.54

-2.44

0.0145

Nurse Aide HPRD, case-mix
adjusted.

567

2.39

0.45

400

2.49

1.82

-1.34

0.1803

Total Nurse HPRD, case-mix
adjusted.

567

3.27

0.58

400

3.51

2.47

-2.21

.0271

Acuity Index, 2000 base year.

567

1.00

0.13

435

0.99

0.20

0.93

.3509

Total skilled nursing and
intermediate care days.*
*Note. Variable is scaled by 1,000.

567

32.23

14.47

452

28.71

17.33

3.53

0.00040
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the resulting t-statistics) for this comparison are adjusted for dependence of
observations within facilities. The results of this analysis are located in Table A1 in
Appendix A.
The t-tests in Table 9 show a statistically significant difference between the
sample and excluded observations across three of the four dependent variables. The final
sample had lower staffing than the excluded observations except for nurse aide staffing.
For example, the case-mix adjusted RN HPRD averaged .27 HPRD for the final sample
of free-standing nursing homes versus the excluded observations’ .34 average.
The acuity index and total skilled nursing and intermediate care days variables are
included with the dependent variables in Table 9 since both are used in the denominator
for the case-mix adjusted HPRD. The 2002 indexed average acuity in the final sample is
not statistically different than for the excluded sample. However, there is a statistically
significant difference between the total skilled nursing and intermediate care days for the
final sample (32.23 annual average scaled by 1,000) versus the excluded observations
(28.71). This is expected as the focus of the final sample is on facilities that provide total
skilled nursing days as opposed to others that may focus more on other patients and
services.
The differences between the sample and excluded observations carry over to the
organizational characteristics. For example, Table 10 shows there was a statistically
significant difference between organizational slack in the final sample (.06) and the
excluded facilities (-.07). There were also statistically significant differences in terms of
the proportion of patient revenue derived from Medi-Cal and Medi-Cal dependence
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Table 10
Organizational Characteristics Comparison of Final Sample and Excluded Facilities, Study Year 2002

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Beds

567

99.33

44.62

459

103.59

52.02

-1.41

0.15813

Slack

567

0.06

0.47

451

-0.07

0.85

3.13

0.00177

Medi-Cal Revenue

567

0.62

0.20

451

0.47

0.28

9.81

8.82E-22

Dependence - 15 Mile
Market (MM)

567

0.42

0.15

451

0.32

0.20

9.65

3.81E-21

Dependence - 25 MM

567

0.42

0.15

451

0.32

0.20

9.52

1.17E-20
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using a 15 and 25 mile radius to delineate markets. However, there were not
statistically significant differences in terms of beds.
The two groups were much more similar across environmental factors, but there
were statistically significant differences in terms of Medi-Cal concentration using a 15
mile market and median per capita income. For instance, the final sample had a MediCal concentration in 15 mile markets of 68%, which was a statistically significant
difference from excluded facilities which had a 66% Medi-Cal concentration. Also, the
median per capita income for the final sample ($38.68 scaled by 1,000) was statistically
different from the excluded facilities ($39.94). The details of the t-tests can be found in
Table 11.
The control variable comparisons are illustrated in Table 12. This table shows the
groups were similar for the most part except for RN and NA wage differences in 15 mile
markets. The 15 mile market wages for RNs in the final sample were $.50 lower than the
excluded facilities ($31.39 versus $31.89). Similarly, the NA wages in the final sample
were $.21 lower than the excluded facilities ($12.16 versus $12.37).
Table A1 in the Appendix compares the final sample and excluded facilities
across all study years by regressing the variable of interest on a group indicator variable
and clustering by facility. The t-tests from these regressions indicate whether or not the
final sample is in fact statistically significant and different from the excluded facilities.
This supplementary analysis confirms the 2002 t-tests results. Hence, the final sample
and excluded facilities are very similar in terms of both environmental factors and control
variables, but they are much different in terms of the dependent staffing variables (i.e.,
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Table 11
Environmental Factor Comparisons of Final Sample and Excluded Facilities, Study Year 2002

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Nursing Home Competition
15 Mile Market (MM)

567

0.07

0.13

459

0.07

0.15

-0.54

0.58775

Nursing Home Competition
25 MM

567

0.04

0.08

459

0.04

0.10

-0.86

0.38851

Assisted Living Facility (ALF)
Bed Competition - 15 MM*

567

.7326

.5493

459

.7184

.5191

0.42

0.67373

ALF Bed Competition
25 MM*

567

1.4961

1.1332

459

1.4839

1.0756

0.17

0.86194

Home Health Agency (HHA)
Unique Visit Competition
15 MM*

567

3.4628

3.1205

459

3.2355

2.8273

1.21

0.22664

HHA Unique Visit Competition
25 MM*

567

665.27

583.02

459

648.72

547.07

0.46

0.64209

MCAL Concentration - 15 MM

567

0.68

0.08

456

0.66

0.09

3.17

0.00159

MCAL Concentration - 25 MM

567

0.67

0.06

456

0.67

0.07

1.35

0.17888
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Table 11 - continued

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

567

38.68

8.55

459

39.94

10.01

-2.16

0.03089

Population
567
1.32
0.25
459
1.34
0.27
*Variable scaled by 10,000; **Variable scaled by 1,000; ***Variable is converted to December 2007 real dollars.

-1.25

0.21142

Income**, ***
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Table 12
Control Variable Comparisons of Final Sample and Excluded Observations

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Medi-Cal Rate

567

130.75

10.47

459

131.41

10.46

-1.00

0.31574

Registered Nurse (RN)
Wages - 15 Mile Market (MM)*

567

31.39

3.33

452

31.89

3.29

-2.39

0.01714

RN Wages - 25 MM*

567

31.58

3.06

452

31.82

3.19

-1.22

0.22307

Licensed Vocational Nurse
(LVN)
Wages - 15 MM*

567

24.32

3.34

452

24.61

3.34

-1.35

0.17736

LVN Wages - 25 MM*

567

24.38

3.18

452

24.6

3.23

-1.08

0.2787

Nurse Aide (NA) Wages
15 MM*

567

12.16

1.86

452

12.37

1.86

-1.86

0.06374

NA Wages - 25 MM*

567

12.21

1.80

452

12.34

1.79

-1.11

0.26937

Unemployment Rate
567
6.91
*Variable is converted to December 2007 real dollars.

1.70

459

6.83

1.62

0.80

0.42313
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RN, LVN, and total nurse staffing) and organizational characteristics. Thus, the
results of this analysis should only be generalized to free-standing California nursing
homes that were in continuous operation, without a CHOW between 2002 - 2007, that did
not provide subacute care, and that treated Medi-Cal patients.
Other Facilities Used for Competition Measures
There were total of 2,248 observations from distinct-part facilities, SNF
residential facilities, ICFs, ICF residential facilities, and CLHFs that were used in tandem
with the 6,059 free-standing skilled nursing facility observations to compute the nursing
home HHI bed competition measure. This is shown in Table 13 (8,317 total
observations - 6,069 free-standing nursing home observations = 2,248). Of these, 1,196
(2,248 other facility observations - 1,052 distinct-part facilities = 1,196) were also used in
concert with the free-standing nursing facilities to compute the RN, LVN, and NA market
nursing wage rates as well as the Medi-Cal SNF day concentration measure. The 1,052
distinct-part facilities were excluded from these latter variables because the information
was not provided in the OSCAR data.
Table 13 also shows a couple of trends. First, there is a steady decline of distinctpart facilities from a high of 200 in 2002 to 149 in 2007. Second, there is an increase in
the number of CLHFs from only 25 in 2002 to 40 by 2007. The increased CLHF
numbers may be the result of AB 1629 because it also changed the reimbursement
method for sub-acute care and increased the Medi-Cal rates.
The number of ALF beds and HHA unique patient visits around each nursing
home, both using a 15 and 25 mile radius, are also used as competition measures.
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Table 13
Facility Types Used for Nursing Home Bed Competition Measure

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

Distinct-Part Facilities

200

195

179

169

160

149

1,052

Residential Skilled
Nursing Facility

147

151

149

146

146

143

882

Intermediate Care
Facility (ICF)

18

20

18

19

18

17

110

Residential ICF

1

1

2

1

1

2

8

Congregate Living Health
Facility (CLHF)

25

27

33

33

38

40

196

Free-standing Nursing
Home

1,026

1,020

1,016

1,010

1,002

995

6,069

All Facilities

1,417

1,414

1,397

1,378

1,365

1,346

8,317

Table 14 shows an increasing trend for the number of ALFs during the study period. The
number of ALFs increased from 5,506 in 2002 to 6,504 by 2007, but the average number
of beds fell during this time period indicating the trend was increasingly more ALFs, but
smaller in size. Also, the number of ALF beds is customarily set at a minimum of 6, but
it may be as low as one (Mr. Blount, personal communications, February 9, 2011).
The same held true for HHAs, but it was much more pronounced, as illustrated in
Table 15. The number of HHAs increased from 713 in 2002 to 997 by 2007; however,
the average number of unique patient visits decreased. Some HHAs also lacked a single
unique patient visit. This is because some HHAs are considered operating despite not
having certification or serving patients (Mr. Uy, personal communications, Feb. 7, 2011).
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Table 14
Assisted Living Facility (ALF) Descriptive Statistics by Year

Year

Number of
ALFs

Mean Number
of Beds

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

2002

5,506

24.40

56.83

1

783

2003

5,555

24.77

57.20

1

783

2004

5,603

24.77

59.18

1

1,233

2005

5,812

24.63

58.81

1

1,233

2006

6,073

23.98

58.65

1

1,233

2007

6,504

23.21

57.46

1

1,233

Table 15
Home Health Agency (HHA) Descriptive Statistics by Year

Year

Number of
HHAs

Mean Number
of Unique Visits

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

2002

713

733.36

1149.16

0

11,452

2003

837

649.37

1031.12

0

10,689

2004

834

629.95

989.08

0

10,053

2005

876

606.40

966.31

0

9,677

2006

895

609.40

963.45

0

9,699

2007

997

562.92

943.52

0

10,038
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Descriptive Statistics
The means and standard deviations for the study variables, across the 567 panels
and 6 study years, are displayed on Table 16. A cursory review shows there are some
trends over the study period. First, adjusted LVN HPRD increased from .62 in 2002 to
.73 by 2007 and adjusted total HPRD increased from 3.28 to 3.43. Second, the amount of
slack (i.e. cash flow ratio) went from .06 in 2002 to .13 in 2007. Other trends include
higher median per capita income, a higher percentage of the population over the age of
85, increased ALF bed and HHA unique patient visit competition, a higher Medi-Cal rate,
and higher wages for RNs and LVNs. However, NA wages actually decreased over the
study period in terms of real dollars and the unemployment rate in each nursing home’s
market decreased as well. Additionally, Table 16 lists the cutpoints for the variables
broken down into quartiles for potential comparisons to future studies.
A correlation matrix was used to determine multicollinearity amongst the
independent variables. Correlations above .90 are an indication of substantial
multicollinearity that may need to be addressed (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, &
Tatham, 2006). There were some highly correlated variables above .90 as illustrated in
Table A2 located in the Appendix. Most of these entailed correlations between a variable
with a 15 mile and 25 mile market radius. For instance, RN wages using a 15 mile radius
was highly correlated with RN wages using a 25 mile radius (r = .91). This does not
cause a problem because these variables will be in separate regressions. However, the
ALF beds and HHA visits competition measures were highly correlated for both the 15
(.94) and 25 (.98) mile markets when examining the correlation of these variables in
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Table 16
Nursing Home Descriptive Statistics 2002-2007

Variable Name/Cut Points
for Quartiles if Applicable

2002
mean/(s/d)

2003
mean/(s/d)

2004
mean/(s/d)

2005
mean/(s/d)

2006
mean/(s/d)

2007
mean/(s/d)

Registered Nurse (RN) Hours per
Resident Day (HPRD), case-mix adjusted.

0.27
(0.16)

0.26
(0.16)

0.26
(0.16)

0.26
(0.16)

0.27
(0.17)

0.27
(0.17)

Licensed Vocational Nurse (LVN), HPRD,
case-mix adjusted.

0.62
(0.22)

0.63
(0.21)

0.65
(0.21)

0.67
(0.21)

0.69
(0.22)

0.73
(0.22)

Nurse Aide (NA) HPRD, case-mix adjusted.

2.39
(0.45)

237
(0.44)

2.40
(0.48)

2.39
(0.46)

2.43
(0.49)

2.43
(0.47)

Total Nurse HPRD, case-mix adjusted.

3.28
(0.58)

3.26
(0.55)

3.31
(0.60)

3.32
(0.57)

3.39
(0.61)

3.43
(0.59)

Acuity Index, 2002 base year.

1.00
(0.13)

1.01
(0.13)

1.01
(0.13)

1.01
(0.13)

1.02
(0.13)

1.02
(0.13)

Total Skilled Nursing and Intermediate
Care Days *

32.23
(14.47)

32.47
(14.56)

31.99
(15.11)

32.67
(14.92)

32.51
(14.65)

32.14
(14.42)

Beds/
(Quartile 1 = 65, Quartile 2 = 99,
Quartile 3 = 120)

99.33
(44.62)

99.25
(44.61)

99.39
(44.62)

99.43
(45.21)

99.52
(45.38)

99.49
(45.25)

Slack

0.06
(0.47)

0.05
(0.48)

0.05
(0.42)

0.12
(0.34)

0.13
(0.49)

0.13
(0.50)
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Table 16-continued

Variable Name/Cut Points
for Quartiles if Applicable

2002
mean/(s/d)

2003
mean/(s/d)

2004
mean/(s/d)

2005
mean/(s/d)

2006
mean/(s/d)

2007
mean/(s/d)

Medi-Cal Revenue.

0.62
(0.20)

0.62
(0.20)

0.61
(0.20)

0.60
(0.20)

0.60
(0.20)

0.60
(0.21)

Dependence - 15 Mile Market (MM)/
(Quartile 1 = .31, Quartile 2 = .42,
Quartile 3 = 53).

0.42
(0.15)

0.42
(0.15)

0.41
(0.15)

0.41
(0.15)

0.41
(0.15)

0.40
(0.15)

Dependence - 25 MM/
(Quartile 1 = .31, Quartile 2 = .42,
Quartile 3 = .53).

0.42
(0.15)

0.42
(0.15)

0.41
(0.15)

0.41
(0.15)

0.40
(0.15)

0.40
(0.15)

Nursing Home Competition - 15 MM

0.07
(0.13)

0.07
(0.14)

0.07
(0.14)

0.07
(0.13)

0.07
(0.13)

0.07
(0.13)

Nursing Home Competition - 25 MM

0.04
(0.08)

0.04
(0.08)

0.04
(0.08)

0.04
(0.08)

0.04
(0.08)

0.04
(0.08)

Assisted Living Facility (ALF) Bed
Competition - 15 MM**

.7326
(.5493)

.7381
(.5445)

.7573
(.5675)

.7594
(.5521)

.7713
(.5649)

.7957
(.5749)

AFL Bed Competition - 25 MM**

1.4961
(1.1333)

1.5124
(1.1253)

1.5390
(1.1512)

1.5626
(1.1490)

1.5981
(1.844)

1.6508
(1.2130)

Home Health Agency (HHA) Visit
Competition - 15 MM**

3.4629
(3.1206)

3.6312
(3.2993)

3.4314
(3.0837)

3.5572
(3.2639)

3.6188
(3.2947)

3.8413
(3.5583)
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Table 16-continued

Variable Name/Cut Points
for Quartiles if Applicable

2002
mean/(s/d)

2003
mean/(s/d)

2004
mean/(s/d)

2005
mean/(s/d)

2006
mean/(s/d)

2007
mean/(s/d)

6.6528
(5.8302)

7.0201
(6.1903)

6.6733
(5.8234)

6.8827
(6.0761)

7.0121
(6.1612)

7.4455
(6.7075)

MCAL Concentration - 15 MM

0.68
(0.08)

0.68
(0.07)

0.68
(0.07)

0.67
(0.07)

0.67
(0.07)

0.67
(0.07)

MCAL Concentration - 25 MM

0.67
(0.06)

0.68
(0.06)

0.67
(0.06)

0.67
(0.06)

0.67
(0.06)

0.67
(0.06)

Income,* ***

38.68
(8.55)

39.06
(83.53)

39.89
(88.34)

40.50
(93.81)

42.43
(10.18)

42.63
(10.36)

Population

1.32
(0.25)

1.35
(0.26)

1.39
(0.28)

1.43
)0.28)

1.47
(0.28)

1.51
(0.28)

Medi-Cal Rate*

130.75
(10.47)

130.15
(10.89)

130.71
(11.92)

137.43
(12.04)

148.80
(18.15)

150.16
(20.05)

RN Wages - 15 MM*

31.39
(3.33)

31.95
(3.00)

32.59
(2.70)

33.24
(2.65)

33.46
(2.45)

33.60
(2.20)

RN Wages - 25 MM*

31.58
(3.06)

32.09
(2.70)

32.79
(2.31)

33.34
(2.17)

33.54
(2.17)

33.65
(1.86)

LVN Wages - 15 MM*

24.32
(3.34)

24.63
(3.08)

25.00
(2.91)

25.31
(3.01)

25.27
(2.91)

25.26
(2.88)

HHA Visit Competition - 25 MM**
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Table 16-continued

Variable Name/Cut Points
for Quartiles if Applicable

2002
mean/(s/d)

2003
mean/(s/d)

2004
mean/(s/d)

2005
mean/(s/d)

2006
mean/(s/d)

2007
mean/(s/d)

LVN Wages - 25 MM*

24.38
(3.18)

24.66
(2.90)

25.04
(2.74)

25.34
(2.83)

25.28
(2.69)

25.23
(2.62)

NA Wages - 15 MM*

12.16
(1.86)

12.06
(1.72)

11.87
(1.65)

11.79
(1.61)

11.85
(1.62)

11.93
(1.65)

NA Wages - 25 MM*

12.21
(1.80)

12.11
(1.65)

11.92
(1.58)

11.83
(1.52)

11.88
(1.51)

11.96
(1.51)

Unemployment rate

6.91
(1.70)

7.09
(1.76)

6.48
(1.72)

5.62
(1.51)

5.06
(1.44)

5.51
(1.59)

567

567

567

567

567

567

N

*Variable converted to December 2007 real dollars; **Scaled by 10,000; ***Scaled by 1,000.
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levels. It is anticipated that the correlation between these variables will be much less
when examining them using first-differences. These variables will be included regardless
because the empirical literature shows that they are important measures of competition.
Additionally, high degrees of multicollinearity do not violate the first difference
assumption of no perfect collinearity. The ramifications of including these two highly
correlated variables are larger variances for their slope estimators making their statistical
significance more difficult to discern. However, high multicollinearity between these
two variables does not have a direct effect the variances for the other variables of interest
(Wooldridge, 2002).
Multiple Regression Results
Simple OLS Interaction Models
The simple OLS interaction models were run using both a 15 and 25 mile radius
to delineate nursing home markets and determine a nursing home’s dependence on MediCal revenue (resource importance × resource concentration). The purpose of these
regressions was to provide a simple, yet straightforward, view of AB1629’s impact on
nurse staffing. Additionally, chain membership and post × chain membership variables
were included in a couple other sets of regressions. These variables were included to
investigate if nurse staffing was different in nursing homes that were part of a chain,
versus those that were not, before and after AB 1629. Tables 17-20 show the results of
these regressions broken down by nurse categories (i.e., RN, LVN, NA, and Total Nurse
HPRD).
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Table 17
Ordinary Least Squares Results for Registered Nurses (RNs)

RN 15 Mile
Market
(MM)

RN 25
MM

RN 15 MM
With Chain

RN 25 MM
With Chain

0.006
(0.012)

0.004
(0.012)

0.016
(0.015)

0.015
(0.015)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 1a

0.1388***
(0.011)

0.132***
(0.011)

0.137***
(0.011)

0.131***
(0.011)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 2

0.082***
(0.011)

0.087***
(0.011)

0.080***
(0.011)

0.085***
(0.011)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 3

0.034***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.011)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
a
Dependence Quartile 1

0.012
(0.017)

0.017
(0.017)

0.013
(0.017)

0.018
(0.017)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 2

-0.002
(0.017)

-0.007
(0.017)

-0.001
(0.017)

-0.006
(0.017)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 3

-0.019
(0.017)

-0.013
(0.017)

-0.018
(0.017)

-0.013
(0.017)

Chain Member

-

-

0.016*
(0.009)

0.016*
(0.009)

Post AB 1629 Chain
Member

-

-

-0.014
(0.014)

-0.014
(0.014)

0.200***
(0.007)

0.201***
(0.007)

0.189***
(0.010)

0.189***
(0.010)

Observations

2,835

2,835

2,835

2,835

R-squared

0.113

0.107

0.114

0.108

Variables
Post AB 1629

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Quartile 1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.

160
Table 18
Ordinary Least Squares Results for Licensed Vocational Nurses (LVNs)
LVN 15 Mile
Market
(MM)

LVN 25
MM

LVN 15 MM
With Chain

LVN 25 MM
With Chain

Post AB 1629

0.046***
(0.016)

0.046***
(0.016)

0.056***
(0.021)

0.056***
(0.021)

Medi-Cal Dependence
a
Quartile 1

0.033**
(0.015)

0.037**
(0.015)

0.032**
(0.015)

0.036**
(0.015)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 2

-0.048***
(0.015)

-0.058***
(0.015)

-0.050***
(0.015)

-0.060***
(0.015)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 3

-0.050***
(0.015)

-0.060***
(0.015)

-0.050***
(0.015)

-0.060***
(0.015)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 1a

0.043*
(0.023)

0.035
(0.023)

0.044*
(0.023)

0.035
(0.023)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 2

0.047**
(0.023)

0.051**
(0.023)

0.049**
(0.023)

0.052**
(0.023)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 3

0.041*
(0.023)

0.046**
(0.023)

0.041*
(0.023)

0.046*
(0.023)

Chain Member

-

-

0.018
(0.013)

0.02
(0.013)

Post AB 1629 Chain
Member

-

-

-0.013
(0.019)

-0.014
(0.019)

0.647***
(0.010)

0.651***
(0.010)

0.634***
(0.014)

0.636***
(0.014)

Observations

2,835

2,835

2,835

2,835

R-squared

0.055

0.061

0.056

0.062

Variables

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Quartile 1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.
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Table 19
Ordinary Least Squares Results for Nurse Aides (NAs)
NA 15 Mile
Market
(MM)

NA 25
MM

NA 15 MM
With Chain

NA 25 MM
With Chain

(0.034)

(0.034)

(0.044)

(0.044)

Medi-Cal Dependence
a
Quartile 1

-0.249***
(0.031)

0.046
(0.034)

-0.246***
(0.031)

-0.255***
(0.031)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 2

-0.308***
(0.031)

-0.257***
(0.031)

-0.304***
(0.031)

-0.324***
(0.031)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 3

-0.223***
-0.031

-0.329***
-0.031

-0.221***
-0.031

-0.243***
-0.031

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 1a

-0.02
(0.049)

0.008
(0.031)

-0.018
(0.049)

-0.016
(0.049)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 2

-0.02
(0.049)

0.008
(0.049)

-0.018
(0.049)

-0.016
(0.049)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 3

-0.008
(0.049)

-0.019
(0.049)

-0.002
(0.049)

0.016
(0.048)

Chain Member

-

-

-0.049*
(0.026)

-0.048*
(0.026)

Post AB 1629 Chain
Member

-

-

-0.073*
(0.040)

-0.070*
(0.040)

2.582***
(0.022)

2.594***
(0.022)

2.618***
(0.029)

2.630***
(0.029)

Observations

2,835

2,835

2,835

2,835

R-squared

0.068

0.075

0.075

0.082

Variables

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 20
Ordinary Least Squares Results for Total Nurse Hours Per Resident Day

Total 15 Mile
Market
(MM)

Total 25
MM

Total 15 MM
With Chain

Total 25 MM
With Chain

Post AB 1629

0.106**
(0.044)

0.097**
(0.044)

0.175***
(0.057)

0.163***
(0.057)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 1a

-0.079**
(0.040)

-0.088**
(0.039)

-0.078**
(0.040)

-0.088**
(0.039)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 2

-0.274***
(0.040)

-0.301***
(0.039)

-0.273***
(0.040)

-0.300***
(0.039)

Medi-Cal Dependence
Quartile 3

-0.239***
(0.040)

-0.271***
(0.039)

-0.238***
(0.040)

-0.270***
(0.039)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
a
Dependence Quartile 1

0.047
(0.063)

0.06
(0.062)

0.049
(0.063)

0.062
(0.062)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 2

0.026
(0.063)

0.024
(0.062)

0.03
(0.063)

0.03
(0.062)

Post AB 1629 Medi-Cal
Dependence Quartile 3

0.014
(0.063)

0.041
(0.062)

0.021
(0.063)

0.048
(0.062)

Chain Member

-

-

-0.015
(0.034)

-0.012
(0.034)

Post AB 1629 Chain
Member

-

-

-0.100*
(0.051)

-0.098*
(0.051)

3.429***
(0.028)

3.446***
(0.028)

3.440***
(0.037)

3.455***
(0.037)

Observations

2,835

2,835

2,835

2,835

R-squared

0.047

0.055

0.050

0.058

Variables

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Quartile 1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.
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A few of the RN regression results bear mentioning. First, there was a
statistically significant difference between the first three Medi-Cal dependence quartiles
and the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile (pre-AB 1629) for all four regressions.
Second, there may have been a ―dose effect‖ present wherein RN staffing increased as
each subsequent dependence quartile was compared to the highest dependence quartile.
For instance, there were .138 more case-mix adjusted RN HPRD in the first quartile over
the fourth quartile (pre-AB 1629) for the RN regression using a 15-mile market. The
coefficients for the second and third quartiles where .082 and .034, respectively, thereby
potentially showing an increase in adjusted RN HPRD as Medi-Cal dependence
decreased. Third, RN staffing increased for the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile
between the pre and post AB 1629 periods, but the results were not statistically
significant (i.e., POST coefficients). Fourth, chain membership displayed a marginally
statistically significant difference pre AB 1629 indicating that nursing homes that were
part of a chain had higher RN staffing before the legislation was passed.
The results for the LVN regressions again showed statistically significant
differences between the first three Medi-Cal dependence quartiles and the highest MediCal dependence quartile pre-AB 1629. Specifically, the lowest Medi-Cal dependence
quartile had higher LVN staffing than the highest dependence quartile, but the second and
third dependence quartiles had lower LVN staffing than the highest dependence quartile.
Moreover, LVN staffing was significantly higher across all four regressions when
comparing the fourth quartile’s post AB 1629 period to the pre AB 1629 period. In the
post AB 1629 period, estimates indicate that the first three Medi-Cal dependence
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quartiles increased LVN staffing more than the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile
though estimates were not significantly different from zero at conventional levels in
dependence quartile 1 in the specifications involving a 25 mile market. The staffing
results for chain members in the pre and post periods were not statistically significant.
The NA regression results were different from the LVN results. There was
statistically significant and lower NA staffing when the first three dependence quartiles
were compared to the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile pre-AB 1629 in 15 mile
markets. Parallel results were found in 25 mile markets, but the estimate for the first
Medi-Cal dependence quartile was positive but not statistically different from the highest
dependence quartile. Moreover, the highest dependence quartile did not display
statistically significant NA staffing increases between the pre and post-AB 1629 periods
except in the specifications that included the chain member variables. The lowest MediCal dependence quartile post AB 1629 showed statistically significant and lower NA
staffing than the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in 25 mile markets. Additionally,
chain members pre and post AB 1629 had less NA staffing than their non-chain
counterparts.
The first three dependence quartiles of the total staffing regressions had less total
nurse staffing than the fourth Medi-Cal dependence quartile pre-AB 1629. Total nurse
staffing increased for the highest dependence quartile between the pre and post-AB 1629
time periods for all four regressions. The lower three post dependence quartiles had
positive coefficients in relation to the highest dependence quartile, but the coefficients
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were not statistically significant. Chain members had less total nurse staffing than
nonchain members post AB 1629 with a marginal statistical difference.
In summary, there were statistically significant nurse staffing differences (i.e.,
RN, LVN, NA, and total nurse) between the first three Medi-Cal dependence quartiles
and the fourth quartile pre-AB 1629 (except for NA staffing in the first Medi-Cal
dependence quartile using 25 mile markets). There may have also been a dose effect
present (not tested) for the coefficients in the RN staffing regressions pre-AB 1629 in
both 15 and 25 mile markets. The highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile increased NA
staffing more than the first dependence quartile in 25 mile markets post AB 1629. On the
other hand, the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile increased LVN staffing less the
first three quartiles using both 15 and 25 mile markets (except for the first quartile using a
25 mile market). Chain membership was positively related to RN staffing pre AB 1629,
but negatively related to NA and total nurse staffing post AB 1629. Finally, the highest
dependence quartile had statistically significant increases in LVN and total nurse staffing
between the pre and post AB 1629 periods.
First-Differenced Estimation Using Instrumental Variables
Tables 21 and 22, respectively, display the FD IV regressions using both 15 and
25 mile markets. Regarding the 15 mile market regressions, smaller nursing homes in
general had higher LVN, NA, and total nurse HPRD when compared to the larger nursing
homes pre AB 1629. For example, the third bed quartile in the LVN regression had .055
more LVN HPRD than the fourth bed quartile, the second bed quartile had .080 more
LVN HPRD than the fourth bed quartile, and the lowest bed quartile had .112 more LVN
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Table 21
Instrumental Variable First-Differenced Results Using 15 Mile Markets

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Medi-Cal Rate

0.006
(0.005)

-0.004
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.012)

-0.005
(0.018)

Post AB 1629

-0.012
(0.023)

0.009
(0.027)

0.047
(0.061)

0.054
(0.089)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.036
(0.088)

0.112***
(0.037)

0.127
(0.175)

0.206
(0.268)

Beds - Q2

0.023
(0.042)

0.080***
(0.024)

0.206***
(0.096)

0.306***
(0.117)

Beds - Q3

0.032
(0.043)

0.055***
(0.017)

0.122
(0.082)

0.215***
(0.100)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q1

0.006
(0.015)

-0.014
(0.018)

0.029
(0.040)

0.024
(0.054)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q2

0.008
(0.013)

-0.025
(0.017)

-0.023
(0.043)

-0.046
(0.059)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q3

01010
(0.012)

-0.010
(0.014)

-0.004
(0.033)

-0.006
(0.044)

Slack

-0.026**
(0.011)

-0.005
(0.012)

-0.071***
(0.021)

-0.101***
(0.029)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.002
(0.014)

0.009
(0.013)

0.054**
(0.024)

0.065**
(0.030)

Post AB 1629
a
Dependence Q1

-0.107
(0.094)

0.114
(0.112)

0.073
(0.229)

0.131
(0.357)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

-0.046
(0.038)

0.050
(0.045)

-0.008
(0.096)

0.018
(0.145)

Variables
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Table 21 - continued

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

-0.024*
(0.012)

0.030*
(0.016)

-0.020
(0.040)

-0.011
(0.051)

Nursing Home
Competition

-0.067
(0.258)

0.162
(0.184)

0.422
(0.381)

0.689
(0.645)

Assisted Living
Facility Bed Competition

-0.045
(0.064)

0.100
(0.074)

0.065
(0.174)

0.088
(0.230)

Home Health Agency
Competition

0.002
(0.007)

0.015*
(0.008)

0.015
(0.022)

0.030
(0.029)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.001
(0.004)

0.001
(0.004)

0.008
(0.014)

0.012
(0.018)

Percent Population > 85

-0.038
(0.121)

-0.024
(0.147)

0.594*
(0.351)

0.552
(0.462)

Registered Nurse (RN)
Wages

-0.004
(0.003)

-

-

0.003
(0.011)

Unemployment Rate

0.004
(0.005)

0.004
(0.007)

-0.015
(0.019)

-0.005
(0.024)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.009
(0.005)

-

-0.025
(0.016)

Nurse Aides (NA) Wages

-

-

-0.058*
(0.033)

-0.064
(0.040)

-0.004
(0.004)

0.023***
(0.006)

-0.027*
(0.015)

-0.008
(0.019)

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

Variables

Constant

Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Q1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.
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Table 22
Instrumental Variable First-Differenced Results Using 25 Mile Markets

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Medi-Cal Rate

0.009
(0.007)

-0.003
(0.007)

-0.004
(0.012)

0.001
(0.020)

Post AB 1629

-0.028
(0.032)

0.005
(0.032)

0.046
(0.069)

0.022
(0.101)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.025
(0.083)

0.109***
(0.040)

0.118
(0.178)

0.196
(0.267)

Beds - Q2

0.038
(0.043)

0.080***
(0.028)

0.204**
(0.098)

0.313**
(0.127)

Beds - Q3

0.042
(0.040)

0.053***
(0.018)

0.118
(0.084)

0.209*
(0.107)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q1

0.006
(0.017)

-0.017
(0.017)

0.025
(0.039)

0.011
(0.052)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q2

0.014
(0.017)

-0.025
(0.018)

-0.024
(0.045)

-0.037
(0.060)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q3

0.017
(0.016)

-0.013
(0.015)

-0.005
(0.035)

-0.004
(0.047)

Slack

-0.030**
(0.013)

-0.006
(0.012)

-0.070***
(0.022)

-0.106***
(0.031)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.004
(0.016)

0.009
(0.013)

0.053**
(0.024)

0.066**
(0.031)

Post AB 1629
a
Dependence Q1

-0.173
(0.134)

0.102
(0.134)

0.110
(0.245)

0.044
(0.385)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

-0.069
(0.050)

0.045
(0.050)

-0.020
(0.094)

-0.041
(0.143)

Variables
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Table 22 - continued

Resident Day

Resident Day

Resident Day

Total Nurse
Resident Day

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

-0.027*
(0.016)

0.036**
(0.017)

0.006
(0.041)

0.015
(0.054)

Nursing Home
Competition

-0.010
(0.784)

0.766**
(0.370)

0.277
(1.265)

1.184
(1.726)

Assisted Living
Facility Bed Competition

-0.031
(0.051)

0.030
(0.060)

-0.096
(0.128)

-0.112
(0.173)

Home Health Agency
Competition

0.002
(0.005)

0.005
(0.006)

0.003
(0.014)

0.009
(0.019)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.000
(0.004)

0.001
(0.005)

0.006
(0.014)

0.007
(0.018)

Percent Population > 85

-0.076
(0.147)

-0.019
(0.163)

0.685*
(0.365)

0.623
(0.485)

Registered Nurse (RN)
Wages

0.001
(0.004)

-

-

0.021
(0.016)

Unemployment Rate

0.003
(0.006)

0.004
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.021)

-0.006
(0.028)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.007
(0.007)

-

-0.038*
(0.022)

Nurse Aides (NA) Wages

-

-

-0.062
(0.048)

-0.053
(0.060)

-0.006
(0.005)

0.023***
(0.006)

-0.025
(0.016)

-0.011
(0.021)

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

Variables

Constant

Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Q1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.
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HPRD than the fourth bed quartile (all were statistically significant at the .01 level).
Similar results held true for the NA (only the second bed quartile displayed a statistically
significant difference from the fourth bed quartile) and the total nurse (second and third
bed quartiles displayed statistically significant differences from the fourth bed quartile)
staffing regressions. Increased slack (e.g., cash flow) was statistically significant and
negatively related to RN, NA, and total nurse staffing pre AB 1629. However, slack was
statistically significant and positively related to NA and total nurse staffing post AB
1629. The third Medi-Cal dependence quartile coefficient was statistically significant
and negative in the RN regressions indicating that this quartile had a larger RN staffing
decrease than the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile post AB 1629. On the other
hand, the third Medi-Cal dependence quartile was statistically significant and positive in
the LVN regression indicating that this quartile had a higher LVN staffing increase than
the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile post AB 1629. Increased HHA competition
and a higher percentage of the population over the age of 85 also resulted in higher LVN
staffing with a marginal statistically significant differences. LVN and NA wages showed
negative and marginal statistically significant differences in their respective regressions
thereby illustrating that a higher wage rate was negatively related to each of these staffing
categories. Finally, the constant for the LVN regression was statistically significant and
positive indicating that the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile showed LVN staffing
increases during the pre-AB 1629 period. Conversely, the constant for the NA regression
was marginally statistically significant and negative illustrating that the highest Medi-Cal
dependence quartile showed NA staffing decreases during the pre AB 1629 period.
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The 25-mile market regression results were similar to the 15-mile market
results overall. Again smaller nursing homes in general had higher LVN, NA, and total
nurse HPRD when compared to the larger nursing homes pre AB 1629. Coefficients for
the three lowest bed quartiles pre AB 1629 were statistically significant and higher than
the fourth bed quartile in the LVN regression. Similarly, the coefficients for the second
bed quartile in the NA regression and the second and third bed quartiles in the total nurse
staffing regression were statistically significant and higher than the fourth bed quartile.
Slack resources in terms of cash flow were negatively related to RN, NA, and total nurse
staffing pre AB 1629, but slack resources were positively related to NA and total nurse
staffing post AB 1629. The third Medi-Cal dependence quartile was statistically
significant and negative in the RN regression indicating that this quartile had a decrease
in RN staffing larger than the decrease in staffing for the highest dependence quartile post
AB 1629. On the other hand, the third Medi-Cal dependence quartile was statistically
significant and positive in the LVN regression indicating that this quartile had a larger
change relative to the increase for the highest dependence quartile post AB 1629.
Decreased nursing home bed competition was statistically significant and positively
related to additional LVN staffing. Similarly, a higher percentage of the population over
age 85 was positively related to NA staffing with a marginal statistically significant
difference. Higher LVN wages was also marginally statistically significant and
negatively related to total nurse staffing. Finally, the constant for the LVN regression
was statistically significant and positive indicating that the highest Medi-Cal dependence
quartile showed staffing increases during the pre-AB 1629 period.
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Sensitivity Analyses
The inclusion of the CHAIN_MEMBER variable in the first set of OLS
regressions was a portion of this study’s sensitivity analyses. It was proposed that chain
membership may have affected nurse staffing. A review of tables 17-20 shows a slightly
higher R2 indicating more variation in the DVs was accounted for in the models that
included chain membership. Chain membership pre AB 1629 was further associated with
increased RN HPRD in both the 15 and 25 mile markets and decreased NA HPRD in 15
mile markets. Additionally, NA and total nurse staffing was statistically significant and
lower for chain members post AB 1629. However, the DEPENDENCE, POST, and
POST DEPENDENCE variables all had the same sign and statistical significance when
the CHAIN_MEMBER variable was included versus when it was not.
The use of a 25 mile market was also a part of the sensitivity analyses.
Grabowski and Stevenson (2008) used a 25 km (approximately 15.5 miles) radius around
each nursing home in their national study of nursing home ownership conversions while
Phibbs and Robinson (1993) used multiple measures including a 15 mile radius to
determine hospital market structure. This study incorporated a 25 mile radius as part of a
sensitivity analyses because a 15 mile radius may have been too small and the use of
counties to delineate markets may have been too large. The OLS regression results for
the 15 and 25 mile markets were nearly identical when the chain member variables were
excluded. The coefficient values were about the same, the signs were in the same
direction, and the statistical significance was the same except in two cases. First, the
LVN regression had a marginal statistically significant and positive POST
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DEPENDENCE coefficient for the first quartile using a 15 mile market, but not when
a 25 mile market was used. Second, the NA regression had a statistically significant and
negative POST DEPENDENCE variable for the first quartile using a 25 mile market, but
not when a 15 mile market was used.
The FD results using IV estimation procedures were very similar using a 15 and
25 mile market. The only differences were in terms of LVN HHA competition, nursing
home bed competition, LVN wages, NA wages, and the constant in the NA regression.
Basically, the HHA competition, LVN wages (for the LVN regression), and NA wages
showed marginal statistically significant differences in the 15 mile market, but not the 25
mile market. Conversely, nursing home bed competition and LVN wages (for the total
nurse staffing regression) displayed marginal statistically significant differences in the 25
mile market, but not the 15 mile market.
The FD IV regressions were also performed using counties to define markets,
located in Table 23 as part of the sensitivity analyses. The coefficients and statistical
significance for the regressions using the county as the market were similar to those
obtained using 15 and 25 mile markets. The biggest difference lies in the nursing home
bed HHI. For instance, the county RN HHI was 1.569 (significant at .01 level)
versus -0.067 (not significant) for the 15 mile market and .010 for the 25 mile market (not
significant). Similar results were found in the total nurse hours regressions.
The final part of the sensitivity analyses entailed running the nurse staffing regressions
using FDs, but without the lagged IV. These regression results are shown in Tables A3A5 located in the Appendix. It is important to note that these estimates are biased
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Table 23
First-Differenced Instrumental Variable Results Using County as Market

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Medi-Cal Rate

0.008
(0.007)

-0.003
(0.007)

-0.009
(0.015)

0.012
(0.019)

Post AB 1629

-0.024
(0.032)

0.007
(0.032)

0.071
(0.078)

0.085
(0.099)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.028
(0.084)

0.112***
(0.042)

0.093
(0.185)

0.158
(0.280)

Beds - Q2

0.033
(0.042)

0.086***
(0.027)

0.180*
(0.099)

0.274**
(0.117)

Beds - Q3

0.045
(0.040)

0.052***
(0.018)

0.105
(0.085)

0.190*
(0.104)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q1

0.004
(0.017)

-0.016
(0.018)

0.028
(0.042)

0.022
(0.056)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q2

0.009
(0.015)

-0.021
(0.016)

-0.025
(0.044)

-0.044
(0.057)

Post AB 1629 Beds-Q3

0.012
(0.014)

-0.009
(0.014)

-0.008
(0.035)

-0.011
(0.046)

Slack

-0.028**
(0.012)

-0.006
(0.012)

-0.065***
(0.022)

-0.094***
(0.029)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.005
(0.015)

0.009
(0.012)

0.052**
(0.025)

0.064**
(0.031)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q1a

-0.149
(0.131)

0.082
(0.133)

0.187
(0.299)

0.277
(0.362)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

-0.072
(0.051)

0.044
(0.052)

-0.017
(0.120)

-0.052
(0.143)

Variables

175

Table 23 - continued

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

-0.012
(0.014)

0.031**
(0.015)

0.028
(0.040)

0.056
(0.048)

Nursing Home
Competition

1.569***
(0.455)

0.497**
(0.230)

1.250
(1.033)

3.281**
(1.286)

Assisted Living
Facility Bed Competition

-0.040
(0.102)

0.028
(0.119)

-0.155
(0.270)

-0.213
(0.336)

Home Health Agency
Competition

0.004
(0.004)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.019
(0.013)

0.022
(0.016)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.001
(0.004)

0.000
(0.004)

0.009
(0.014)

0.012
(0.018)

Percent Population > 85

-0.137
(0.191)

-0.005
(0.209)

0.845*
(0.505)

0.881
(0.603)

Registered Nurse (RN)
Wages

0.002
(0.003)

-

-

0.000
(0.014)

Unemployment Rate

0.002
(0.006)

0.007
(0.008)

-0.003
(0.020)

-0.006
(0.026)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.006
(0.006)

-

-0.030
(0.020)

Nurse Aides (NA) Wages

-

-

-0.058*
(0.035)

-0.046
(0.045)

-0.004
(0.005)

0.027***
(0.007)

-0.008
(0.014)

-0.030
(0.026)

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

Variables

Constant

Observations

Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
a
Q1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.
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and inconsistent because endogeneity is present based upon how Medi-Cal rates were
constructed post AB-1629 (i.e., past staffing costs help in part determine future Medi-Cal
rates). The results are simply presented as part of a sensitivity analyses. There were a
couple of notable differences. First, RN wages were also negative and statistically
significant using 15 mile markets whereas they were not statistically significant before.
Second, ALF competition was positive and marginally statistically significant in the 15
mile markets without IVs whereas it was not statistically significant before. Again, these
results are neither unbiased or consistent due to endogeneity.
Chapter Summary
This chapter described the sample derivation procedures, compared the California
nursing home sample versus the California nursing home population across the
dependent, independent, and control variables, and presented the descriptive statistics as
well as the regression results. Sensitivity analyses using alternate market definitions (25
mile and county), chain membership, and FDs without IV estimation were presented.
Statistically significant differences between the population and sample were
found across the variables indicating that the study should only be generalized to
free-standing California nursing homes that were in continuous operation, without a
CHOW between 2002-2007, that did not provide subacute care, and that treated Medi-Cal
patients. The OLS results showed that LVN and total nurse HPRD increased for the
highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile post-AB 1629. The FD IV regressions showed
that facilities with fewer beds in general had less LVN, NA, and total nurse HPRD in the
pre-AB 1629 period. Furthermore, HHA competition was related to higher LVN staffing
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in 15 mile markets while LVN staffing was positive in the pre AB 1629 period. The
alternate regressions used in the sensitivity analyses returned similar results to the FD IV
results except for ALF competition and RN wage variables.

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

Introduction
This study’s primary purpose was to examine AB 1629’s effect on California
nursing home staffing. More specifically, the study sought to determine if RN, LVN,
NA, and total nurse staffing HPRD (adjusted for case-mix) increased in free-standing
nursing homes following passage of the legislation. It was expected that nurse staffing
would improve because Medi-Cal reimbursement rates generally increased after the
legislation was passed. The new reimbursement rate was also based on each individual
nursing home’s lagged costs (18-24 months) which provided incentive to hire more nurse
staff. This was especially true considering the LDOA which potentially rewarded
facilities up to 8% more than employee labor costs, not to exceed 5% of the total MediCal reimbursement rate. Thus, higher staffing cost in the present would generally lead to
a higher Medi-Cal reimbursement rate in the future. However, this incentive may not
have been great enough for some nursing homes given that each faced varying degrees of
resource dependencies, environmental changes and pressures, and uncertainty.
A RDT conceptual framework was chosen to examine nurse staffing increases
post AB 1629 because it effectively accounts for resource dependencies, environmental
factors, and organizational characteristics. It also outlines potential responses to
exogenous changes in the environment including organizational change strategies,
178
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resource dependence avoidance, resource control avoidance, or even no change when
organizations are not dependent on a particular resource for survival. The passage of AB
1629 certainly qualified as an exogenous event.
Four research questions were posed in this study based in part on AB 1629’s
legislative intent (i.e., increase nurse staffing) as well as organizational and
environmental considerations framed by RDT:
1. Did California nursing home nurse staffing increase following the passage of
AB 1629?
2. Did nursing homes with the highest levels of Medi-Cal dependence increase
staffing more than those nursing homes with lower dependence?
3. What were the organizational characteristics and environmental factors
associated with nurse staffing?
4. Did ALF and HHA competition effect nursing home staffing?
The first research question entails the basic policy impact of AB 1629, but it is not
derived from the conceptual framework and therefore does not have a hypothesis. It was
however anticipated that nurse staffing HPRD would increase post AB 1629 because that
was the Assembly Bill’s legislative intent. On the other hand, five hypotheses were built
upon the last three research questions and the RDT derived conceptual model:
H1: Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased
nurse staffing relative to nursing homes with lower Medi-Cal dependence
post AB 1629, other things constant.
H2: Smaller nursing homes increased nurse staffing relative to large
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nursing homes post AB 1629, other things constant.
H3: Nursing homes with more slack resources, (e.g. higher cash flow)
increased nurse staffing post AB 1629, other things constant.
H4: Nursing homes in more competitive markets had higher nurse
staffing, other things constant.
H5: Nursing homes in markets with higher resource munificence (e.g.
higher per capita income and greater percentage of population over 85)
were positively associated with nurse staffing, other things constant.
The data for this study came from administrative sources with most of them being
California state agencies. The COSHPD provided the bulk of the data (including HHA
information), but the California Departments of Finance (population over age 85), Social
Services (ALF), Health Care Services (Medi-Cal reimbursement rates), and Public Health
(CHOW and closure listings) also contributed. Other data sources included the
University of Southern California (geocoding), Brown University (distinct-part beds and
case-mix), U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (median per capita income), and the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rates and CPI).
Summary and Interpretation of the Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive analyses of the nursing home study sample and excluded observations
were conducted to ascertain if there were differences between them. This was initially
done using two-group mean comparison tests (i.e., t-tests) for the year 2002. An
additional analysis of the final sample and excluded nursing homes compared all study
years (2002-2004 and 2006-2007) with the standard errors adjusted for the dependence of
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the observations within facilities. The 2002 analysis and the 2002-2004 and 20062007 analysis returned very similar results except that the 2002 analysis did not find a
statistically significant difference in terms of beds while the latter analysis did.
The final study sample generally had lower nurse staffing and more total SNF and
ICF days than the excluded observations. Additionally, the final sample by and large had
a higher ratio of cash flow to total assets (i.e., slack), a higher proportion of Medi-Cal
revenue, and a higher Medi-Cal resource dependence. The remaining final sample
differences involved a higher Medi-Cal concentration in 15-mile markets, a lower median
per capita income, and lower RN wages in 15-mile markets than the excluded
observations.
The dependent variable related differences between the final sample and excluded
nursing homes were predictable. For instance, the final sample did not include CLHFs
and sub-acute facilities that generally treat patients and residents with a higher acuity. A
higher patient/resident acuity would ostensibly require both a more professional staff as
well as more staff in general. Also, the final sample had a higher number of total skilled
nursing and intermediate care days which was anticipated because this study specifically
examined skilled nursing care whereas some of the excluded facilities may have focused
on other care such as sub-acute or intermediate care.
In terms of the organizational characteristics, it was also expected that the final
sample would have had a higher proportion of Medi-Cal revenue and greater Medi-Cal
resource dependence (i.e., interaction term of Medi-Cal revenue and Medi-Cal SNF day
concentration in each market) using both a 15 and 25 mile market radius. This was
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anticipated since the excluded facilities such as MLRCs, CCRCs, and CLHF provided
additional services that generate non-Medi-Cal revenue.
The Medi-Cal concentration (15 mile radius) difference is intuitive since the final
sample included nursing homes that predominantly treated Medi-Cal patients while the
excluded group also included nursing homes that focused on private pay patients (i.e.,
zero Medi-Cal SNF days). The 15 mile markets may have also picked up on urban
versus rural area differences which were not explicitly studied (these would be ―washed
away‖ in the fixed effects models). If this were true, it would help explain why 15 mile
markets showed significant differences, but 25 mile markets did not. It may been the
case that 15 mile markets captured urban areas which typically have people with a lower
socioeconomic status and therefore were more likely to have Medi-Cal as a payer.
Conversely, the 25 mile markets may have captured more suburban and rural areas in
which people may have had a higher socioeconomic status and less likelihood of having
Medi-Cal as a payer. This is further supported in both analyses because the excluded
group had a statistically significant and higher median per capita income when compared
to the final sample.
RN wages was the only control variable that was significantly different when
comparing the final sample (lower average RN wage) to the excluded group. The
excluded group included facilities that served a higher patient/resident acuity; thus, RNs
may have been paid more on average in these facilities to provide this more intensive
care. Also, facilities in the excluded group may have had newer and better facilities or
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provided a higher quality of care. This may have potentially lowered RN turnover
resulting in a higher average wage (i.e., longevity raises) if true.
Summary and Interpretation of the Hypotheses Tested
The dependent variables (i.e., RN, LVN, NA, and total nurse staffing HPRD) used
OLS to answer research question one, OLS and FD IV to answer research question two,
and FD IV to answer research questions three and four. All of the estimation procedures
used both a 15 and 25 mile radii to delineate markets. There were two main purposes for
the OLS regressions. First, the OLS regressions were used to examine the first research
question, if nurse staffing increased post AB-1629. In addition to using the fourth
quartile as the omitted reference group, the OLS regressions were run (15 and 25 mile
markets) using the other dependence quartiles (i.e., first, second, and third quartiles) as
the reference group to ascertain if staffing increased post AB 1629 in each quartile. For
instance, the POST variable for the RN OLS regression, using the first dependence
quartile, would indicate if RN staffing changed for the first quartile after AB 1629. The
specific coefficient values and standard errors for these latter OLS regressions are not
presented herein, but are available upon request. Second, these regressions were used as
a straightforward method to see if nursing homes with the highest levels of Medi-Cal
dependence increased nurse staffing more than those nursing homes with lower
dependence post AB 1629. Thus, the results displayed in Tables 17-20 helped address
the second research question and the first hypothesis.
The FD IV regressions were performed to test the RDT developed hypotheses.
The results of these tests (Tables 21 and 22) address the five hypotheses, but also the last
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three research questions. The FD IV regressions were a more comprehensive
statistical analysis which accounted for endogeneity in the Medi-Cal reimbursement rate
as well as facility-specific constants (e.g., ownership). Clustering by nursing home in
these regressions also overcame heteroskedasticity and serial correlated errors. Hence,
these results provided consistent parameter estimates.
First Research Question: Post AB 1629 Nurse Staffing
The first research question entailed an examination of nurse staffing after the AB
1629 legislation was passed. A hypothesis was not specified for this research question,
but it was expected that nurse staffing would increase because the new reimbursement
methodology was facility-specific, cost-based and the reimbursement rate was higher for
the most part. Table 24 illustrates the OLS results and includes the coefficient sign and
statistical significance using each of the dependence quartiles as the reference group.
The results show that RN HPRD only had a marginal statistically significant
increase in the first Medi-Cal dependence quartile using a 25 mile market. There are also
a couple of reasons why RN staffing may not have increased in the other Medi-Cal
dependence quartiles. First, RNs are expensive as shown by the hourly wages in Tables
12 and A1. Thus, AB 1629’s Medi-Cal reimbursement rate increase may not have been
enough to spur most nursing homes to hire more RN staff. Second, there was uncertainty
surrounding the legislation given that it originally had a 2008 sunset date. This meant
that nursing homes had to make the initial investment to hire RNs, they would not see the
returns until 18-24 months later given the lagged costs used to compute the rates, and
there was no guarantee that a nursing home’s investment in RN staffing would keep

185
Table 24
Ordinary Least Squares Results With Different Reference Group Quartiles

Dependent Variable

Reference
Quartile

15 Mile Market
Coefficient Sign/
Statistical Significance**

25 Mile Market
Coefficient Sign/
Statistical Significance**

Registered Nurse (RN)
Hours Per Resident
Day (HPRD)*

Quartile 1

Positive,
Not Significant (NS)

Positive
Marginal Significance
(MS)

RN HPRD*

Quartile 2

Positive, NS

Negative, NS

RN HPRD*

Quartile 3

Negative, NS

Negative, NS

RN HPRD

Quartile 4

Positive, NS

Positive, NS

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) HPRD*

Quartile 1

Positive, Statistically
Significant (SS)

Positive, SS

LVN HPRD*

Quartile 2

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

LVN HPRD*

Quartile 3

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

LVN HPRD

Quartile 4

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

Nurse Aide (NA)
HPRD*

Quartile 1

Positive, NS

Positive, NS

NA HPRD*

Quartile 2

Positive, NS

Positive, NS

NA HPRD*

Quartile 3

Positive, NS

Positive, NS

NA HPRD

Quartile 4

Positive, NS

Positive, NS

Total Nurse HPRD*

Quartile 1

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

Total Nurse HPRD*

Quartile 2

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

Total Nurse HPRD*

Quartile 3

Positive, SS

Positive, SS

Total Nurse HPRD

Quartile 4

Positive, MS

Positive, MS

Note. *Coefficients and standard errors not presented, but available upon request. ** Statistical
significance is a p value < .05 or lower and marginal statistical significance is a p value > .05 and < .10.
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paying off given that the legislation and higher associated Medi-Cal rates could end
in 2008. Third, a country- wide shortage of RNs and the notion that nursing homes are
generally not the preferred work place for RNs also needs to be considered. All of these
may have contributed to a lack of statistically significant RN staffing increases post AB
1629.
LVN staffing increased in the post AB 1629 period across all of the dependence
quartiles. This partially affirms that nurse staffing increased post AB 1629. A nursing
home’s decision to increase LVN staffing over RN staffing is understandable for a few
reasons. First, LVNs are less expensive than RNs as shown in Tables 12 and A1. Thus,
nursing homes may have been more willing to take advantage of the more generous
Medi-Cal reimbursement rate and make the investment in LVNs despite the risk involved
in AB 1629’s sunset date. Second, more LVNs may have also been available, and
therefore easier to recruit, due to a shorter training pipeline than RNs. Third, LVNs may
have been preferred to RNs because the average nursing home’s patient acuity in the
sample did not warrant more RNs. Fourth, it would have behooved nursing homes to hire
more professional staff and get reimbursed for associated Medi-Cal labor costs, assuming
they stay under their peer group’s labor percentile. This was because up to 100% of the
costs could potentially be reimbursed. Furthermore, the LDOA would enable them to
receive an additional 8% above and beyond these costs. This may have been very
appealing to some nursing homes.
Nursing homes did not increase NA staffing post AB 1629 and this may have
occurred for a couple of reasons. First, they are the least skilled direct care provider.
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Thus, nursing homes wishing to treat higher acuity patients or provide a higher level
of quality of care needed to hire more RNs and LVNs. Second, NAs already were the
dominant nurse staffing category pre AB 1629 so other nurse categories (e.g., RNs and
LVNs) were more than likely needed. Case in point, NAs make up the bulk of these
hours as witnessed by the constants in the OLS regressions (Tables 17-20).
Nursing homes increased total nurse HPRD overall in the post AB 1629 period
thereby providing the strongest support yet that nurse staffing increased post AB 1629
because total nurse staffing encompasses RN, LVN, and NA staffing. Moreover, the
driving force behind the total nurse staffing increase appeared to be LVN staffing.
However, the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile also appeared to increase NA
staffing although it was not statistically significant due to it being measured with poor
precision.
In summary, there was statistically significant support that LVN and total nurse
staffing increased post AB 1629 thereby answering research question one. The LVN and
total nurse staffing HPRD increased across all four Medi-Cal dependence quartiles.
Additionally, RN staffing for the first quartile showed a marginal statistically significant
increase post AB 1629 in 25 mile markets.
Research Question Two: Nurse Staffing and High Medi-Cal Dependence
The second research question involved an examination of nurse staffing in
nursing homes which had the highest Medi-Cal dependence. Hypothesis one predicted
that nursing homes in the highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile increased nurse staffing
more than nursing homes with the lowest Medi-Cal dependence since they gained the
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most from the new reimbursement methodology. The OLS results in Tables 17-20
show that positive coefficients for the POST variable indicating that the highest Medi-Cal
dependence quartile increased RN, LVN, NA and total nurse staffing post AB 1629, but
the RN and NA results were not statistically significant. The FD IV results failed to
provide any statistically significant nurse staffing increased for the highest Medi-Cal
dependence quartile post AB 1629.
There was marginal statistically significant evidence that the highest Medi-Cal
dependence quartile increased NA staffing relative to the lowest Medi-Cal dependence
quartile post AB 1629. There was not any statistically significant evidence that the
highest Medi-Cal dependence quartile increased RN and total nurse staffing relative to
the lower Medi-Cal dependence quartiles post AB 1629. Unexpectedly, the lowest three
Medi-Cal dependence quartile coefficients (15 mile markets) and second and third MediCal dependence quartile coefficients (25 mile markets) for the LVN regressions were
positive and at least marginally significant. This indicates that nursing homes with lower
Medi-Cal dependence increased LVN staffing more than facilities with the highest MediCal dependence.
Two additional results pertaining to hypothesis one bear mentioning. First, the
third POST DEPENDENCE quartile in the RN FD IV regression was negative and had a
marginal statistically significant difference indicating that RN staffing for nursing homes
in this quartile fell even further than nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal
dependence. Second, the third POST DEPENDENCE quartile in the LVN FD IV
regression was positive with a marginal statistically significant difference. This indicates
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that LVN staffing for nursing homes in this quartile increased even more than nursing
homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence.
In review, support for hypothesis one is mixed. The OLS regressions provide
support that LVN and total nurse staffing HPRD increased in nursing homes with the
highest Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629. The FD IV regressions failed to
substantiate these OLS results. Additionally, LVN HPRD increased in nursing homes
with lower Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629 relative to nursing homes with the
highest level of Medi-Cal dependence.
Research Question Three: Organizational Characteristics and Environmental Factors
The third research question comprised an assessment of organizational
characteristics and environmental factors, using a RDT conceptual framework, related to
nurse staffing in nursing homes. Hypothesis two predicted that nursing homes with
smaller beds would increase nurse staffing relative to larger bedded facilities, but this was
not supported. Hypothesis three expected that nursing homes with more slack resources
post AB 1629 would increase nurse staffing. This hypothesis was supported for the NA
and total nurse staffing regressions. The fourth hypothesis that pertained to this research
question predicted that higher nursing home bed competition would lead to increased
nurse staffing. There was not any statistically significant support for this hypothesis. On
the contrary, the opposite was found for the LVN regression using a 25 mile market. The
fifth hypothesis expected increased nurse staffing in more munificent markets (e.g.,
higher per capita income and greater % of the population over age 85). There was some
support for this in the NA staffing regressions using both a 15 and 25 mile market.
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Hypothesis two stated that smaller facilities (in terms of beds) would increase
nurse staffing more in relation to larger facilities. This hypothesis was not supported, but
there were some interesting results nonetheless involving the bed quartiles pre AB 1629.
Specifically, the LVN regression first, second, and third BED quartiles pre-AB 1629
were positive and statistically significant thereby indicating that LVN staffing was higher
in smaller facilities before AB 1629. Similarly, the NA (second quartile) and total nurse
staffing (second and third quartiles) coefficients for the pre AB 1629 period were positive
and had at least a marginal statistical significance. This also indicated that NA and total
nurse staffing was higher in smaller facilities before AB 1629.
Hypothesis three concerning higher cash flow (i.e., slack resources) and higher
nurse staffing was supported in the NA and total nurse staffing regressions as the
coefficients were positive and statistically significant. This is an encouraging result
because it means that nursing homes with slack resources were investing in more NA
staffing and more total nurse staffing overall. The coefficients for RN and LVN were
also positive, but not statistically significant.
Hypothesis four concerning nursing home bed competition was not supported. In
contrast, a lower concentration of nursing homes in 25 mile markets resulted in more
LVN staffing which was unexpected. Furthermore, this result was amplified when
counties were used as markets. For instance, the coefficients for RN HPRD was 1.569
and total nurse staffing was 3.281 both statistically significant when counties were used
as the market. This statistically significant result using counties as markets lends some
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support to the cited problems of using these large geographical areas to delineate
nursing home markets.
Hypothesis five, which entailed median per capita income and percentage of the
population over 85 being positively related to nurse staffing, had some statistical support
in the NA regressions. Specifically, a higher percentage of the population over age 85 in
the market resulted in increased NA staffing. The coefficient for the total nurse staffing
was also about the same, but it was not statistically significant. The median per capita
income coefficients were positive for all the regressions as expected, but they were not
statistically significant.
In summary, the FD IV regressions provided some evidence supporting research
question number three and hypotheses three and five. However, there was not statistical
evidence that smaller nursing homes (in terms of beds) increased nurse staffing post AB
1629 or that facilities with more nursing home bed competition increased staffing. There
was statistically significant support though that nursing homes with slack resources post
AB 1629 increased NA and total nurse staffing. Additionally, NA staffing was higher in
markets with a higher percentage of the population over the age of 85.
Research Question Four: Assisted Living Facility and Home Health Agency Competition
The final hypothesis for the fourth and final research question postulated that
increased ALF and HHA competition would result in more nursing home nurse staffing.
Only the FD IV LVN regression using a 15 mile market provided marginal statistically
significant support for this hypothesis. In essence, for every 10,000 HHA unique patient

192
visits, LVN HPRD increased by .015 in 15 mile markets. Thus, there is mixed
support for hypothesis number four.
Summary of the Findings
The OLS regression results illustrated that LVN and total nurse staffing increased
in nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence post AB 1629. However,
nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence only increased NA HPRD more
than facilities with lower Medi-Cal dependence in 25 mile markets. Unexpectedly, LVN
regression results showed that nursing homes with lower Medi-Cal dependence increased
LVN staffing more than nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence (except
for the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in 25 mile markets).
The FD IV analyses also did not support the hypothesis that smaller facilities
would increase nurse staffing more than larger one post AB 1629. The rationale behind
this was that smaller facilities more than likely had lower nurse staffing HPRD when
compared to larger ones. However, this did not turn out to be the case as the lower bed
quartiles, in general pre AB 1629, had more nurse staffing than the highest bed quartile.
Regardless, bed size post AB 1629 size did not matter in terms of nurse staffing
increases.
It was also expected that a higher ratio of net income and depreciation to total
assets (i.e., slack) would be related to higher nurse HRPD post AB 1629. This turned out
to be true for the NA and total nurse staffing regressions. Thus, it appears that nursing
homes with slack resources post AB 1629 concentrated on NA staffing which would have
also helped increase total nurse staffing.
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Resource munificence was also anticipated to be positively related to
increased nurse staffing. There was some statistical evidence to support this hypothesis.
Specifically, NA staffing was found to be higher in markets with a higher percentage of
the population over the age of 85.
Competition was also expected to be related to increased nursing home nurse
staffing HPRD. Only the LVN HPRD using 15 mile markets supported this hypothesis
that higher HHA competition resulted in higher nursing home LVN HPRD. A lack of
results here may have been due to different types of competition that each nursing home
faced. Nursing homes faced competition for patients that may have required additional
staff to differentiate their services. On the other hand, nursing homes also faced
competition for nursing staff, particularly RNs which were in a short supply nationally.
It may have very well been the case that nursing homes were unable to attract
professional nurse staffing, despite well intentioned efforts, because of competition from
other health care providers such as hospitals, ALFs, and HHAs. This is especially true
considering that California has minimum nurse staffing requirements for hospitals (Dr.
McCue, personal communications, April 1, 2011) which would obviously shrink the
available pool of RNs.
Implication for Theory – Based Research
The findings support a couple of the resource dependence theory (RDT) framed
hypotheses. A lack of more statistically significant results may be due to the design of
AB 1629. In some cases, the increased resources may have been distributed to
shareholders or retained rather than used to increase nurse staffing. Another potential
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explanation is that nurse staffing changes were not detected because only two years of
data post AB 1629 were studied. There was an 18-24 month lag used to compute the new
reimbursement rates meaning that increased nurse staffing in 2005, in response to AB
1629, would not show up in higher Medi-Cal reimbursement rates until at least 2007.
Hence, this study that only runs through 2007 may only have touched upon the start of
increased nurse staffing in California nursing homes. Moreover, there was a sunset date
for the reimbursement methodology which caused some uncertainty as to whether past
investments in nurse staffing would continue to lead to higher Medi-Cal reimbursement
rates in the future.
The use of the resource dependence interaction term (resource concentration ×
resource importance) was noteworthy. Frequently researchers have used only resource
concentration or resource importance in isolation to represent the resource dependence
construct. However, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stated that it was the interaction of
resource concentration and resource importance that determined resource dependence.
Using one of these in isolation to represent resource dependence did not present the entire
picture of an organization’s characteristics and environmental factors. The use of MediCal dependence provided statistically significant results for LVN and total nurse staffing
post AB 1629 when using OLS. However, the FD IV regressions in general were not
statistically significant perhaps due to the two reasons outlined in the previous paragraph.
Implication for Methodology
A key consideration in RDT is the competition for scarce resources. Thus, the use
of alternative markets was also an important contribution of this study. Nursing home

195
studies overwhelmingly use counties to delineate nursing home markets and therefore
competitors. Much of this is due to a lack of data, particularly for national nursing home
studies. This study’s results show the problem with this approach particularly when one
examines the nursing home competition results in Tables 21-23. For example, RN
staffing was negative and statistically insignificant in the 15 and 25 mile markets;
however, it has positive and showed great statistical significance (p <.01) using counties
as the market. This is because counties overstate competition. The 15 and 25 mile
markets may have more closely resembled the markets that each nursing home operated
in during this study period.
Defining competitors is equally important as defining the markets in which they
compete and operate. ALF and HHA competitors are predominantly excluded as
competitors in nursing home studies because the data is generally not available
particularly for national studies. This study was able to contribute to the empirical
literature by including ALFs and HHAs as competitors. LVN staffing increased in
response to greater HHA competition using 15 mile markets. The remaining ALF and
HHA results were not statistically significant, but this may be due to using fixed 15 and
25 mile market radii. The use of fixed radii is an improvement over using counties to
delineate markets, but surely not every facility operates solely in either a 15 or 25 mile
market. For instance, rural nursing homes may have a larger geographical market while
urban ones may have a smaller one. An examination of variable market radii based on
patient origin at time of admission would be a more precise measure of market
competition.

196
A lack of more statistically significant results in this study may be related to
the data and analytical procedures used. Only two years of post AB 1629 data were
available for this study. This is because the case-mix data necessary to for 2008 remains
unavailable (last checked on April 10, 2011) on the Brown University Long-Term Care
Focus website. The use of the FD IV regressions may not have been able to pick up
staffing changes in this short amount of time.
The use of the 2005 data to compute first differences could be improved upon in
two ways. First, find a strictly exogenous instrument and apply the withintransformation. This would subtract out the average value of the panel making the use of
2005 data unnecessary in the analysis. The difficulty was finding a strictly exogenous
instrument that was related to the Medi-Cal rate, but not the nurse staffing dependent
variables. One was not found, but perhaps such an instrument is out there. Another
option would be to use forward orthogonal deviations to transform and then subtract out
the average of all available future observations.
The OLS regressions also did not explain much of the variation in the dependent
variables; however, the intent was never to explain this variation. Rather, the OLS
regressions were meant to give a straightforward answer as to whether nursing homes
with higher Medi-Cal dependence increased nurse staffing post AB 1629. This proved to
be the case for the LVN and total nurse staffing regressions. There are many other
variables that help explain this variation such as ownership type, chain membership, use
of a management company, and geographical location (i.e., rural versus urban).

197
However, these are all ―constant‖ variables or fixed effects for the most part and
could not be included in the IV FD regressions.
Implications for Policymakers and Legislators
The study provides some evidence in the OLS regressions that California nursing
homes increased LVN and total nurse staffing post AB 1629. This is an important
contribution because studies of Medicaid prospective payment based on facility-specific
costs and its relationship with nursing home nurse staffing are rare. This is mainly
because only two other states had employed a Medicaid prospective payment method
based on facility-specific costs before California passed AB 1629 (Harrington, et al.,
2008).
This study’s results are contrary to some of the findings in the Harrington et al.
(2008) and Schnelle et al. (2007) AB 1629 reports. For instance, the Harrington et al.
(2008) report found that RN HPRD had increased by 1.5% between 2004 and 2006 while
the Schnelle et al. (2007) report found that CNA staffing had decreased from 2001-2006.
However, there were similarities between this study’s results and the two aforementioned
reports. Most notably Harrington et al. (2008) found that total nurse staffing HRPD
increased between 2004 and 2006 and Schnelle et al. (2007) found that licensed nurse
staffing increased, of which LVNs are a major part. This study’s results also confirmed
Feng et al. (2008) national panel study of nursing homes that found that higher state
Medicaid rates were positively associated with LPN and total nurse HPRD.
It must be noted that this study’s OLS results showing LVN and total nurse
staffing HPRD increases is not particularly strong evidence. This is especially the case
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since the more robust IV FD regressions did not support these nurse staffing
increases. It may be that AB 1629 did not increase staffing as intended due to multiple
reasons.
First, the sunset date was originally 2008 leaving nursing homes with uncertainty
as to whether the higher reimbursement rates would continue. It is expensive to hire and
train additional staff only to have to potentially release them later because the new
reimbursement methodology would be halted. This may have quelled some of the nurse
staffing hiring. It may be best to stop the practice of establishing sunset dates for this
legislation. This would reduce uncertainty and give nursing homes more confidence to
make the investment in additional nurse staffing.
Second, the reimbursement rates were based on cost reports that were 18-24
months old. Therefore, it would take nursing homes this long before they saw any
returns on their nurse staffing increases. This time period may have been too long
especially considering the uncertainty outlined above. It may behoove policymakers to
use more recent cost data if possible. This would enable nursing homes to see a return on
their staffing investments much quicker thereby potentially prodding them to invest in
more nurse staffing.
The LDOA was designed as an incentive to reward nursing homes for hiring
additional staff (excluding contract and temporary agency) above and beyond their costs.
Nursing homes could earn up to 8% more than these costs, but the LDOA component
could not exceed 5% of the total reimbursement rate. These caps may have been too
prohibitive and complicated for nursing homes to hire additional nursing staff. One
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potential solution is to consider retaining the 8% of costs cap, but remove the 5% cap
on the total reimbursement rate. This may provide more incentive for nursing homes to
hire more nursing staff.
Nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased their total nurse
HPRD to approximately 3.5 HPRD (case-mix adjusted) which exceeded state’s minimum
nursing home nurse staffing requirement. Therefore, it appears that nursing homes highly
dependent on Medi-Cal took advantage of the more generous rates to increase nurse
staffing above and beyond the state’s minimum staffing requirements. It further appears
that they did this predominantly by hiring more LVN staff. These nursing homes may
not have previously been able to hire additional and more expensive profession nurse
staff considering that California was in the bottom 10% of Medicaid (Medi-Cal) nursing
home reimbursement rates prior to the implementation of the AB 1629 (California Health
Policy and Data Advisory Committee, 2005). It may also be the case that more specific
staffing goals needed to be established with the reimbursement rates tied to attainment.
For instance, maybe it is more desirable to hire RNs instead of LVNs meaning that future
Medi-Cal rates could potentially be tied to also having the appropriate nurse staffing mix.
Limitations of the Study
There were some important limitations in this study that need to be recognized.
First, this was a single state study thereby limiting generalizability to California. The
results are also only generalizable to the nursing homes that did not: provide sub-acute
care or care for the mentally or developmentally disabled; have a study year without
COSHPD data; change license type from/to a skilled nursing license; have missing case-
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mix information for any given year; fail to provide skilled nursing care to Medi-Cal
patients; have missing Medi-Cal revenue or Medi-Cal rates for any given study year; or
changed ownership or closed between 2002-2007. The final sample was also different
from the nursing home population in terms of nurse staffing, Medi-Cal days, case-mix,
slack, Medi-Cal dependence, and median per capita income. Second, only 2 years of data
were available post AB 1629 meaning that enough time may not have elapsed to observe
positive staffing increases. Third, gross Medi-Cal revenue was used to compute the
resource importance variable instead of net Medi-Cal revenue. Fourth, the COSHPD data
did not segregate skilled nursing care and intermediate care nursing hours. Fifth, there
was not a true comparison group in this study because the lowest dependence quartile had
exposure to AB 1629. Facilities without exposure to AB 1629 were not included in the
lowest dependence quartile because their case-mix variable was not available.
Suggestions for Future Research
An obvious extension to this study is to incorporate more post AB 1629 data and
potentially use forward orthogonal deviations instead of FD. Additional data years may
provide more opportunity to discern nurse staffing changes in response to AB 1629. The
forward orthogonal deviations procedure may also be an improvement versus this study’s
reliance on FD using the 2005 data.
AB 1629 had many other goals besides increasing SNF nurse staffing. More
specifically, the legislative intent was meant to effectively ensure individual access to
appropriate long-term care services, promote quality care, support provider compliance
with all applicable state and federal requirements, and encourage administrative
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efficiency. Each of these presents an opportunity to see if AB 1629 was positively
related to any of these goals. For instance, one study could examine if access for MediCal residents improved post AB 1629 due to higher Medi-Cal rates. Another potential
study could investigate if any of the NHC quality measures changed post AB 1629. A
different study could probe if OSCAR nursing home deficiencies decreased after AB
1629. All of these are potential studies could test whether a portion of AB 1629’s
legislative intent was met. AB 1629 also increased the reimbursement rate for sub-acute
care facilities. Therefore, staffing and quality studies examining subacute facilities is
another potential research avenue.
Examining nursing home competition using a variable radius, instead of a fixed
radius, for market competition is also intriguing. This type of research has been
conducted in the hospital empirical literature, but has yet to be studied in the nursing
home literature. There is opportunity here since the MDS lists the zip code of the nursing
home resident immediately before admission. This data could be used to determine each
nursing home’s individual market with competition measures calculated accordingly.
Research on what administrators and patients consider as their markets would be
important as well.
A study pertaining to staffing mix may also shed light on staffing changes spurred
by AB 1629. Perhaps nursing homes changed their professional staff mix or staff mix in
general in response to AB 1629. For instance, nursing homes may have decided to hire
more LVNs, but less NAs in an attempt to increase the quality of care. This topic would
make an interesting follow-up study.
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Surprisingly, there were over 313 CHOWs and 30 nursing home closures
during the study period. Future studies could examine these facilities in terms of quality
of care and access provided to Medi-Cal residents before and after a nursing home was
sold or closed. It would also be appealing to examine the CHOW trend to see if AB 1629
decreased these CHOWs and closures.
Conclusion
AB 1629 was an ambitious piece of legislature. It sought to improve nurse
staffing as a means of improving the quality of care among other honorable pursuits. The
first research question sought answers to whether or not nursing home nurse staffing
improved post AB 1629. In general, LVN and total nurse staffing HPRD increased post
AB 1629 as shown by the OLS regressions using different Medi-Cal quartiles as the
reference group.
The second research question specifically pertained to the highest Medi-Cal
dependence nursing homes. It was hypothesized that these nursing homes would increase
nurse staffing because the legislation benefited them the most. The results showed a
glimmer of evidence that nursing homes with the highest Medi-Cal dependence increased
LVN, NA, and total nurse staffing post AB 1629 thereby answering the second research
question and first hypothesis. However, since the support was provided by OLS
regression models, it is not particularly strong as the IV FD results failed to offer
statistically significant support for this question.
The third research question entailed an examination of organizational
characteristics and environmental factors that were thought to be related to nurse staffing.
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The second hypothesis which postulated that smaller bedded nursing homes would
increase nurse staffing greater than larger facilities post AB 1629 was not supported. The
third hypothesis, which speculated that increased slack resources would be positively
related to nurse staffing post AB 1629, was substantiated for NA and total nurse staffing.
The fourth hypothesis which involved nursing home bed competition was not supported,
but the fifth hypothesis illustrated that higher resource munificence in terms of a higher
percentage of the population over the age of 85 was related to more NA staffing.
The final research question involved ALF and HHA competition expecting it to
be positively related to increased nurse staffing. Increased HHA competition was
positively related to greater LVN HPRD in 15 mile markets thereby showing some
support for hypothesis four. However, ALF and HHA competition was not statistically
significant for the remaining regressions.
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Table A1
Variable Comparison of Final Sample and Excluded Facilities, 2002-2004, 2006-2007

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Registered Nurse hours per
Resident Day HPRD, casemix adjusted.

2,835

0.27

0.16

1,935

0.32

0.30

3.68

.0002

Licensed Vocational Nurse
HRPD, case-mix adjusted.

2,835

0.74

0.22

1,935

0.73

0.70

2.32

0.0204

Nurse Aide HPRD,
case-mix adjusted.

2,835

2.41

0.47

1,935

2.49

2.02

0.91

0.3603

Total Nurse HPRD,
case-mix adjusted.

2,835

3.33

0.59

1,935

3.54

2.80

1.70

.0893

Acuity Index, 2002
base year.

2,835

1.01

0.17

2,121

1.05

0.33

-0.61

0.541

Total skilled nursing and
intermediate care days.*

2,835

32.27

14.63

2,180

29.05

17.35

-3.24

0.0012
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Table A1 - continued

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

Beds

2,835

99.40

44.87

2,224

104.63

52.10

1.72

0.0859

Slack

2,835

0.08

0.47

2,171

-0.06

1.51

-3.53

0.0004

Medi-Cal Revenue

2,835

0.61

0.20

2,175

0.46

0.27

-10.24

1.61800E-23

Dependence - 15 Mile
Market (MM)

2,835

0.41

0.15

2,175

0.31

0.19

-10.04

1.06200E-22

Dependence - 25 MM

2,835

0.41

0.15

2,175

0.31

0.19

9.92

3.31400E-22

Nursing Home Competition 15 MM

2,835

0.07

0.13

2,224

0.07

0.15

0.64

0.5204

Nursing Home Competition 25 MM

2,835

0.04

0.08

2,224

0.04

0.11

0.93

0.3532

Assisted Living Facility
(ALF) Bed Competition - 15
MM**

2,835

.76

.56

2,224

.75

.53

-.34

0.7314

ALF Bed Competition - 25
MM**

2,835

1.56

1.16

2,224

1.55

1.11

-.10

0.9218

Home Health Agency (HHA)
Visit Competition - 15 MM**

2,835

3.59

3.28

2,224

3.36

2.92

-1.24

0.2152
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Table A1-continued

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

HHA Visit Competition 25 MM**

2,835

6.96

6.15

2,224

6.79

5.77

-.44

0.6618

MCAL Concentration
15 MM

2,835

0.67

0.07

2,210

0.66

0.08

2.38

0.0175

MCAL Concentration
25 MM

2,835

0.67

0.06

2,211

0.67

0.06

0.71

0.4748

Income*, ***

2,835

40.54

9.44

2,224

41.63

10.82

1.73

0.0835

Population

2,835

1.41

0.28

2,224

1.43

0.30

0.92

0.3556

Medi-Cal Rate

2,835

138.11

17.50

2,066

138.01

17.00

0.13

0.8975

RN Wages - 15 MM

2,835

32.60

2.89

2,179

32.96

2.85

2.30

0.0214

RN Wages - 25 MM*

2,835

32.73

2.58

2,179

32.86

2.65

0.90

0.3678

LVN Wages - 15 MM*

2,835

24.90

3.05

2,180

24.99

2.94

0.49

0.6232

LVN Wages - 25 MM*

2,835

24.92

2.85

2,180

24.98

2.80

0.35

0.7246

NA Wages - 15 MM*

2,835

11.97

1.70

2,180

12.13

1.65

1.47

0.1415
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Table A1-continued

Sample
N

Sample
Mean

Sample
St. Dev.

Excluded
N

Excluded
Mean

Excluded
St. Dev.

t
Statistics

P Values

NA Wages - 25 MM*

2,835

12.01

1.61

2,180

12.09

1.59

0.74

0.4607

Unemployment Rate

2,835

6.21

1.82

2,224

6.16

1.74

0.46

0.6432

Note. *Variable is converted to December 2007 real dollars; **Variable scaled by 10,000; ***Variable scaled by 1,000.
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Table A2. Correlation Matrix of Independent and Control Variables
post de~15 de~15 de~15 de~25 de~2 de~2 po~15 po~1 po~15 po~25 po~25 po~25
_q1
_q2 _q3 _q1 5_q2 5_q3 _q1 5_q2 _q3 _q1 _q2
_q3
post

1.00

depend~15_q1 .00
depend~15_q2 .00
depend~15_q3 .00
depend~25_q1 .00
depend~25_q2 .00
depend~25_q3 .00
post_d~15_q1 .41
post_d~15_q2 .41
post_d~15_q3 .41
post_d~25_q1 .41
post_d~25_q2 .41
post_d~25_q3 .41
beds_q1
.00
beds_q2
-.01
beds_q3
.01
post_beds_q1 .41
post_beds_q2 .39
post_beds_q3 .42
slack
.08
post_slack
.20
nh_hhi15
.00
nh_hhi25
.00
alf_beds15
.04
alf_beds25
.05
hha_visits15 .03
hha_visits25
0.04
income
0.17
population
0.24
mcal_rate
0.53
wages_rn_15 0.26
wages_lvn_15 0.10
wages_aid~15 -0.04
wages_rn_25 0.27
wages_lvn_25 0.10

1.00
-.33
-.33
.93
-.27
-.33
.58
-.19
-.19
.54
-.15
-.19
-.03
-.04
-.01
-.02
-.02
-.01
.07
.07
.00
-.02
-.08
-.13
-.14
-0.16
0.20
0.11
0.28
0.16
0.15
0.25
0.14
0.14

wages_aid~25 -0.05

0.23

unemploy_r~e -0.41

1.00
-.33
-.27
.82
-.22
-.19
.58
-.19
-.15
.47
-.13
-.12
.09
.03
-.07
.05
.02
.03
.03
-.02
-.03
.01
.02
.00
0.02
0.06
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.07

1.00
-.33
-.22
.80
-.19
-.19
.58
-.19
-.13
.46
-.02
.02
-.01
-.01
.02
-.01
.00
-.03
.01
-.01
-.01
.02
.00
0.03
-0.07
-0.03
-0.10
-0.06
-0.06
-0.06
-0.04
-0.05

0.06 -0.06

-0.20 -0.08

1.00
-.33
-.33
.54
-.15
-.19
.58
-.19
-.19
-.03
-.03
.01
-.02
-.02
.01
.06
.08
.01
-.02
-.10
-.14
-.15
-0.17
0.21
0.13
0.30
0.17
0.18
0.27
0.16
0.18

1.00
-.33
-.15
.47
-.13
-.19
.58
-.19
-.12
.06
.04
-.07
.03
.02
.06
.04
-.01
-.03
.01
.02
.00
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.03

1.00
-.19
-.13
.46
-.19
-.19
.58
.00
.02
-.02
.00
.01
-.01
-.02
-.05
-.02
-.03
.02
.04
.02
0.04
-0.03
0.00
-0.09
-0.02
-0.04
-0.03
-0.03
-0.04

1.00
-.11
-.11
.94
-.06
-.11
-.01
-.03
.00
.14
.13
.16
.10
.19
.00
-.01
-.03
-.05
-.08
-0.08
0.20
0.16
0.52
0.19
0.13
0.12
0.18
0.13

0.25 0.03 -0.05

0.11

1.00
-.11
-.06
.85
-.02
-.07
.05
.02
.06
.23
.20
.06
.12
-.01
-.02
.02
.03
.01
0.03
0.11
0.15
0.25
0.14
0.08
0.02
0.14
0.08

1.00
-.11 1.00
-.02 -.11 1.00
.84
-.11 -.11
-.01 -.01 -.07
.01
-.02
.03
.00
.01
.03
.15
.14
.06
.18
.14
.21
.16
.18
.21
.01
.11
.07
.04
.19
.14
.00
.01
.00
.00
-.01 -.02
.01
-.04
.02
.03
-.06
.03
.01
-.08
.01
0.03 -0.09 0.03
0.03 0.20 0.08
0.08 0.18 0.12
0.09 0.54 0.22
0.09 0.20 0.11
0.01 0.14 0.05
-0.05 0.13 -0.01
0.10 0.19 0.14
0.01 0.14 0.06

0.02 -0.05

1.00
.00
.01
-.01
.17
.18
.15
-.01
.01
-.01
-.02
.03
.04
.03
0.04
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.01
-0.03
0.10
0.02

0.12

0.00 -0.04

0.01 -0.18 -0.09 0.01 -0.26 -0.21 -0.17 -0.25

-0.21 -0.17
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beds_q beds_ beds_ post_ post_ post_ slack post_s~ nh_h nh_hh alf_h~ alf_h~
1
q2
q3 b~1 b~2 b~3
k
hi15 i25
15
25
post
depend~15_q1
depend~15_q2
depend~15_q3
depend~25_q1
depend~25_q2
depend~25_q3
post_d~15_q1
post_d~15_q2
post_d~15_q3
post_d~25_q1
post_d~25_q2
post_d~25_q3
beds_q1
beds_q2

1.00
-0.32

1.00

beds_q3
post_beds_q1

-0.34 -0.33 1.00
0.58 -0.19 -0.20 1.00

post_beds_q2

-0.18

post_beds_q3
slack

-0.20 -0.19 0.58 -0.11 -0.11 1.00
-0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04

0.57 -0.19 -0.11 1.00
1.00

post_slack
nh_hhi15

-0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.66
0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03

1.00
-0.01

1.00

nh_hhi25
alf_beds15

0.00 -0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.02
-0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.09

-0.01
0.03

0.82 1.00
-0.51 -0.44

1.00

alf_beds25

-0.02

0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.09

0.04

-0.50 -0.45

0.95

1.00

hha_visits15
hha_visits25

-0.05
-.03

0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.02
.09 -.03 .00 .07 .00

0.10
.10

0.04
.03

-0.44 -0.37
-.44 -.39

0.94
.93

0.92
.98

income
population

0.04
0.03

0.02 -0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.00
0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.00

0.06
0.06

-0.20 -0.23 0.20 0.20
0.21 0.14 -0.11 -0.10

mcal_rate

-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 0.19 0.20

0.03

0.15

0.08

0.04

-0.30 -0.33

wages_rn_15
wages_lvn_15

0.03
0.06

0.00 -0.08 0.11 0.11 0.08 -0.05
-0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.07

0.03
0.01

-0.19 -0.21 -0.02 -0.03
0.04 -0.03 -0.20 -0.22

wages_aid~15
wages_rn_25

0.06
0.06

-0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10
-0.01 -0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09 -0.05

-0.03
0.04

0.00 -0.06 -0.31 -0.34
-0.13 -0.20 -0.07 -0.07

wages_lvn_25
wages_aid~25

0.07
0.07

-0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.06
-0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10

0.02
-0.02

0.05 -0.02 -0.22 -0.23
0.04 -0.05 -0.34 -0.36

unemploy_r~e

0.03

-0.06 0.05 -0.16 -0.20 -0.13 -0.03

-0.10

0.24

0.30

-0.30 -0.30
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hha_h hha_ income popula~ mcal_~t wa~rn wa~v wag~ wa~r wa~v wag~ unem
~15 h~25
n
e
_15 n_15 s_15 n_25 n_25 s_25 pl~e
post
depend~15_q1
depend~15_q2
depend~15_q3
depend~25_q1
depend~25_q2
depend~25_q3
post_d~15_q1
post_d~15_q2
post_d~15_q3
post_d~25_q1
post_d~25_q2
post_d~25_q3
beds_q1
beds_q2
beds_q3
post_beds_q1
post_beds_q2
post_beds_q3
slack
post_slack
nh_hhi15
nh_hhi25
alf_beds15
alf_beds25
hha_visits15

1.00

hha_visits25

0.72 1.00

income

-0.22 -0.32

1.00

population

0.20 0.15

0.51

1.00

mcal_rate

0.13 0.11

0.51

0.38

1.00

wages_rn_15

-0.16 -0.18

0.61

0.35

0.58

1.00

wages_lvn_15

0.10 0.04

0.65

0.46

0.58

0.81 1.00

wages_aid~15

0.08 0.05

0.64

0.42

0.60

0.75 0.86 1.00

wages_rn_25

-0.05 -0.15

0.61

0.39

0.59

0.91 0.81 0.75 1.00

wages_lvn_25

0.12 0.05

0.63

0.48

0.58

0.80 0.97 0.86 0.85 1.00

wages_aid~25

0.15 0.06

0.61

0.44

0.58

0.71 0.85 0.96 0.78 0.88 1.00

unemploy_r~e

0.26 0.34

-0.52

-0.41

-0.31

-0.36 -0.19 -0.26 -0.39 -0.18 -0.25 1.00
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Table A3
First-Differenced Results Using 15 Mile Markets

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Post AB 1629

0.013
(0.097)

-0.009
(0.014)

0.033
(0.038)

0.037
(0.049)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.052
(0.097)

0.122***
(0.036)

0.135
(0.173)

0.216
(0.264)

Beds - Q2

0.006
(0.037)

0.091***
(0.021)

0.214**
(0.096)

0.317***
(0.114)

Beds - Q2

0.027
(0.041)

0.057***
(0.016)

0.123
(0.083)

0.218**
(0.101)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q1

0.012
(0.011)

-0.018
(0.015)

0.025
(0.039)

0.02
(0.051)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q2

0.000
(0.011)

-0.02
(0.014)

-0.019
(0.038)

-0.04
(0.050)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q3

0.006
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.012)

-0.001
(0.031)

-0.004
(0.042)

Slack

-0.021**
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.011)

-0.074***
(0.021)

-0.104***
(0.028)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.001
(0.012)

0.01
(0.012)

0.055**
(0.024)

0.066**
(0.030)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q1

0.012
(0.012)

0.029*
(0.018)

0.011
(0.045)

0.052
(0.060)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

0.002
(0.010)

0.016
(0.014)

-0.033
(0.039)

-0.015
(0.050)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

0.016*
(0.010)

0.024*
(0.014)

-0.024
(0.037)

-0.016
(0.046)

Variables
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Table A3 - continued

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Nursing Home
Competition

0.107
(0.202)

0.033
(0.080)

0.334*
(0.202)

0.571
(0.380)

Assisted Living
Facility Competition

-0.068
(0.058)

0.118*
(0.069)

0.077
(0.170)

0.104
(0.223)

Home Health Agency
Competition

-0.002
(0.006)

0.017**
(0.008)

0.017
(0.022)

0.032
(0.029)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.003
(0.003)

0.000
(0.004)

0.007
(0.013)

0.010
(0.017)

Percentage Population
> 85

0.068
(0.084)

-0.101
(0.111)

0.535**
(0.268)

0.483
(0.352)

Registered Nurse (RN)
Wages

-0.005**
(0.002)

-

-

0.004
(0.011)

Unemployment Rate

0.006
(0.005)

0.002
(0.007)

-0.016
(0.018)

-0.007
(0.023)

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000

0.000
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.008*
(0.004)

-

-0.024
(0.016)

Nurse Aides (NA)
Wages

-

-

-0.056*
(0.032)

-0.063
(0.039)

-0.005
(0.004)

0.024***
(0.006)

-0.026*
(0.013)

-0.007
(0.019)

Observations

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

R-squared

0.022

0.010

0.011

0.012

Variables

Medi-Cal Rate

Constant

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A4
First-Differenced Results Using 25 Mile Markets

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Post AB 1629

0.013
(0.010)

-0.010
(0.014)

0.03o
(0.038)

0.032
(0.049)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.051
(0.094)

0.119***
(0.037)

0.127
(0.174)

0.190
(0.268)

Beds - Q2

0.011
(0.035)

0.090***
(0.021)

0.213**
(0.096)

0.307***
(0.118)

Beds - Q2

0.035
(0.038)

0.056***
(0.016)

0.12
(0.084)

0.208*
(0.108)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q1

0.013
(0.011)

-0.019
(0.015)

0.022
(0.039)

0.013
(0.050)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q2

0.000
(0.010)

-0.019
(0.014)

-0.019
(0.038)

-0.04
(0.050)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q3

0.006
(0.009)

-0.008
(0.012)

-0.001
(0.031)

-0.007
(0.041)

Slack

-0.022**
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.011)

-0.073***
(0.021)

-0.104***
(0.028)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.001
(0.012)

0.010
(0.012)

0.054**
(0.024)

0.066**
(0.031)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q1

0.015
(0.011)

0.031*
(0.018)

0.043
(0.045)

0.086
(0.059)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

0.001
(0.010)

0.018
(0.015)

-0.045
(0.039)

-0.026
(0.049)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

0.013
(0.010)

0.030**
(0.014)

0.001
(0.037)

-0.019
(0.045)

Variables

237
Table A4 - continued

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Nursing Home
Competition

0.203
(0.530)

0.681**
(0.322)

0.179
(1.188)

1.237
(1.668)

Assisted Living
Facility Competition

-0.054
(0.037)

0.038
(0.054)

-0.091
(0.126)

-0.116
(0.168)

Home Health Agency
Competition

-0.002
(0.004)

0.007
(0.005)

0.004
(0.014)

0.008
(0.019)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.003
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.004)

0.005
(0.013)

0.007
(0.016)

Percentage Population
> 85

0.086
(0.084)

-0.084
(0.115)

0.625**
(0.278)

0.658**
(0.364)

Registered Nurse
(RN) Wages

-0.003
(0.002)

-

-

0.021
(0.015)

Unemployment Rate

0.007
(0.005)

0.003
(0.007)

-0.015
(0.019)

-0.005
(0.025)

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.005
(0.006)

-

0.037*
(0.022)

Nurse Aides (NA)
Wages

-

-

-0.056
(0.040)

-0.056
(0.049)

-0.006
(0.004)

0.024***
(0.006)

-0.024*
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.020)

Observations

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

R-squared

0.020

0.009

0.011

0.013

Variables

Medi-Cal Rate

Constant

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A5
First-Differenced Results Using County as the Market

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Post AB 1629

0.012
(0.010)

-0.006
(0.014)

0.033
(0.038)

0.033
(0.048)

Beds - Quartile (Q) 1

-0.051
(0.093)

0.121***
(0.037)

0.116
(0.173)

0.19
(0.265)

Beds - Q2

0.01
(0.034)

0.094***
(0.021)

0.204**
(0.095)

0.305***
(0.114)

Beds - Q2

0.038
(0.036)

0.054***
(0.017)

0.111
(0.083)

0.198*
(0.103)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q1

0.011
(0.011)

-0.018
(0.016)

0.02
(0.040)

0.012
(0.052)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q2

0.001
(0.011)

-0.018
(0.014)

-0.017
(0.038)

-0.033
(0.049)

Post AB 1629 Beds
Q3

0.006
(0.009)

-0.007
(0.012)

-0.002
(0.031)

-0.002
(0.041)

Slack

-0.022**
(0.010)

-0.008
(0.011)

-0.071***
(0.021)

-0.102***
(0.028)

Post AB 1629 Slack

0.003
(0.012)

0.01
(0.012)

0.053**
(0.024)

0.066**
(0.031)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q1a

0.015
(0.012)

0.023
(0.017)

0.024
(0.046)

0.06
(0.060)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q2

-0.007
(0.010)

0.021
(0.016)

-0.048
(0.039)

-0.034
(0.050)

Post AB 1629
Dependence Q3

0.003
(0.009)

0.028**
(0.014)

0.019
(0.036)

-0.043
(0.044)

Variables
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Table A5 - continued

RN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

LVN Hrs. Per
Resident Day

NA Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Total Nurse
Hrs. Per
Resident Day

Nursing Home
Competition

1.550***
(0.240)

0.502*
(0.263)

1.293*
(0.779)

3.335***
(0.955)

Assisted Living
Facility Competition

-0.067
(0.046)

0.066
(0.073)

-0.052
(0.175)

-0.082
(0.237)

Home Health Agency
Competition

0.000
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.005)

0.016
(0.012)

-0.018
(0.015)

Median Per Capita
Income

0.002
(0.003)

0.000
(0.004)

0.007
(0.014)

0.01
(0.017)

Percentage Population
> 85

0.073
(0.083)

-0.083
(0.117)

0.639**
(0.294)

0.604
(0.387)

Registered Nurse
(RN) Wages

-0.002
(0.003)

-

-

0.001
(0.014)

Unemployment Rate

0.006
(0.005)

0.006
(0.007)

-0.007
(0.018)

0.000
(0.024)

0.000
0.000

0.001
0.000

0.000
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

Licensed Vocational
Nurse (LVN) Wages

-

-0.007
(0.006)

-

0.036*
(0.019)

Nurse Aides (NA)
Wages

-

-

-0.052
(0.033)

-0.035
(0.039)

-0.004
(0.005)

0.028***
(0.007)

-0.008
(0.014)

-0.032
(0.025)

Observations

2,268

2,268

2,268

2,268

R-squared

0.023

0.01

0.013

0.015

Variables

Medi-Cal Rate

Constant

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
a
Quartile 1 represents the lowest Medi-Cal dependence quartile in the table.

240

VITA

Matthew Krauchunas was born in Blue Island, Illinois on July 25, 1971. He
graduated from John Hersey High School a year early in 1988 and joined the United
States Air Force as Telephone and Data Circuitry Specialist in 1989. He rose to the rank
of Staff Sergeant until being commissioned as a Medical Service Corps First Lieutenant
in July 2000. He has been part of many military operations throughout his career
including DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, and
ENDURING FREEDOM. He has received an Associate in Applied Science, Electronic
Systems Technology from the Community College of the Air Force in 1996, a Bachelor
of Science in Health Care Management in 1996 from the University of Maryland
University College, and a Master of Science, Health Services Administration in 1999
from Central Michigan University. He was selected by the Air Force to obtain a Ph.D. in
Health Services Organization and Research in 2006 and began classes at VCU in 2007.
He is currently an instructor at the United States’ Army Baylor MHA program. He is
married to Melanie Krauchunas and has six children: Tanner, Caleb, Adeline, Alexia,
William, and Evie.

